EARLY 

LAST  YEAR  OF  THZ  ;AR  FOR  INDEPENDENCE 
IN  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


A.    MEMOIR 


THE   LAST  YEAR 


OF  THK 


FOR  INDEPENDENCE, 


IN  THK 

CONFEDERATE    STATES  .OF  AMERICA, 

CONTAINING 

\N  ACCOUNT    OF    THE   OPERATIONS    OF    HIS  COMMANDS 
IN  THE  YEARS  1864  AND  18G5, 


LIEUTEXAXY-GENERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY, 

HE   PROVISIONAL   ARMY  OF  THE  CONl-'KDKKAT  E  STATED. 


I)  B  1 1  I  0  A  T  !•;  I  > 

itjt  iftUmors  of  tfjt  ^.t.-cic  Stair,  Snljo  fjcll  fi'afctinjg  for  litcrtj,  JRigljt  &  Jusiitt. 


DEO   VINDICE." 


PUBLISHED    BY  CIIAftLES  W.  BUTTOX, 

[A  MEMORIAL   A58OC]  *. 

1    H   G  7  . 


A.    MEMOIR 


OF 


FHE   LAST  YEAR 


OF  TllK 


WAR  FOR  INDEPENDENCE, 


IN  THE 

CONFEDERATE    STATES    OF  AMERICA, 

CONTAINING 

AN   ACCOUNT   OF    THE   OPERATIONS    OF    HIS    COMMANDS 
1\  THE  YEARS  1864  AND  1865, 


LIEUTENANT-GEKERAL  JUBAL  A.  EARLY, 

OF  THE  PROVISIONAL  ARMY  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES. 


DEDICATED 

t{)t  jHtmorj  of  t${  ?9.f rou  StaJ),  bf)o  tell  fi^ttt'njj  for  liitrtj,  3£tiflf)t  ^  3usti«. 


VINDICE." 


PUBLISHED   BY  CHARLES  W.  BUTTOX, 

1867. 


BTT     THE 


Tlie  author  of  this  work,  having  generously  placed  it  ut  the  disposal  of  the 
of  Virginia, — engaged  in  the  pious  task  of  collecting  the  re- 
mains of  the  Southern  iia  battle-tields,  with  the  view  of 
enclosing  ami  mttrking  their  graves, — it  is  published  at  the  lowe-t  possible  cost, 
for  the  purpose  of  raising  funds  for  this  praise-worthy  object.  All  the  profits 
arising  from  the  sale  of  the  work  will  be  sacredly  appropriated  to  the  end  in  view- 
In  a  letter  to  tho  publisher  On.  Early  Bays  :  "  iVrhaps  1  might  have  made  some- 
thing by  a  sale  of  the  wi>rk  :  but  I  wantfd  to  kc-'p  clonr  of  nil  suspicion  of  writ 
ing  a  book  for  iin-iii-y."  He  add*:  it  is  worthy  oi' 
republication.  One  thing  is  certain — it  contains  the  truth."  And  nobody  why 
knows  Jubal  A.  Early  as  we  know  him,  will  question  his  veracity. 

Apart  from  the  intrinsic  merits  of  the  work, — as  a  valuable  contribution  to  the 
history  of  the  late  war — revealing  facts  c<>;  tb  n  <-:u;ipaign  that  has  not 

been  understood  <-\TH  by  our  own  penplr,  ;  ;i.at  iln-  hnidable  object  of 

those  who  have  inrurred  t:  •>!'  I'-pulili-lniig  it,  will  secure  for  this  pro- 

duction of  a  gallant  and  meritorious  officer  an  extended  sale. 


E: 

tt 

E/ 


P  K  E  F  A  C  E  . 

X 

Under  a  solemn  sense  of  duty  to  my  unhappy  country,  and 
to  the  brave  soldiers  who  fought  under  me,  as  well  as  to  my- 
self, the  following  pages  have  been  written. 

When  the  question  of  practical  secession  from  the  United 
States  arose,  as  a  citizen  of  the  State  of  Virginia,  and  a 
member  of  the  Convention  called  by  the  authority  of  the  Leg- 
islature of  that  State,  I  opposed  secession  with  all  the  ability  I 
possessed,  with  the  hope  that  the  horrors  of  civil  war  might  be 
averted,  and  that  a  returning  sense  of  duty  and  justice  on  the 
part  of  the  masses  of  the  Northern  States,  would  induce  them 
to  respect  the  rights  of  the  people  of  the  South.  While  some 
Northern  politicians  and  editors,  who  subsequently  took  rank 
among  the  most  unscrupulous  and  vindictive  of  our  enemies, 
and  now  hold  me  to  be  a  traitor  and  rebel,  were  openly  and 
sedulously  justifying  and  encouraging  secession,  I  was  la- 
boring honestly  and  earnestly  to  preserve  the  Union. 

As  a  member  of  the  Virginia  Convention,  I  voted  against 
the  ordinance  of  secession  on  its  passage  by  that  body,  with 
the  hope  that,  even  then,  the  collision  of  arms  might  be  avoided, 
and  some  satisfactory  adjustment  arrived  at.  The  adoption  of 
that  ordinance  wrung  from  me  bitter  tears  of  grief;  but  I  at 
once  recognized  my  duty  to  abide  the  decision  of  my  native 
State,  and  to  defend  her  soil  against  invasion.  Any  scruples 
which  I  may  have  entertained  as  to  the  right  of  secession, 
were  soon  dispelled  by  the  mad,  wicked,  and  unconstitutional 
measures  of  the  authorities  at  Washington,  and  the  frenzied 
clamour  of  the  people  of  the  North  for  war  upon  their  former 
brethren  of  the  South.  I  then,  and  ever  since  have,  regarded 
Abraham  Lincoln,  his  counsellors  and  supporters,  as  tho  real 

785529 


iv  PREFACE. 

traitors  who  had  overthrown  the  constitution  and  government 
of  the  United  States,  and  established  in  lieu  thereof  an  odious 
despotism:  and  this  opinion  I  entered  on  the  journal  of  the 
Convention  when  I  signed  the  ordinance  of  secession.  T 
recognized  the  right  of  resistance  and  revolution  as  exercised 

.~~  ~ 

by  our  fathers  in  1770,  and,  without  cavil  as  to  the.  name  by 
which  it  was  called,  I  entered  the  military  service  of  my  State, 
willingly,  cheerfully,  and  zealously. 

When  the  State  <>f  Virginia  became  one  of  the  Confederate 
States,  and  her  troops  were  turned  over  to  the  Confederate 
Government,  I  embraced  the  cause  of  the  whole  Confederacy 
with  equal  ardour,  and  continued  in  the  service,  with  the  de- 
termination to  devote  all  the  energy  and  talent  I  possessed  to 
the  common  defence.  I  fought  through  the  entire  war,  without 
once  regretting  the  course  1  had  pursued;  with  an  abiding 
faith  in  the  justice  of  our  cause  :  and  I  never  saw  the  moment 
when  I  would  ha\e  !»een  willing  to  consent  to  any  compromise 
or  settlement  short  of  the  absolute  independence  of  my 
country. 

It  was  my  fortune  to  participate  in  most  of  the  great  military 
operations  in  which  the  army  in  Virginia  wa>  engaged,  both 
liefore  and  alter  (Jeneral  Lee  a>>umed  the  command.  In  the 
last  year  of  this  momentous  struggle,  1  commanded,  at  differ- 
ent times,  a  division  and  two  corp>  <>!'  (Jeneral  Lee's  Army,  in 
the  campaign  from  the  liapidan  to  James  River,  and,  suhsc- 
(pienth.  a  separate  force  which  marched  into  Maryland, 
threatened  Washington  City,  and  then  went  through  an  event- 
ful campaign  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia.  Xo  detailed  reports 
of  the  operations  of  these  different  commands  were  made 
before  the  dose  of  the  war.  and  the  campaign  in  Maryland 
and  the  Valley  of  Virginia  ha>  been  the  subject  of  much  com- 
ment and  misapprehension.  I  have  now  written  a  narrative  of 
the  operations  of  all  my  commands  during  the  closing  year  of 
the  war,  and  lay  it  before  the  world  as  a  contribution  to  the 
history  of  our  great  struggle  for  independence.  In  giving  that 
narrative,  1  have  made  such  statements  of  the  positions  and 
strength  of  the  opposing  forces  in  Virginia,  and  such  reference 
to  their  general  operations,  as  were  necessary  to  enable  the 


PREPACK.  v 

reader  to  understand  it ;  but  I  do  not  pretend  to  detail  the 
operations  of  other  commanders. 

I  have  not  found  it  necessary  to  be  guilty  of  the  injustice  of 
attempting  to  pull  down  the  reputation  of  any  of  my  fellow 
officers,  in  order  to  build  up  my  own.  My  operations  and  my 
campaign  stand  on  their  own  merits,  whatever  they  may  be. 
Nor,  in  anything  I  may  have  found  it  necessary  to  say  in  regard 
to  the  conduct  of  my  troops,  do  I  wish  to  be  understood  as,  in 
way,  decrying  the  soldiers  who  constituted  the  rank  and  file  of 
my  commands.  I  believe  that  the  world  has  never  produced  a 
body  of  men  superior,  in  courage,  patriotism,  and  endurance, 
to  the  private  soldiers  of  the  Confederate  armies.  I  have 
repeatedly  seen  those  soldiers  submit,  with  cheerfulness,  to 
privations  and  hardships  which  would  appear  to  be  almost 
incredible ;  and  the  wild  cheers  of  our  brave  men,  (which  were 
so  different  from  the  studied  hurrahs  of  the  Yankees,)  when 
their  thin  lines  sent  back  opposing  hosts  of  Federal  troops, 
staggering,  reeling,  and  flying,  have  often  thrilled  every  fibre 
in  my  heart.  I  have  seen,  with  my  own  eyes,  ragged,  bare- 
footed, and  hungry  Confederate  soldiers  perform  deeds,  which, 
if  performed  in  days  of  yore  by  mailed  warriours  in  glittering 
armour,  would  have  inspired  the  harp  of  the  minstrel  and  the 
pen  of  the  poet. 

I  do  not  aspire  to  the  character  of  a  historian,  but,  having 
been  a  witness  of  and  participator  in  great  events,  I  have  given 
a  statement  of  what  I  saw  and  did,  for  the  use  of  the  future 
historian.  Without  breaking  the  thread  of  my  narrative,  as  it 
proceeds,  I  have  given,  in  notes,  comments  on  some  of  the 
errors  and  inconsistencies  committed  by  the  commander  of  the 
Federal  army,  General  Grant,  and  the  Federal  Secretary  of 
War,  Mr.  Stanton,  in  their  reports  made  since  the  close  of  the 
war;  also  some  instances  of  cruelty  and  barbarity  committed 
by  the  Federal  commanders,  "which  were  brought  to  my  im- 
mediate attention,  as  well  as  some  other  matters  of  interest. 

As  was  to  have  been  expected,  our  enemies  have  flooded  the 
press  with  sketches  and  histories,  in  which  all  the  appliances  of 
a  meretricious  literature  have  been  made  use  of,  to  glorify 
their  own  cause  and  its  supporters,  and  to  blacken  ours.  But 


vi  P  R  E  F  A  C  K  . 

some  Southern  writers  also,  who  preferred  the  peii  to  the  sword 
or  musket,  have  not  been  able  to  resist  the  temptation  to  rush 
into  print;  and,  accordingly,  carping  criticisms  have  been 
written  by  the  light  of  after  events,  and  even  histories  of  tin- 
war  attempted  by  persons,  who  imagined  that  the  distinctness 
of  their  vision  was  enhanced  by  distance  iVom  the  scene  of 
conflict,  and  an  exemption  from  the  disturbing  elements  of 
whistling  bullets  and  bursting  shells.  Perhaps  other  writers 
of  the  same  class  may  follow,  and  various  speculations  be 
indulged  in,  as  to  the  causes  of  our  di-aster<.  As  for  myself,  I 
have  not  undertaken  to  speculate  as  to  the  causes  of  our  failure, 
as  I  have  seen  abundant  reason  for  it  in  the  tremendous  odds 
brought  against  ns.  Having  had  some  means  of  judging,  I 
will,  however,  say  that,  in  my  opinion,  both  President  Davis 
and  General  Lee,  in  their  respective  spheres,  did  all  for  the 
success  of  our  cause  which  it  was  po»ible  for  mortal  men  to 
do  ;  and  it  is  a  great  privilege  and  comfort  for  me  so  to  believe, 
and  to  have  been  able  to  bring  with  me  into  exile  a  profound 
love  and  veneration  for  those  great  men. 

In  regard  to  my  own  services,  all  I  have  to  say  is,  that  1 
have  the  consciousness  of  having  done  my  duty  to  my  country, 
to  the  very  best  of  my  ability,  and,  whatever  may  be  my  fate, 
I  would  not  exchange  that  consciousness  for  untold  millions. 
I  have  come  into  exile  rather  than  submit  to  the  yoke  of  the 
oppressors  of  my  country ;  but  I  have  never  thought  of  attrib- 
uting aught  of  blame  or  censure  to  those  true  men  who,  after 
having  nobly  done  their  duty  in  the  dreadful  struggle  through 
which  we  passed,  now,  that  it  has  gone  against  us,  remain  to 
share  the  misfortunes  of  their  people,  and  to  aid  and  comfort 
them  in  their  trials;  on  the  contrary,  I  appreciate  and  honour 
their  motives.  I  have  not  sought  refuge  in  another  land  from 
insensibility  to  the  wrongs  and  sufferings  of  my  own  countrv: 
but  I  feel  deeply  and  continually  for  them,  and  could  my  life 
secure  the  redemption  of  that  country,  as  it  has  been  often 
risked,  so  now  it  would  be  as  freely  given  for  that  object. 

There  were  men  born  and  nurtured  in  the  Southern  States, 
and  some  of  them  in  my  own  State,  who  took  sides  with  our 
enemies,  and  aided  in  desolating  and  humiliating  the  laud  of 


PREFACE.  vii 

their  own  birth,  and  of  the  graves  of  their  ancestors.  Some 
of  them  rose  to  high  positions  in  the  United  States  Army,  and 
others  to  high  civil  positions.  I  envy  them  not  their  dearly 
bought  prosperity.  I  had  rather  be  the  humblest  private  sol- 
dier who  fought  in  the  ranks  of  the  Confederate  Army,  and 
now,  maimed  and  disabled,  hobbles  on  his  crutches  from  house 
to  house,  to  receive  his  daily  bread  from  the  hands  of  the 
grateful  women  for  whose  homes  he  fought,  than  the  highest 
of  those  renegades  and  traitors.  Let  them  enjoy  the  advant- 
ages of  their  present  positions  as  best  they  may !  for  the  deep 
and  bitter  execrations  of  an  entire  people  now  attend  them, 
and  an  immortality  of  infamy  awaits  them.  As  for  all  the 
enemies  who  have  overrun  or  aided  in  overrunning  my  country, 
there  is  a  wide  and  impassable  gulf  between  us,  in  which  I  see 
the  blood  of  slaughtered  friends,  comrades,  and  countrymen, 
\\iiich  all  the  waters  in  the  firmament  above  and  the  sea* 
beneath  cannot  wash  away.  Those  enemies  have  undertaken 
to  render  our  cause  odious  and  infamous;  and  among  other 
atrocities  committed  by  them  in  the  effort  to  do  so,  an  humble 
subordinate,  poor  AYirz,  has  been  selected  as  a  victim  to  a 
fiendish  spirit,  and  basely  murdered  under  an  executive  edict, 
founded  on  the  sentence  of  a  vindictive  and  illegal  tribunal. 
Let  them  continue  this  system  !  they  are  but  erecting  monu- 
ments to  their  own  eternal  dishonour,  and  furnishing  finger 
jiosts  to  guide  the  historian  in  his  researches.  They  may 
employ  the  infamous  Holt,  with  his  ''Bureau  of  Military  .Jus- 
tice," to  sacrifice  other  victims  on  the  altars  of  their  hatred, 
and  provost  marshals,  and  agents  of  the  "Freedman's  Bureau," 
may  riot  in  all  the  license  of  petty  tyranny,  but  our  enemies 
can  no  more  control  the  verdict  of  impartial  history,  than  they 
can  escape  that  doom  which  awaits  them  at  the  final  judgment. 

During  the  war,  slavery  was  used  as  a  catchword  to  arouse 
the  passions  of  a  fanatical  mob,  and  to  some  extent  the  preju- 
dices of  the  civilized  world  were  excited  against  us ;  but  the 
war  was  not  made  on  our  part  for  slavery.  High  dignitaries 
in  both  church  and  state  in  Old  England,  and  puritans  in  Xew 
England,  had  participated  in  the  profits  of  a  trade,  by  which 
the  ignorant  and  barbarous  natives  of  Africa  were  brought 


vni  P  R  E  V  A  0  E  . 

from  that  country,  and  sold  into  slavery  in  the  American  Col- 
onies. The  generation  in  the  Southern  States  which  defended 
their  country  in  the  late  war,  found  amongst  them,  in  a  civi- 
lized and  christianized  condition,  4,000,000  of  the  descendant* 
of  those  degraded  Africans.  The  Almighty  Creator  of  the 
Universe  had  stamped  them,  indelibly,  with  a  different  colour 
and  an  inferior  physical  and  mental  organization.  He  had  not 
done  this  from  mere  caprice  or  whim,  but  forlwise  purposes. 
An  amalgamation  of  the  races  was  in  contravention  of  His 
designs,  or  lie  would  not  have  made  them  so  different.  This 
immense  number  of  people  could  not  have  been  transported 
back  to  the  wilds  from  which  their  ancestors  were  taken,  or  if 
they  could  have  been,  it  would  have  resulted  in  their  relapse 
into  barbarism.  U^ason,  common  >enso.  true  humanity  to  the 
black,  as  well  as  the  safety  ot  the  white  race,  required  that  the 
inferior  race  should  be  kept  in  a  state  of  subordination.  The. 
condition  of  domestic  slavery,  as  it  existed  in  the  South,  had 
not  only  resulted  in  a  great  improvement  in  the  moral  and 
physical  condition  of  the  negro  race,  but  had  furnished  a  das- 
of  labourers  as  happy  and  contented  as  any  in  the  world,  if  not 
more  so.  Their  labour  had  nor  only  developed  the  immen>e 
resource-* ..f  the  immediate  country  in  which  they  were  located, 
but  was  the  main  source  of  the  great  prosperity  of  the  United 
Suite:-.,  and  furnished  the  means  for  the  employment  of  mil- 
lions of  the  working  classes  in  other  countries.  Xevertheles.-, 
the  struggle  made  by  the  people  of  the  South  was  not  for  the 
institution  of  slavery,  but  for  ihe  inestimable  right  of  self- 
government,  again.-t  the  domination  of  a  fanatical  faction  at 
the  Xorth ;  and  slavery  was  the  mere  occasion  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  antagonism  betueen  the  two  sections.  That  right 
of  self-government  ha.-  been  lost,  and  slavery  violently  abol- 
ished. Four  million.-  of  blacks  have  thus  been  thrown  on 
their  own  resources,  to  starve,  to  die,  and  to  relapse  into  bar- 
barism ;  and  inconceivable  miseries  have  been  entailed  on  the 
white  race. 

The  civilized  world  will  find,  too  iate,  that  its  philanthropy 
has  been  all  false,  and  its  religion  all  wrong  on  this  subject: 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States  will  find  that,  under  the 


r  n  ]•;  F  A  o  K  .  ix 

pretence  of  ''saving  the  life  of  the  nation,  and  upholding  the 
old  flag,"  they  have  surrendered  their  own  liberties  into  the 
hands  of  that  worst  of  all  tyrants,  a  body  of  senseless  fanatics. 

When  the  passions  and  infatuations  of  the  day  shall  have 
been  dissipated  by  time,  and  all  the  results  of  the  late  war 
shall  have  passed  into  irrevocable  history,  the  future  chroni- 
cler of  that  history  will  have  a  most  important  duty  to  per- 
form, and  posterity,  while  poring  over  its  pages,  will  he  lost 
in  wonder  at  the  follies  and  crimes  committed  in  this  gen- 
eration. 

My  narrative  is  now  given  to  the  public,  and  the  sole  merit  i 
claim  for  it  is  that  of  truthfulness.  In  writing  it,  I  have 
received  material  aid  from  an  accurate  diary  kept  by  Lieu- 
tenant William  W.  Old,  aide  to  Major  General  Edward  John- 
son, who  was  with  me  during  the  campaign  in  Maryland  and 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  until  the  12th  of  August,  1864,  and  the 
copious  notes  of  Captain  J.  Kotchkiss,  who  acted  as  Topo- 
graphical Engineer  for  the  "2nd  Corps  and  the  Army  of  the 
Valley  District,  and  recorded  the  events  of  each  day,  from  the 
opening  of  the  campaign  on  the  Uapidan  in  May,  1864,  until 
the  affair  at  Waynesboro'  in  March,  1865. 

J.  A.  EAKLY. 

NOVEMBER,  1866. 


PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 


This  work  was  written  under  an  imperative  sense  of  duty, 
as  a  matter  of  historical  evidence;  and,  for  reasons  which  will 
be  understood,  I  determined  from  the  beginning  not  to  make 
it  a  source  of  personal  profit.  The  first  edition  was  published  in 
<  1anada  at  my  own  expense  for  gratuitous  distribution,,  and  was 
necessarily  limited.  Some  errors  and  inaccuracies  which  una- 
voidably crept  into  that  edition, — the  greater  part  being  mere 
typographical  mistakes, — have  been  corrected,  though  these 
corrections  make  no  material  change  in  any  of  the  statements 
of  facts  contained  in  my  narrative  :  and  this  edition  is  pub- 
lished for  the  benefit  of  the  Ladies'  Memorial  Associations  of 
'Virginia,  which  have  undertaken  the  work  of  collecting  the 
remains  and  marking  the  graves  of  the  Confederate  dead,  who 
fell,  on  the  battle-fields  of  that  State.  Let  it  not  be  supposed 
that  this  appropriation  has  been  made  because  these  Associa- 
tions are  in  my  own  dearly  loved  State,  ^o !  the  feelings 
which  have  dictated  it  are  not  confined  to  her  limits,  but 
embrace  the  whole  South,  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Rio 
(Jrande.  Our  enemies  are  in  the  habit  of  referring  scofKnglv 
to  Virginia  as  the  "sacred  soil ;  "'  and  in  the  hearts  of  all  her 
true  sons  and  daughters,  her  soil  is,  and  from  time  immemorial 
lias  been  held  sacred:  as  well  because  of  the  associations 
connected  with  her  history,  as  because  it  is  the  land  of  their 
birth,  and  with  that  soil  mingle  the  ashes  of  their  ancestors. 
This  sentiment  all  true  men  everywhere  must  appreciate  and 
honour.  But  the  soil  of  Virginia  is  now,  and  henceforth  will 
be,  held  sacred  in  the  hearts  of  all  true  Southern  men  and 
women,  because  she  has  been  baptized  in  the  blood  and  has 
received  into  her  bosom  the  remains  nf  thousands  upon  r.hou- 


XII  PREFACE  TO  SECOND  EDITION. 

sands  of  the  truest  and  noblest  sons  of  the  entire  Confederacy. 
Tt  is  from  this  consideration  that  I  have  made  the  appropria- 
tion designated. 

When  the  duty  assumed  by  the  ladies  of  Virginia  shall  have 
been  fulfilled,  it  will  curry  consolation  to  the  hearts  of  many 
mourning  mothers  and  widows  in  the  savannahs  of  the  South, 
as  well  as  upon  the  far  distant  plains  of  Texas,  whose  hearts 
will  yearn  with  gratitude  towards  their  noble  sisters  of  the 
grand  old  State — grand  even  in  her  misfortunes. 

.1.   A.   KARLY. 
TORONTO,  February  !.<?/,  1867. 


CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA, 

FROM  THE 

RAPIDAN  TO  JAMES  RIVER. 


INTRODUCTION. 

On  the  3rd  of  May,  1864,  the  positions  of  the  Confederate 
Army  under  General  Lee,  and  the  Federal  Army  under  Lieu- 
tenant-General  Grant,  in  Virginia,  were  as  follows :  General 
Lee  held  the  southern  hank  of  the  Rapidan  River,  in  Orange 
county,  with  his  right  resting  near  the  mouth  of  Mine  Run, 
and  his  left  extending  to  Liberty  Mills  on  the  road  from 
Gordonsville  (via  Madison  Court  House)  to  the  Shenandoah 
Valley ;  while  the  crossings  of  the  river  on  the  right,  and  the 
roads  on  the  left  were  watched  by  cavalry.  Ewell's  corps  was 
on  the  right,  Hill's  on  the  left,  and  two  divisions  of  Long- 
street's  corps  were  encamped  in  the  rear,  near  Gordonsville. 
Grant's  army  (composed  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under 
Meade,  and  the  9th  corps  under  Burnside,)  occupied  the  north 
banks  of  the  Rapidan  and  Robertson  rivers;  the  main  body 
being  encamped  in  Culpeper  county,  and  on  the  Rappahau- 
nock  River. 

I  am  satisfied  that  General  Lee's  army  did  not  exceed 
50,000  effective  men  of  all  arms.  The  report  of  the  Federal 
Secretary  of  War,  Stanton,  shows  that  the  "available  force 
present  for  duty,  May  1st,  1864,"  in  Grant's  army,  was  141,166, 
to-wit :  In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  120,386,  and  in  the  9th 
corps  20,780.  The  draft  in  the  United  States  was  being  ener- 
getically enforced,  and  volunteering  had  been  greatly  stimu- 
lated by  high  bounties.  The  North- Western  States  had  ten- 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

dered  large  bodies  of  troops  to  serve  one  hundred  days,  in 
order  to  relieve  other  troops  on  garrison  and  local  duty,  and 
this  enabled  Grant  to  put  in  the  iield  a  large  number  of  troops 
which  had  been  employed  on  that  kind  of  duty.  It  was  known 
that  he  was  receiving  heavy  reinforcements  up  to  the  very  time 
of  his  movement  on  the  4th  of  May,  and  afterwards  :  so  that 
the  statement  of  his  force  on  the  1st  of  May,  by  Stanton.  does 
not  cover  the  whole  force  with  which  IK-  epBtnaenced  the  cam- 
paign. Moreover,  Secretary  Stanton's  report  shows  that  there 
were,  in  the  Department  of  Washington  and  the  Middle 
Department.  47.7-31  available  men  for  duty,  the  chief  part  of 
which,  he  -ay-,  was  <-alled  t«>  the  front  after  the  campaign 
lieiran,  "in  order  to  repair  the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac:" and  (irani  sty-  that,  at  Spotsylvania  Court  House, 
"the  18th,  14th,  15th,  16th,  17th.  and  18th  [of  May,]  were  con- 
sumed in  manu-uvring  and  awaiting  the  arrival  of  reint< 
ments  from  Washington."  His  army,  then-fore,  must  have 
numbered  very  nearly,  if  not  quite,  iMM.iiiio  mm,  l.efo-v  a 
junction  was  effected  with  Butler. 

On  the  4th  of  May,  it  was  discovered  that  Grant's  Army 
was  moving  towards  (icrmanna  Ford  on  i  he  Rapidan,  which 
was  ten  or  twelve  miles  from  our  right.  This  movement  had 
begun  on  the  night  of  the  3rd,  and  the  enemy  succeeded  ii 
seizing  the  ford,  and  effecting  a  crossing,  as  the  river  was 
guarded  at  that  point  by  only  a  small  cavalry  picket.  The 
direct  road  from  (iermanna  Ford  to  Richmond  passe-  l.y  Sjmt- 
syl.vania  Court  House,  and  when  (I rant  had  effected  his  cross- 
ing, he  was  nearer  to  Richmond  than  General  Lee  was.  From 
Orange  Court  House,  near  which  were  General  Lee"-  head- 
quarters, there  are  two  nearly  parallel  roads  running  ea>l- 
wardly  to  Fredericks!) urg — the  one  which  is  nearest  to  the 
river  being  called  "  The  old  Stone  Pike,"  and  the  other  "The 
Plank  Road."  The  road  from  Germanna  Ford  to  Spotsylva- 
nia  Court  House,  crosses  the  old  Stone  Pike  at  the  "Old  Wil- 
derness Tavern,"  and  two  or  three  miles  further  on,  it  cros-r> 
the  Plank  Road. 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  Grant's  movement  was  a 
serious  one,  preparations  were  made  to  meet  him,  and  the 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

troops  of  General  Lee's  Army  Avere  put  in  motion — Ewcll's 
corps  moving  on  the  old  Stone  Pike,  and  Hill's  corps  on  the 
Plank  Road ;  into  which  latter  road  Longstreet's  force  also 
came,  from  his  camp  near  Gordonsville. 

Swell's  corps,  to  which  my  division  belonged,  crossed  Mine 
linn,  and  encamped  at  Locust  Grove,  four  miles  beyond,  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  4th.  When  the  rest  of  the  corps  moved, 
my  division  and  Kamseur's  brigade  of  Rodes'  division  were 
left  to  watch  the  fords  of  the  llapidan,  until  relieved  by 
cavalry.  As  soon  as  this  was  done,  I  moved  to  the  position 
occupied  by  the  rest  of  the  corps,  carrying  Kamseur  with  me. 

Kwell's  corps  contained  three  divisions  of  infantry,  to-wit : 
Johnson's,  Rodes',  and  my  own  (Early's).  At  this  time, 
one  of  my  brigades  (Hoke's)  was  absent,  having  been  with 
.Moke  in  North  Carolina ;  and  I  had  only  three  present,  to  wit : 
Hays',  Pegram's,  and  Gordon's.  One  of  Rodes'  brigades  (R. 
I).  .Johnston's)  was  at  Hanover  Junction.  I  had  about  4,000 
muskets  for  duty;  Johnson  about  the  same  number:  and 
Rodes  (including  Johnston's  brigade)  about  6,000. 


HATTLKS  <>F  T1IK   WILDKKXKSS. 

o]'Kl:.\TI<>.\>  OF   KAIILVS   Iil 


(  hi  tin-  morning  of  the  -^tli.  Fwell'>  <-orp>  was  put  in  motion, 
inv  division  bringing  up  tin.'  rear.  A  sliort  distance  t'nmi  tin- 
Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  and  jn«1  in  advance  of  the  place  where 
a  road  di\  erges  to  tin-  It-It  from  tin-  old  Stone  1'ike  to  the  (ier- 
manna  Ford  road,  the  enemy,  in  heavy  t'otve.  wa:*  encountered. 
and  .lone-'  brigade.  of  Johnson's  division.  and  Kattle's  brigade, 
of  Kodes'  division,  were  driven  i>ae|<  in  some  eont'nsion.  My 
division  wa-  ordered  up.  and  formed  across  the  pike:  (Jordon'- 
brigade  heiiiii1  on  rln.-  I'iu'ln  of  the  road.  This  brigade,  as  8OO11 

~  O  i  » 

as  it  wa>  Kroim'ht  into  line.  \va>  m'dered  forward,  and  ad- 
\aneeil,  tln-oiijjli  a  dens*-  pine  thieket.  in  u-ailant  <tyle.  In 
conjuiieiioii  with  hani*-!'-.  hole.-',  and  Uamseiir's  hi-i^ades,  of 
Kodes'  division,  it  drove  the  enemy  l»aek  \\'ifh  heavy  loss,  caji- 
tnrin-'  -evefal  hundred  prisoners,  and  ptinin-i'  a  eommandin^ 
position  on  the  riirht.  .lohnson.at  the  same  time,  was  heavily 
enu-aired  in  Lis  t'ront  :  his  dm>ion  hi-in«:'  «»n  the  left  of  the  pike. 

«i     i  •  J 

and  exteinlin--  a<-n»s  the  mad  to  the  <  ierinanna  Ford  road. 
which  lias  heen  mentioned.  After  tin-  enemy  had  been  re- 
pulsed. Hays'  brigade  was  sen!  to  .Johnson's  left,  in  order  t<> 
}»articipate,  in  a  forward  movement  :  and  it  did  nmve,  forward. 
some  balt-a-mile  or  so,  encountering  the  enemy  in  force;  but, 
from  -ome  inistake,  not  nieetinu1  with  the  expected  c<i-opera- 
tion.  except  from  one  regiment  of  Jones'  brigade  (tin-  ^")th 
\'a.),  the  most  of  which  was  captui-ed,  it  was  drawn  hack  \« 
Johnson's  line,  and  took  position  on  bis  left. 

Tegram's  brigade  wa-  -ul>se(|iienrly  >enr  to  take  position  ou 
1  fays'  left;  and,  ju<t  befure  night,  a  very  heavy  attack  was 
made  on  its  front,  which  was  repnUed  with  -everc  loss  to  the 
enemy.  In  thin  affair,  (ieneral  Tc-grani  received  a  severe 
wound  in  the  leg,  which  disabled  him  for  the  Held  for  some 
months. 

During  the  afternoon  there  was  heavy  skirmishing  along  the 


BATTLES  OF  THE  WILDERNESS.  17 

whole  line,  several  attempts  having  been  made  by  the  enemy, 
without  success,  to  regain  the  position  from  which  he  had  been 
driven ;  and  the  fighting  extended  to  General  Lee's  right,  on 
the  Plank  Road.  Gordon  occupied  the  position  which  he  had 
gained,  on  the  right,  until  after  dark,  when  he  was  withdrawn 
to  the  extreme  left,  and  his  place  occupied  by  part  of  Rodes' 
division. 

The  troops  encountered,  in  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  con- 
sisted of  the  5th  corps,  under  "Warren;  but  other  troops  were 
brought  to  his  assistance.  At  the  close  of  the  day,  Swell's 
corps  had  captured  over  a  thousand  prisoners,  besides  inflict- 
ing on  the  enemy  very  heavy  losses  in  killed  and  wounded. 
Two  pieces  of  artillery  had  been  abandoned  by  the  enemy, 
just  in  front  of  the  point  at  which  Johnson's  right  and  Rodes' 
left  joined,  and  were  subsequently  secured  by  our  troops. 

After  the  withdrawal  of  Gordon's  brigade  from  the  right, 
the  whole  of  my  division  was  on  the  left  of  the  road  diverging 
from  the  pike,  in  extension  of  Johnson's  line.  All  my  bri- 
gades had  behaved  handsomely;  and  Gordon's  advance,  at  the 
time  of  the  confusion,  in  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  was  made 
with  great  energy  and  dispatch,  and  was  just  in  time  to  pre- 
vent a  serious  disaster. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the  fighting  was  resumed, 
and  a  very  heavy  attack  was  made  on  the  front  occupied  by 
Pegrain's  brigade  (now  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Hoff- 
man, of  the  81st  Virginia  Regiment) ;  but  it  was  handsomely 
repulsed,  as  were  several  subsequent  attacks  at  the  same  point. 

These  attacks  were  so  persistent,  that  two  regiments  of 
Johnson's  division  were  moved  to  the  rear  of  Pegram's  bri- 
gade, for  the  purpose  of  supporting  it;  and,  when  an  offer  was 
made  to  relieve  ^it,  under  the  apprehension  that  its  ammuni- 
tion might  be  exhausted,  the  men  of  that  gallant  brigade 
begged  that  they  might  be  allowed  to  retain  their  position, 
stating  that  they  were  getting  along  very  well  indeed,  and 
wanted  no  help. 

During  the  morning,  the  fact  was  communicated  to  General 
Ewell,  by  our  cavalry  scouts,  that  a  column  of  the  enemy's 
c 


18  BATTLES  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. 

infantry  was  moving  between  our  left  and  the  river,  with  the 
apparent  purpose  of  turning  our  left  flank;  and  information 
was  also  received  that  Burnside's  corps  had  crossed  the  river, 
and  was  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  right.  I  received  directions  to 
watch  this  column,  and  take  steps  to  prevent  its  getting  to  our 
rear;  and  Johnston's  brigade,  of  Rodes'  division,  which  had 
just  arrived  from  Hanover  Junction,  was  sent  to  me  for  that 
purpose.  This  brigade,  with  some  artillery,  was  put  in  posi- 
tion, some  distance  to  my  left,  so  as  to  command  some  bye- 
roads  coming  in  from  the  river.  In  the  meantime  General 
<Joi-don  had  sent  out  a  scouting  party  on  loot,  which  discov 
ered  what  was  supposed  to  be  the  enemy's  right  flank  resting 
in  the  woods,  in  front  of  my  division:  and,  during  my  absence 
while  poMiiiir  -Johnston'-;  brigade,  lie  reported  the  fact  to 
General  Kwell,  and  Miggc.-t'-d  the  propriety  of  attacking  this 
Hank  of  the  enemy  with  his  brigade,  which  was  not  engaged. 
On  my  return,  the  subject  was  mentioned  to  me  by  General 
Kwell,  and  I  staled  to  him  the  danger  and  risk  <>f  making  t he- 
attack  under  the  circumstances  as  a  column  was  threatening 
our  left  tiank,  and  Burnside's  corps  was  in  rear  of  the  enemy's 
flank  on  which  the  attack  was  sugge-ted.  Gen-Tal  Kwell  con- 
curred with  me  in  this  opinion,  and  the  impolicy  of  the  attempt 
at  that  time  was  obvious,  as  we  had  no  reserves  and,  if  it 
failed,  and  the  enemy  showed  any  enterprise,  a  serious  disaster 
would  befall,  not  only  our  corps,  but  General  Lee's  whole  army. 
In  the  afternoon,  when  the  column  threatening  our  left  had 
been  withdrawn,  and  it  had  been  ascertained  that  Burnside  had 
gone  to  Grant's  left,  on  account  of  the  heavy  fighting  on  that 
think,  at  my  suggestion,  General  Kwell  ordered  the  movement 
which  Gordon  had  proposed.  I  determined  to  make  it  with 
Gordon's  brigade  supported  by  Johnston's,  and  to  follow  it  14., 
if  successful,  with  the  rest  of  my  division.  Gordon's  brigade 
was  accordingly  formed  in  line  near  the  edge  of  the  woods  in 
which  the  enemy's  right  rested,  and  Johnston's  in  the  rear, 
with  orders  to  follow  Gordon  and  obey  his  orders.  I  posted 
my  Adjutant  General,  Major  John  \V.  Daniel,  with  a  courier, 
in  a  position  to  be  communicated  with  by  Gordon,  so  as  to 
inform  me  of  the  success  attending  the  movement,  and  enable 


BATTLES  OP  THE  WILDERNESS.  19 

me  to  put  in  the  other  brigades  at  the  right  time.  As  soon  as 
Gordon  started,  which  was  a  very  short  time  before  sunset,  I 
rode  to  my  line  and  threw  forward  Pegram's  brigade  in  a  posi- 
tion to  move  when  required.  In  the  meantime  Gordon  had 
become  engaged,  and,  while  Pegram's  brigade  was  being 
formed  in  line,  I  saw  some  of  Gordon's  men  coming  back  in 
confusion,  and  Colonel  Evans,  of  the  31st  Georgia  Regiment, 
endeavoring  to  rally  them.  Colonel  Evans  informed  me  that 
his  regiment,  which  was  on  Gordon's  right,  had  struck  the 
enemy's  breastworks  and  had  given  way.  I  immediately 
ordered  Pegram's  brigade  forward,  and  directed  Colonel 
Evans  to  guide  it.  Its  advance  was  through  a  dense  thicket  of 
underbrush,  but  it  crossed  the  road  running  through  John- 
son's line,  and  struck  the  enemy's  works,  and  one  of  the  regi- 
ments, the  13th  Virginia,  under  Colonel  Terrill,  got  posses- 
sion of  part  of  the  line,  when  Colonel  Hoffman  ordered  the 
brigade  to  retire,  as  it  was  getting  dark,  and  there  was  much 
confusion  produced  by  the  difficulties  of  the  advance.  Gordon 
had  struck  the  enemy's  right  flank  behind  breastworks,  and  a 
part  of  his  brigade  was  thrown  into  disorder.  In  going- 
through  the  woods,  Johnston  had  obliqued  too  much  and 
passed  to  Gordon's  left,  getting  in  rear  of  the  enemy.  Major 
Daniel,  not  hearing  from  Gordon,  had  endeavored  to  get  to 
him,  when,  finding  the  condition  of  things,  he  attempted  to 
lead  one  of  Pegram's  regiments  to  his  assistance,  and  was  shot 
down  while  behaving  with  great  gallantry,  receiving  a  wound 
in  the  leg  which  has  permanently  disabled  him.  IsTotwith- 
standing  the  confusion  in  part  of  his  brigade,  Gordon  succeeded 
in  throwing  the  enemy's  right  flank  into  great  confusion,  cap- 
turing two  brigadier  generals  (Seymour  and  Shaler),  and  several 
hundred  prisoners,  all  of  the  6th  Corps,  under  Sedgwick.  The 
advance  of  Pegram's  brigade,  and  the  demonstration  of  John- 
ston's brigade  in  the  rear,  where  it  encountered  a  part  of  the 
enemy's  force  and  captured  some  prisoners,  contributed  ma- 
terially to  the  result.  It  was  fortunate,  however,  that  darkness 
came  to  close  this  affair,  as  the  enemy,  if  he  had  been  able  to 
discover  the  disorder  on  our  side,  might  have  brought  up  fresh 
troops  and  availed  himself  of  our  condition.  As  it  was, 


20  BATTLES  OF  THE  \YILPERXF.Sv 

doubtless,  the  lateness  of  the  hour  caused  him  to  be  surprised, 
and  the  approaching  darkness  increased  the  confusion  in  his 
ranks,  as  he  could  not  see  the  strength  of  the  attacking  force, 
and  probably  imagined  it  to  be  much  more  formidable  than  it 
really  was.  All  of  the  brigades  engaged  in  the  attack  were 
drawn  back,  and  formed  on  a  new  line  in  front  of  the  old  one, 
and  obliquely  to  it. 

At  light  on  tlic  morning  of  the  7th,  an  advance  was  made, 
which  disclosed  tho  fact  that  the  enemy  had  given  up  his  line 
of  works  in  front  of  my  whole  line,  and  a  good  portion  of 
Johnson's.  Between  the  lines,  a  large  number  of  his  dead  h;id 
been  left,  and,  at  his  breastworks,  a  large  number  of  muskets 
and  knapsacks  had  been  abandoned,  and  there  was  every  in- 
dication of  great  confusion.  Ft  was  not  till  then,  that  we 
ascertained  the  full  extent  of  the  success  attending  the  move- 
ment of  the  evening  before.  The  enemy  had  entirely  aban- 
doned the  left  side  of  the  road,  across  which  .Johnson's  line 
extended,  and  my  division  and  a  part  of  his  were  thrown  for- 
ward, occupying  a  part  of  the  abandoned  works  on  the  right 
of  the  road,  and  leaving  all  those  on  the  left  in  our  rear.  This 
rendered  our  line  straight,  the  left  having  been  previously 
thrown  back,  making  a  curve. 

During  this  day  there  was  some  skirmishing,  but  no  serious 
fighting  in  my  front.  The  loss  in  my  division  during  the 
fighting  in  the  Wilderness  was  comparatively  light. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th,  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy 
was  leaving  our  front  and  moving  towards  Bpotsylvania  Court 
House.  General  Lee's  army  was  also  put  in  motion;  Ewell's 
corps  moving  along  the  line  occupied  by  our  troops  on  the  day 
before,  until  it  reached  the  Plank  Eoad,  where  it  struck  across 
to  Shady  Grove,  which  is  on  the  road  from  Orange  Court 
House  to  Spotsylvania  Court  House. 

On  reaching  the  Plank  Road,  I  received  through  General  A. 
P.  Hill,  who  was  sick  and  unable  to  remain  on  duty,  an  order 
from  General  Lee,  transferring  Hays'  brigade  from  my  division 
to  Johnson's,  in  order  that  it  might  be  consolidated  with 
another  Louisiana  brigade  in  that  division,  whose  Brigadier- 


BATTLES  OP  THE  WILDERNESS.  21 

General  had  been  killed  at  the  "Wilderness,  and  Johnston's 
brigade  from  Rodes'  division  to  mine;  and  assigning  me  to 
the  temporary  command  of  Hill's  corps,  which  was  still  in 
position  across  the  Plank  Eoad,  and  was  to  bring  up  the  rear. 
I  accordingly  turned  over  the  command  of  my  division  to 
Gordon,  the  senior  Brigadier  left  with  it,  and  assumed  com- 
mand of  Hill's  corps.* 

*In  his  official  report,  Grant  says:  "Early  on  the  5th,  the  advance  corps,  the  5th,  Major- 
General  G.  K.  Warren  commanding,  met  and  engaged  the  enemy  outside  his  entrenchments 
near  Mine  Run ;"  and  further  on  he  says  :  "  On  the  morning  of  the  7th,  reconnoissances 
showed  that  tho  enemy  had  fallen  behind  his  entrenched  lines,  with  pickets  to  the  front 
covering  a  part  of  the  battle-field.  From  this  it  was  evident  to  my  mind  that  the  two  days 
fighting  had  satisfied  him  of  his  inability  to  further  maintain  the  contest  in  the  open  field, 
notwithstanding  his  advantage  of  position,  and  that  he  could  wait  an  attack  behind  his 
works."  In  mentioning  his  movement  toward  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  he  says :  "  But  the 
enemy  having  become  aware  of  our  movement,  and  having  the  shorter  line,  was  enabled  to 
reach  there  first."  If  these  statements  were  true,  the  only  legitimate  inference  is  that  Gen- 
eral Lee  had  an  entrenched  line  on,  or  near  Mine  Run,  previously  established ;  that  the 
battle  commenced  immediately  in  front  of  the  works  on  this  line;  and  that,  after  the  two 
days  fighting,  he  had  fallen  behind  them  to  wait  an  attack.  Whereas  the  fact  is,  that  the 
only  entrenched  line  on,  or  near,  Mine  Run,  was  that  made,  on  its  west  bank,  when  Meade 
crossed  the  river  at  the  end  of  November,  18G3,  and  which  was  used  for  that  occasion  only. 
Tho  fighting  in  the  Wilderness  began  eight  or  ten  miles  east  of  that  line,  and  at  no  time 
during  that  fighting  was  it  used  for  any  purpose.  The  "entrenched  lines"  occupied  by  our 
army  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  were  slight  temporary  works  thrown  up,  on,  or  in  front  of 
the  battle-field,  though  it  is  probable  that,  at  some  points,  the  line  may  not  have  been  so  far 
to  the  front,  as  our  troops  had  advanced;  as,  in  taking  it,  regard  was  necessarily  had  to  the 
conformation  |of  the  ground.  On  our  left,  as  will  be  seen  abore,  the  line  was  advanced  in 
front  of  Grant's  own  line  of  the  previous  day. 

Grant  says  Genera  1  Leo  had  the  advantage  of  position.  As  the  latter  had  to  move  from  his 
lines  on  the  Rapidan  and  attack  Grant  in  the  Wilderness,  how  happened  it  that  he  was 
enabled  to  get  the  advantage  of  position,  after  the  two  days  fighting.  He  also  says  that  Gen- 
eral Lee  was  enabled  to  reach  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  first,  because  he  had  the  shorter 
line.  The  iact  is,  that,  as  the  two  armies  lay  in  their  positions  at  the  Wilderness,  their  lines 
were  parallel  to  the  road  to  Spotsylvania  Court  House.  Grant  had  the  possession  of  the 
direct  road  to  that  place,  and  he  had  the  start.  General  Lee  had  to  move  on  the  circuitous 
route  by  Shady  Grove,  and  he  was  enabled  to  arrive  at  the  Court  House  first  with  part  of  his 
infantry,  because  his  cavalry  held  Grant's  advance  in  check  for  nearly  an  entire  day. 


BATTLES  AROTOD  SPOTSYLVAKIA  COURT  HOUSE. 

OPERATIONS  OF  HILL'S  CORPS. 

Hill's  Corps  was  composed  of  Heth's,  Wilcox's,  and  Ma- 
hone's  (formerly  Anderson's)  divisions  of  infantry,  and  three 
battalions  of  artillery  under  Colonel  Walker.  When  I  took 
command  of  it,  the  infantry  numbered  about  13,000  muskets 
for  duty. 

General  Lee's  orders  to  me,  were  to  move  by  Todd's  tavern 
along  the  Brock  Road  to  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  as  soon  as 
our  front  was  clear  of  the  enemy.  In  order  to  get  into  that 
road,  it  was  necessary  to  reopen  an  old  one  leading  from  Hill's 
right,  by  which  I  was  enabled  to  take  a  cross  road  leading  into 
the  road  from  Shady  Grove  to  Todd's  tavern.  The  waggon 
trains  and  all  the  artillery,  except  one  battalion,  was  sent 
around  by  Shady  Grove.  About  a  mile  from  the  road  from 
Shady  Grove  to  Todd's  tavern,  the  enemy's  cavalry  videttes 
were  encountered,  and  Mahone's  division  was  thrown  forward 
to  develope  the  enemy's  force  and  position.  Mahone  encoun- 
tered a  force  of  infantry,  which  had  moved  up  from  Todd'n 
tavern  towards  Shady  Grove,  and  had  quite  a  brisk  engage- 
ment with  it,  causing  it  to  fall  back  rapidly  towards  the  former 
place.  At  the  same  time,  General  Hampton,  who  had  com- 
municated with  me,  after  I  left  the  Plank  Road,  moved  with 
his  cavalry  on  my  right  and  struck  the  enemy  on  the  flank  and 
rear ;  but  on  account  of  want  of  knowledge  of  the  country  on 
our  part,  and  the  approach  of  darkness,  the  enemy  was  enabled 
to  make  his  escape.  This  affair  developed  the  fact  that  the 
enemy  was  in  possession  of  Todd's  tavern  and  the  Brock  Road, 
and  a  continuation  of  my  march  would  have  led  through  his 
entire  army.  We  bivouacked  for  the  night,  at  the  place  from 
which  Mahone  had  driven  the  enemy,  and  a  force  was  thrown 
out  towards  Todd's  tavern,  which  was  about  a  mile  distant. 

Very  early  next  morning,  (the  9th,)  I  received  an  order  from 


BATTLES  OP  SPOTSYLVANIA  G.  H.  23 

General  Lee,  through  Hampton,  to  move  on  the  Shady  Grove 
road  towards  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  which  I  did,  crossing 
a  small  river  called  the  Po,  twice.  After  reaching  the  rear  of 
the  position  occupied  by  the  other  two  corps,  I  was  ordered  to 
Spotsylvania  Court  House,  to  take  position  on  the  right,  and 
cover  the  road  from  that  place  to  Fredericksburg.  No  enemy 
appeared  in  my  front  on  this  day,  except  at  a  distance  on  the 
Fredericksburg  Road. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  10th,  I  was  ordered  to  move 
one  of  my  divisions  back,  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  Po  on 
the  Shady  Grove  road;  and  to  move  with  another  division,  to 
the  rear  and  left,  by  the  way  of  Spotsylvania  Old  Court  House, 
and  drive  back  a  column  of  the  enemy  which  had  crossed  the 
Po  and  taken  possession  of  the  Shady  Grove  road,  thus  threat- 
ening 'our  rear  and  endangering  our  trains,  which  were  on  the 
road  leading  by  the  Old  Court  House  to  Louisa  Court  House. 

Our  line  was  then  north  of  the  Po,  with  its  left,  Field's 
division  of  Longstreet's  corps,  resting  on  that  stream,  just 
above  the  crossing  of  the  Shady  Grove  road.  The  whole  of 
the  enemy's  force  was  also  north  of  the  Po,  prior  to  this  move- 
ment of  his.  Mahone's  division  was  sent  to  occupy  the  banks 
of  the  Po  on  Field's  left,  while,  with  Heth's  division  and  a  bat- 
talion of  artillery,  I  moved  to  the  rear,  crossing  the  Po  on  the 
Louisa  Court  House  Road,  and  then  following  that  road  until 
we  reached  one  coming  in  from  Waite's  Shop  on  the  Shady 
Grove  Road.  After  moving  about  a  mile  on  this  road,  wre  met 
Hampton  gradually  falling  back  before  the  enemy,  who  had 
pushed  out  a  column  of  infantry  considerably  to  the  rear  of 
our  line.  This  column,  was,  in  turn,  forced  back  to  the  posi- 
tion on  the  Shady  Grove  Road,  which  was  occupied  by  what 
was  reported  to  be  Hancock's  corps.  Following  up  and  cross- 
ing a  small  stream  just  below  a  mill  pond,  we  succeeded  in 
reaching  Waite's  Shop,  from  whence  an  attack  was  made  on 
the  enemy,  and  the  entire  force  which  had  crossed  the  Po  was 
driven  back  with  a  loss  of  one  piece  of  artillery,  which  fell 
into  our  hands,  and  a  considerable  number  in  killed  and 
wounded.  This  relieved  us  from  a  very  threatening  danger, 
as  the  position  the  enemy  had  attained  would  have  enabled 


24  BATTLES  OF  SPOTSYLVANIA  C.  H. 

him  to  completely  enfilade  Field's  position,  and  get  possession 
of  the  line  of  our  communications  to  the  rear,  within  a  very 
short  distance  of  which  he  was,  when  met  by  the  force  which 
drove  him  back.  In  this  affair,  Ileth's  division  behaved  very 
handsomely,  all  of  the  brigades,  (Cook's,  Davis',  Kirkland's, 
and  Walker's,)  being  engaged  in  the  attack.  General  II.  II. 
Walker  had  the  misfortune  to  receive  a  severe  wound  in  the 
foot,  which  rendered  amputation  necessary,  but,  otherwise,  our 
loss  .was  slight.  As  soon  as  the  road  was  cleared,  Mahone's 
division  crossed  the  Po,  but  it  was  not  practicable  to  pursue 
the  affair  further,  as  the  north  bank  of  the  stream  at  this  point 
was  covered  by  a  heavily  entrenched  line,  with  a  number  of 
batteries,  and  night  was  approaching. 

On  the  morning  of  the  llth,  Iletli  was  moved  back  to  Spot- 
sylvania  Court  Iloii.-e,  ami  Mahone  was  left  to  occupy  the. 
position  on  the  Shady  Grove  lload,  from  which  the  enemy  had 
been  driven.* 

My  line  on  the  right  had  been  connected  with  Kwell's  right, 
and  covered  the  Fredericksburg  road,  as  also  the  road  leading 
from  Spotsylvania  Court  House  across  the  Ny  into  the  road 
from  Fredericksburg  to  Hanover  Junction.  Wilcox  was  on 
my  left  uniting  withEwell,  and  Ileth  joined  him.  The  enemy 
had  extended  his  lines  across  the  Frederieksburg  Road,  but 
there  was  no  fighting  on  this  front  on  the  10th  or  llth,  except 
some  artillery  firing. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  llth,  the  enemy  was  demonstrating 
to  our  left,  up  the  To,  as  if  to  get  possession  of  Shady  Grove 
and  the  road  from  thence  to  Louisa  Court  House.  General 
Hampton  reported  a  colum  of  infantry  moving  up  the  1Y>,  and 
L  was  ordered  by  General  Lee  to  take  possession  of  Shady 
Grove,  by  light  next  morning,  and  hold  it  against  the  enemy. 
To  aid  in  that  purpose,  two  brigades  of  Wih-ox's  division. 


*Itwill  bo  seen  that,  after  this  affair.  I  h.-l.l,  f..r  a  time,  both  of  General  L.-.-'S  flunk', 
which  was  rather  an  anomaly,  bat  it  could  not  be  avoided,  as  we.  had  n«  IV.-<T\«-.  and  the 
two  other  corps,  beini;  immediately  in  front  of  the  enemy,  in  line  ,,f  battle.  :l!id  alnmM  con- 
stantly engaged,  could  not  bo  moved  without  profit  risk.  It  was  absolutely  nofes«ary  10 
occupy  the  position  held  ou  the  left  by  Malioue,  to  avoid  a  renewal  of  the  danger  from 
which  we  had  escaped. 


BATTLES  OF  8POTSYLVAN1A  0.   If.  2o 

(Thomas'  and  Scales')  were  moved  from  the  right,  and  Mahone 
was  ordered  to  move  before  light  to  Shady  Grove ;  but  during 
the  night  it  was  discovered  that  the  movement  to  our  left  was 
a  feint,  and  that  there  was  a  real  movement  of  the  enemy 
towards  our  right. 

Before  daybreak  ou  the  morning  of  the  12th,  Wilcox's  bri- 
gades were  returned  to  him,  and  at  dawn,  Mahone's  division 
was  moved  to  the  right,  leaving  Wright's  brigade  of  that  divi- 
sion to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  Po  on  Field's  left.  On  this 
morning,  the  enemy  made  a  very  heavy  attack  on  Ewell's  front, 
and  broke  the  line  where  it  was  occupied  by  Johnson's  division. 
A  portion  of  the  attacking  force  swept  along  Johnson's  line  to 
Wileox' s  left,  and  was  checked  by  a  prompt  movement  on  the 
part  of  Brigadier-General  Lane,  who  was  on  that  tiank.  As 
swon  as  the  tiring  was  heard,  General  Wilcox  sent  Thomas' 
and  Scales'  brigades  to  Lane's  assistance,  and  they  arrived  just 
as  Lane's  brigade  had  repulsed  this  body  of  the  enemy,  and 
they  pursued  it  for  a  short  distance.  As  soon  as  Mahone's 
division  arrived  from  the  left,  Perrin's  and  Harris'  brigades  of 
that  division,  and  subsequently,  MoGowan's  brigade  of  Wil- 
•  •o\'s  division,  were  sent  to  General  Swell's  assistance,  and 
were  carried  into  action  under  his  orders.  Brigadier-General 
Perrin  was  killed,  and  Brigadier-General  McGowan  severely 
wounded,  while  gallantly  leading  their  respective  brigades 
into  action;  and  all  the  brigades  sent  to  Kwell's  assistance 
suffered  severely. 

Subsequently,  on  the  same  day,  under  orders  from  General 
Lee,  .Lane's  brigade  of  Wilcox's  division,  and  Mahone's  own 
brigade  (under  Colonel  Weisiger),  were  thrown  to  the  front, 
tor  the  purpose  of  moving  to  the  left,  and  attacking  the  Hank 
of  the  column  of  the  enemy  which  had  broken  Ewell's  line,  to 
relieve  the  pressure  on  him,  and,  if  possible,  recover  the  part 
of  the  line  which,  had  been  lost.  Lane's  brigade  commenced 
the  movement  and  had  not  proceeded  far,  when  it  encountered 
and  attacked,  in  a  piece  of  woods  in  front  of  my  line,  the  9th 
corps,  under  Burnside,  moving  up  to  attack  a  salient  011  my 
front.  Lane  captured  over  three  hundred  prisoners,  and  three 


26  BATTLES  OF  SPOTSYLVANIA  G.  H. 

battle  flags,  and  his  attack  on  the  enemy's  flank,  taking  him 
by  surprise,  no  doubt,  contributed  materially  to  his  repulse. 
Mahone's  brigade  did  not  become  seriously  engaged.  Tin- 
attacking  column  which  Lane  encountered,  got  up  to  within  a 
very  short  distance  of  a  salient  defended  by  AValker's  brigade 
of  lleth's  division,  under  Colonel  Mayo,  before  it  was  discov- 
ered, as  there  was  a  pine  thicket  in  front,  under  cover  of  which 
the  advance  was  made.  A  heavy  lire  of  musketry  from 
AValker's  brigade  and  Thomas'  which  was  on  its  left,  and  a 
tire  of  artillery  from  a  considerable  number  of  guns  on  lleth's 
line,  were  opened  with  tremendous  efl'ect  upon  tin-  attacking 
column,  and  it  was  driven  baek  with  heavy  loss,  leaving  it> 
<tead  in  front  of  our  works.  This  a  flair  took  place  under  the 
eye  of  General  Lei-  himself.  In  the  afternoon,  another  attempt 
was  made  to  carry  out  the  contemplated  Hank  movement,  with 
Mahone's  brigade,  and  ( 'ook's  brigade  of  lleth's  division,  to  be 
followed  up  by  tin-  other  troops  under  my  command:  but  it 
was  discovered  that  the  enemy  had  one  or  more  intrenched 
lines  in  our  front,  to  the  tire  from  which  our  Hanking  column 
would  have  been  exposed.  Moreover,  the  ground  between  the 
line-;  was  very  rough,  being  full  of  rugged  ravines  and  covered 
with  thick  pines  and  other  growth  :  and  it  was  thought  advis- 
able to  desist  from  the  attempt.  The  two  brigade-;  which  were 
to  have  commenced  the  movement,  wen-  then  thrown  to  the 
front  on  both  sides  of  the  Frcdericksbnig  road,  and,  passing 
over  two  lines  of  breastworks,  defended  by  a  strong  force  of 
skirmishers,  developed  the  existence  of  a  third  and  much 
stronger  line  in  rear,  which  would  have  afforded  an  almost  in- 
•Miperable  obstacle  to  tin-,  proposed  flank  movement.  This 
dosed  the  operations  of  the  corps  under  my  command  on  the 
memorable  l^th  of  May. 

Between  that  day  and  the  19th,  there  was  no  serious  attack 
on  my  front,  but  much  mameuvring  by  the  enemy,  (k-neral 
Mahone  made  two  or  three  reconnoissances  to  the  front,  which 
disclosed  the  fact  that  the  enemy  was  gradually  moving  to  our 
right.  In  making  one  of  them,  he  encountered  a  body  of  the 
enemy  which  had  got  possession  of  (Jayle's  house,  on  the  left 
of  the  road  leading  from  our  right  towards  the  Fredericksburg 


BATTLES  OF  SPOTSYLVANIA  C.  H.  27 

and  Hanover  Junction  road,  at  which  a  portion  of  our  cavalry, 
under  Brigadier  General  Chambliss,  had  been  previously 
posted,  and  drove  it  back  across  the  Xy.*  Another  reconnois- 
sance,  handsomely  made  by  Brigadier-General  Wright,  who 
had  been  brought  from  the  left,  ascertained  that  a  heavy  force 
of  the  enemy  was  between  the  Ny  and  the  Po,  in  front  of  my 
right,  which  was  held  by  Mahone,  and  was  along  the  road 
towards  Hanover  Junction.  To  meet  this  movement  of  the 
enemy,  Field's  division  was  brought  from  the  left  and  placed 
on  my  right. 

On  the  19th,  General  Ewell  made  a  movement  against  the 
enemy's  right,  and  to  create  a  diversion  in  his  favour,  Thomas' 
brigade  was  thrown  forward,  and  drove  the  enemy  into  his 
works  in  front  of  the  salient,  against  which  Burnside's  attack 
had  been  made  on  the  12th,  while  the  whole  corps  was  held  in 
readiness  to  co-operate  with  Ewell,  should  his  attack  prove 
successful ;  but,  as  he  was  compelled  to  retire,  Thomas  was 
withdrawn. 

Subsequently,  the  enemy  retired  from  Heth's  and  Wilcox's 
fronts ;  and,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  21st,  AVilcox  was  sent  out 
on  the  road  leading  from  Mahone's  front  across  the  !Ny,  with 
two  of  his  brigades  to  feel  the  enemy,  and  found  him  still  in 
force  behind  entrenched  lines,  and  had  a  brisk  engagement 
with  that  force. 

"While  Wilcox  was  absent,  an  order  was  received  by  me, 
from  General  Lee,  to  turn  over  to  General  Hill  the  command 
of  his  corps,  as  he  had  reported  for  duty.  I  did  so  at  once, 
and  thus  terminated  my  connection  with  this  corps,  which  I 
had  commanded  during  all  the  trying  scenes  around  Spotsyl- 
vawia  Court  House.  The  officers  and  men  of  the  corps  had 
all  behaved  well,  and  contributed,  in  no  little  degree,  to  the 
result  by  which  Grant  was  compelled  to  wait  six  days  for  rein- 


*The  Mattapony  River,  which,  by  its  junction  with  the  Paiminkey,  forms  York  River,  is 
formed  by  the  confluence  of  four  streams,  called  respectively,  the  "Mat,"  "Ta,"  "Po,"  and 
"Ny.:>  The  Ny  is  north  and  east  of  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  and  behind  it  the  enemy  did 
most  of  liis  manoeuvring  in  my  front.  It  unites  with  the  Po,  a  few  miles  to  the  east  and  south 
of  Spotsylvania  Court  House,  and  both  streams  are  difficult  to  cross,  except  whore  there,  JHV 
bridges. 


28  OPERATION**  AT   HAN'oVKK  . 

forcements  from  Washington,  before  In-  «-<ml<l  tvsmne  the 
offensive,  or  make  another  of  his  flank  movements  to  -ret  l>e- 
tween  General  Lee'-  army  and  .Richmond. 


HANnVKIi 
OPERATIONS  OK  F.AHI.VS  PIVI>|o.\. 

The  movement  of  tlu-  enemy  to  get  between  onr  army  and 
Richmond  had  been  discovered,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
21st,  EwelPs  corps  -\y;is  put  in  motion  towanU  Hanover  .limc- 
tion.*  After  turning  over  to  (ieneral  Hill,  the  command  of 
his  corp>,  1  rode  in  ilie  direction  taken  by  Kwell's  corps,  and 
overtook  it,  a  short  time  before  day  <>\\  the  morning  of  the 
•2±u\.  Hoke's  brigade,  nndcr  Lieutenant  ( 'olonel  Le\yis,  this 
dav  joined  us  from  Petersburg,  and  an  order  wa-  i.-^ued.  truns- 
terrins^  (Jordon's  brigade,  no\v  under  tlie  command  of  Briga- 
dier-General Hvans.  to  ,lo]in<on"s  division,  which  was  placed 
under  the  command  of  (General  (iordon,  who  had  been  made 
a  Major  (ieneral.  This  left  me  in  command  of  three  brigades, 
to  wit:  iVirram's,  Jfoke's.  and  .lohnston's,  all  of  wliich  were 
very  much  reduced  in  strength.  My  Adjutant  ( ieneral.  Major 
Daniel,  had  been  disabled  for  life  by  a  wound  received  at  the 
Wilderness,  and  my  Inspector  <  Jeneral.  Major  Samuel  Hale, 
had  been  mortally  wounded  at  Spotsyivania  Court  House,  on 
the  12th,  while  serving  with  the  division  and  acting  with  j^reat 
irallantry  during  the  disorder  which  ensued  after  Kwell's  line 
was  broken.  Both  were  serious  lushes  lo  me. 

On  this  day.  ithe  i!^nd),  we  moved  to  Hanover  Junction, 
and,  next  day  my  division  was  posted  on  the  extreme  right, 
covering  a  ferry  two  or  three  miles  below  the  railroad  bridge 


*H;iiiu\<T  .Imirtiou  i>  .-il'iiiu  ^  inilo  iVniii  Kiciinitiinl.  mill  is  :it  the  inu-r>iM-ii,,n  ol  lii- 
Kicliiimnil.  Predeiickllbarg  and  I'oli>i,i:ir-  i-iiilri>:tit  uiili  the  ct>ntr:il  railroad  from  I!iriiiii,,ii,l 
ut-M.  \  iu  lionloiisville  and  S  taunt  on.  It  is  on  ih.-  direct  road  from  l.otli  Spotty]  van  in  (.'ourt 
!loii<e  and  Fredarteklburg  to  Riohmoad.  The  North  Anna  Kiter  i»  north  of  the  Juneiioii 
nliiiut  two  in  il^s.  and  the  .-out  1 1  Anna  about  three  miles  south  of  it.  Tln-se  t»o  streams  uniit; 
south  of  oast,  and  a  lew  mile-*  from  the  .lunciion.  and  form  the  Vainuuki-y  River. 


BATTLES  OF  COLD  HARBOUR.  i'9 

across  the  North  Anna.  While  at  Hanover  Junction  my 
division  was  not  engaged.  At  one  time  it  was  moved  towards 
our  left,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  a  part  of  the  line  on 
which  an  attack  was  expected,  and  moved  back  again  without 
being  required.  It  was,  subsequently,  placed  temporarily  on 
the  left  of  the  corps,  relieving  Rodes'  division  and  a  part  of 
Field's  while  the  line  was  being  remodelled,  and  then  took 
position  on  the  right  again. 

During  the  night  of  the  2f>th,  the  enemy  again  withdrew 
from  our  front.* 


BATTLES  OF  COLD  HARBOUR. 

OPERATIONS  OP  SWELL'S  CORPS. 

On  the  27th,  the  enemy  having  withdrawn  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  North  Anna,  and  commenced  another  flank  move- 
ment by  moving  down  the  north  bank  of  the  Pamunkey, 
Ewell's  corps,  now  under  my  command,  by  reason  of  General 
Swell's  sickness,  was  moved  across  the  South  Anna  over  the 
bridge  of  the  Central  railroad,  and  by  a  place  called  "  Merry 
Oaks,''  leaving  Ashland  on  the  Richmond,  Fredericksburg  and 
Potomac  railroad  to  the  right,  and  bivouacked  for  the  night  at 
Hughes'  cross  road,  the  intersection  of  the  road  from  Ashland 
to  Atlee's  station  on  the  Central  railroad  with  the  road  from 


*  At  Hanover  Junction  General  Leo  was  joined  by  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps, 
and  Breckenridge  with  two  small  brigades  of  infantry,  and  a  battalion  of  artillery.  These, 
with  Hoke's  brigade,  were  the  first  and  only  reinforcements  received  by  General  Lee  since 
the  opening  of  the,  campaign.  Yet,  Grant's  immense  army,  notwithstanding  the  advantage 
gained  by  it  on  the  12th  of  May,  had  been  so  crippled,  that  it  was  compelled  to  wait  six  days 
at  Spotsylvania  Court  House  for  reinforcements  from  Washington,  before  it  could  resume 
the  offensive.  Breekenritlge's  infantry  numbered  less  than  3,000  muskets;  yet,  Grant  puts  it 
l'>,000,  and  he  makes  an  absurd  attempt  to  cast  the  whole  blame  for  the  failure  of  the  cam- 
paign, so  far,  on  Butler;  to  immolate  whom,  lie  makes  a  digression  in  his  account  of  the 
operations  at  Hanover  Junction,  and  says:  "The  army  sent  to  operate  against  Richmond 
having  hermetically  sealed  itself  up  at  Bermuda  Hundreds,  the  enemy  was  enabled  to  bring 
the  most,  if  not  all  the  reinforcements  brought  from  the  South  by  Beauregard  against  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.'1  He  therefore  determined  to  try  another  flank  movement,  and  to  got 
more  reinforcements  from  the  army  at  Bermuda  Hundreds. 


30  BATTLES  OF  COLD  HARBOUR. 

the  Merry  Oaks  to  Richmond.  Next  morning  I  moved  by 
Atlee's  station  to  Hundley's  corner,  at  the  intersection  of  the 
road  from  Hanover  Town,  (the  point  at  which  Grant  crossed 
the  Pamunkey,)  by  Pole  Green  Church,  to  Richmond,  with  the 
road  from  Atlee's  station,  by  Old  Church  in  Hanover  County, 
to  the  White  House,  on  the  Pamunkey.  This  is  the  point 
from  which  General  Jackson  commenced  his  famous  attack  on 
McClellan's  Hank  and  rear,  in  1862,  and  it  was  very  important 
that  it  should  be  occupied,  as  it  intercepted  Grant's  direct 
march  towards  Richmond.  All  these  movements  were  made 
under  orders  from  General  Lee. 

My  troops  were  placed  in  position,  covering  the  road  by 
Pole  Green  Church,  and  also  the  road  to  Old  Church,  with  my 
right  resting  near  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  a  small  stream  running 
towards  Mechanicsville  and  into  the  Chickahominy.  Brigadier 
General  Ramseur  of  Rodes'  division,  was  this  day  assigned  to 
the  command  of  my  division.  Ewell's  corps,  the  2nd  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  now  numbered  less  than  9,000 
muskets  for  duty,  its  loss,  on  the  12th  of  May,  having  been 
very  heavy. 

On  the  29th,  the  enemy  having  crossed  the  Tottopotomoy, 
(a  creek  running  just  north  of  Pole  Green  Church,  and  cast- 
ward  to  the  Pamunkey,)  appeared  in  my  front  on  both  roads, 
and  there  was  some  skirmishing,  but  no  heavy  fighting. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  30th,  in  accordance  with  orders  from 
General  Lee,  I  moved  to  the  right  across  Beaver  Dam,  to  the 
road  from  Old  Church  to  Mechanicsville,  and  thence  along 
that  road  towards  Old  Church,  until  we  reached  Bethesda 
Church.  At  this  point  the  enemy  was  encountered,  and  his 
troops  which  occupied  the  road,  were  driven  by  Rodes'  divi- 
sion towards  the  road  from  Hundley's  corner,  which  unites 
with  the  road  from  Mechanicsville,  east  of  Bethesda  Church. 
Pegram's  brigade,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Edward 
\Villis  of  the  12th  Georgia  regiment,  was  sent  forward,  with 
one  of  Rodes'  brigades  on  its  right,  to  feel  the  enemy,  and 
ascertain  its  strength;  but,  meeting  with  a  heavy  force  behind 
breastworks,  it  was  compelled  to  retire,  with  the  loss  of  some 


BATTLES  OP  COLD  HARBOUR.  31 

valuable  officers  and  men,  and  among  them  were  Colonel 
Willis,  mortally  wounded,  and  Colonel  Terrell  of  the  13th  Vir- 
ginia regiment,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Watkins  of  the  52nd 
Virginia  regiment,  killed.  This  movement  showed  that  the 
enemy  was  moving  to  our  right  flank,  and  at  night,  I  withdrew 
a  short  distance  on  the  Mechanicsville  road,  covering  it  with 
mv  force.  When  I  made  the  movement  from  Hundley's 
corner,  my  position  at  that  place  was  occupied  by  a  part  of 
Longstreet's  corps,  under  Anderson. 

On  the  next  morning  my  troops  were  placed  in  position  on 
the  east  side  of  Beaver  Dam  across  the  road  to  Mechanicsville, 
but  Rodes  was  subsequently  moved  to  the  west  side  of  the 
creek. 

Grant's  movement  to  our  right,  towards  Cold  Harbour,  was 
continued  on  the  31st,  and  the  1st  of  June,  and  corresponding 
movements  were  made  by  General  Lee  to  meet  him,  my  com- 
mand retaining  its  position  with  a  heavy  force  in  its  front. 

On  the  2nd,  all  the  troops  on  my  left,  except  Heth's  division 
of  Hill's  corps,  had  moved  to  the  right,  and,  in  the  afternoon 
of  that  day,  Rodes'  division  moved  forward,  along  the  road 
from  Hundley's  corner  towards  Old  Church,  and  drove  the 
enemy  from  his  intrenchments,  now  occupied  with  heavy  skir- 
mish lines,  and  forced  back  his  left  towards  Bethesda  Church, 
where  there  was  a  heavy  force.  Gordon  swung  round  so  as  to 
keep  pace  with  Rodes,  and  Heth  co-operated,  following  Rodes 
and  taking  position  on  his  left  flank.  In  this  movement  there 
was  some  heavy  tighting  and  several  hundred  prisoners  were 
taken  by  us.  Brigadier-General  Doles,  a  gallant  officer  of 
Rodes'  division,  was  killed,  but  otherwise  our  loss  was  not 
severe. 

On  the  next  day  (the  3rd),  when  Grant  made  an  attack  at 
Cold  Harbour  in  which  he  suffered  very  heavily,  there  were 
repeated  attacks  on  Rodes'  and  .Heth's  fronts,  those  on  Cook's 
brigade,  of  Heth's  division,  being  especially  heavy,  but  all  of 
them  were  repulsed.  There  was  also  heavy  skirmishing  on 
Gordon's  front,  During  the  day,  Heth's  left  was  threatened 
by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  but  it  was  kept  off  by  Walker's  brig- 


32  BATTLES  OP  COLD  HARBOUR. 

ade  under  Colonel  Fry,  which  cove-red  that  Hank,  and  also  re- 
pulsed an  effort  of  the  enemy's  infantry  to  get  to  <>ur  rear.  As 
it  was  necessary  that  Hetlvs  division  should  join  its  corps  on 
the  right,  and  my  Hank  in  this  position  was  very  nmrh  ex.- 
posed.  I  withdrew  at  the  close  of  the  day  to  the  line  previously 
occupied,  and  next  morning  Heth  moved  to  the  right. 

My  right  now  connected  witli  the  left  of  Longstreet'-  eorp- 
under  General  Anderson.  The  enemy  subsequently  evacua- 
ted his  position  at  Bethesda  Church  and  his  lines  in  my  front, 
and,  having  no  opposing  force  to  keep  my  troops  in  their  lino. 
I  made  Two  Ht'orts  TO  attack  the  enemy  on  his  right  Hank  and 
rear.  The  tirst  was  made  on  the  lith,  when  I  crossed  the  Mata- 
daquean,  (a  small  stream,  running  through  wide  >wamps  in 
the  enemy's  rear),  and  got  in  rear  of  his  right  tiank,  driving  in 
his  skirmishers  until  we  came  to  a  swamp,  which  could  he 
•  To.-.-ed  only  on  a  narrow  causeway  defended  \>y  an  intrenched 
line  with  artillery.  (.Jem-nil  Ander.-on  \\a.-  to  have  co-ope- 
rated  with  lav,  by  moving  down  the  other  >ide  of  the  Alatada- 
«|iiean,  hiiT  the  divi>ion  sent  for  that  purpose  did  not  reach  tin- 
position  from  which  I  started  until  near  night,  and  1  wa> 
therefore  compelled  to  retire  a-  m\  position  uas  too  much  ex- 
posed. 

<  >n  the  next  day  (tin-  Tthi,  a  reconnois-aiice  made  in  front  of 
Anderson'-  line.  >howed  that  the  <rreater  part  of  it  was  uncov- 
ered, and,  in  accordance  with  instructions  from  (ieneral  Lee. 
I  mo\-ed  in  t'ront  of.  ami  iieivvcen  it  and  the  M.atadui|Uean, 
until  ray  progre>>  \\a>  arresied  Ity  a  ravine  and  swamji  which 
prevented  any  further  advance.  l»ut  a  nnml>er  ot'  piece.-  of  ar- 
tillery were  opened  upon  the  e];em\'>  po>irion  in  tiank  and 
rc\-ei>e.  -i  a>  to  favour  a  movement  from  Anderson's  front. 
which  had  I>een  ordered  hut  was  not  made;  and  at  night  I  re- 
tired from  this  position  to  the  rear  of  our  line.-. 

Since  the  lighting  at  the  Wilderness,  (-irant  had  made  it  an 
invariable  practice  to  cover  his  front,  tiank,  and  rear,  with  a 
perfect  network  of  intrenchmeni.-.  and  all  his  movements  were 
made  under  cover  of  such  works.  It  was  therefore  very  diHi- 
cult  to  get  at  him. 


BATTLES  OF  COLD  HARBOUfc.  S3 

On  the  llth,  my  command  was  moved  to  the  rear  of  Hill's 
line,  near  Games'  Mill;  and,  on  the  12th,  I  received  orders  to 
move,  with  the  2nd  Corps,  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  to  meet 
Hunter.  This,  therefore,  closed  my  connection  with  the  cam- 
paign from  the  Rapidan  to  James  River. 

When  I  moved,  on  the  morning  of  the  loth.,  Grant  had  al- 
ready put  his  army- in  motion  to  join  Butler,  on  James  River, 
;i.  position  which  he  could  have  reached,  from  his  camps  on 
the  north  of  the  Rapidan,  by  railroad  and  transports,  without 
tlie  loss  of  a  man.  In  attempting  to  force  his  way  by  land,  lie 
had  already  lost,  in  killed  and  wounded,  more  men  than  were 
in  General  Lee's  entire  army ;  and  he  was  compelled  to  give 
up,  in  despair,  the  attempt  to  reach  Richmond  in  that  way.* 


*  Grant,  in  describing  his  movement  from  bpotsylvania  Gum  House  to  Hanover  Junction, 
s.iv>  :  '•  Hut  the  enemy  again  having  the  shorter  lino,  and  being  in  possession  of  the  main 
r<>nds.  was  enabled  to  reach  the  North-Anna  in  advance  of  us.  and  took  position  behind  it." 
\nd  when  he  speaks  of  his  final  determination  lo  join  Butler,  he  says  :  '-After  the  Battle  of 
the  Wilderness  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy  deemed  it  of  tiie  first  importance  to  run  no 
risk  with  the  army  h<>  llien  had.  He  acted  purely  on  the  defensive,  behind  breastworks,  or, 
feebly  on  the  offensive,  immediately  in  front  of  them,  and  where,  in  case,  of  repulse,  h«< 
could  retire  behind  them.  Without  a  greater  sacrifice  'if  life  than  f  was  willing  to  make, 
all  could  not  bo  accomplished  that  I  designed  north  of  Richmond.'1 

Mr.  Secretary  Stanton,  with  a  keenness  of  stragetie  acciimen  which  is  altogether  unpar- 
;illed.  >ays:  "Forty-three  days  of  desperate  fighting  or  marching,  by  day  and  night,  forced 
back  the  rebel  army  from  the  Knpidan  to  their  intrenehmentj  around  Richmond,  and  car- 
ried the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  south  side  of , lames  River.  The  strength  of  the  enemy's 
i'oree  when  the  campaign  opened,  or  the  extent  of  his  loss,  is  not  known  to  this  Department. 
Any  inequality  between  Lee's  army  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  fully  compensated  by 
the  advantage  of  position.'' 

We  are  left  in  the  dark  whether  it  was  the  desperate  fighting  or  the  desperate  marching 
which  did  all  this;  but,  however  that  maybe.it  was  a  wonderful  achievement,  especially 
when  it  is  considered  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  might,  have  been  carried  to  the  south 
side  of  James  Uiver  by  transports,  and  Lee's  army  thereby  forced  back  to  the  intreneh- 
lueiits  around  Richmond,  without  the  ''Forty-three  days  of  desperate  lighting  or  marching. 
i>Y  day  and  by  night,"  and  without  the  loss  of  men  sustained  by  Grant.  There  arc  soiii--. 
who  think  Stanton  is  slyly  making  fun  of  Grant ;  but,  il  he  is  not,  and  is  in  dead  earnest,  the 
i|i|cstinn  naturally  arises,  in  the  mind  of  one  not  ,-is  gifted  as  the  Federal  Secretary  of  War: 
JInw  happened  it  that,  if  Lee  was  being  constantly  forced  buck,  for  forty-three  days,  over  a 
distance,  of  more  than  eighty  miles,  he  always  had  the  >horter  line,  and  possession  of  the 
m:dn  roads,  and  got  the  advantage  of  position,  and  had  time  to  fortify  it  ? 

I  happen  to  know  that  General  Lee  always  had  the  greatest  anxiety  to  strike  at  Grant  in 
t!ie  open  field:  and  I  should  like  to  know  when  it  was  that  the  latter  operated  on  the  defer, 
sue,  or  offensive  either,  e.vt-pt  behind,  or  immediately  in  front  of,  far  better  intrenehment- 
than  General  Lee's  army,  with  its  limited  means.  WHS  able  to  make.  An  inspection  of  the 
battle-fields,  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  .lames,  will  show  that  Grant's  army  did  a  vast  deal 
more  digging  than  General  Lee's. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  one  commander  was  a  great  captain,  and  perfect  master  of  his  art. 
while  the  other  had  none  of  the  reiudtsiiCH  of  a  great  captain,  but  merely  possessed  the  mo-t 
ordinary  brute  courage,  and  had  the  control  of  unlimited  number*  and  means.  Yet,  it  i« 
£ 


34  NOTE  ON  THE  REPORTS  OF  GRANT  AND  STANTON. 

Claimed  that  Grant  fights  and  writes  better  than  Alexander,  and  Hannibal.  and<';es.ar.  and 

Napoleon,  and  all  the  rest ;  and  when,  in  the  e\rr,-;^.  ,,f  his  great  powers  of npoMtion.  !i. 

turns  the  batteries  of  hi<  rhetoric  on  Butler,  I  My,  in  his  own  ela--ie  laminate,  "do  in!" 
Von  can't  him  a  li<-k  amiss.  1  cannot,  however,  but  he  amused  at  the  ctlbrt  to  niako  Hutlcr 
the  scape-piai  :  and  cannot  help  thinking  that  dram  might  to  have  known,  beforehand,  tliui 
he  (Butler)  was  nntit  to  jnakc  war,  except  on  deteiieclc.--  women  and  childreii.  mid  that  tie- 
trophies  valued  by  him  were  not  those  won  ;it  tlie  cannon's  mouth. 

drain,  in  his  report,  has  enunciated  the  leading  principles  ol"  hi-  -trateuy.  :>nd  In 
ta inly  entitled  to  the  credit  of  ha\  inir  practi-ed  them,  it'noi  to  t lie  merit  < it' originality.    They 
were:   ••  First,  to  use  the  greatest   number  of  troofta  practicable  again.-!  the  alined  '• 
the  enemy;"  and.  Second,  to  hammer  continuously  against   the  armed   tone  of  the  enemy, 
and  his  resources,  until.  by  mere  Mttritiou.  if  by  nothing  else,  there  -hoitld  l>e  nothing  It'll 
to  him  but  an  e.jual  suhmi-sion,  with  the  loyal  section   ol  our  common  i-ountry.  to  i. 
Mi  tut  ion  and  law  >  of  the  land."    i  Al-i-  !  w  h: lit  has  I  >eeonic  of  t  lie  constitution  and  law  s  '.'     Tlii- 
latter  principle  wa-  more   c-,.!,c-j~,.!y  .-ind   r.ireii.-.  l.y   Mr.   Lincoln,  when   he   de- 

clared his  purpose  to  ••  keep  a  pffjjfin^."  The  jihiin  Knulish  of  the  \\lmle  idea«as  to  eon 
timie  ntisinp  troop-,  ,-in.l  to  opp.,-.-  them,  in  overxs  helming  number.-,  to  the  i  ontederai-' 
Army,  until  tho  Intn-r  -honld  \\":ir  ii-(dl  nut  «  hippinu'  them,  wiu-n  ;i  n«-M  ly-reeruiie<i  army 
uiifcht  "KO  in  and  win.'1  And.  this  MM-  ;ietnally  «  lint  took  pi. ice  in  regard  to  <  •cncriil  !.••••  s 
army. 

drant  having  estalilished   l,i>   i'ai!i.    M  ••  «  vit.  i.  :.-  well  a-  tichtei-.  I   |.;e-i he  \\ill   '_'i\e 

the  world  the  benefit  of  hi.-  idea*,  and  publish  a  work  on  strategy,  which  I  would  Mnr^e-i 
might  to  lie  called  "Th"  l.ineoln-<;rant  or  I'e^^iiiu-fiainmi  i  \>-t  ol 

lie  has  made  sonic  oliscrvations.  in  hi.-  i-.-i.oi-t.  .ii.oiit  i).,.    ,,h •;;i|t-,^.--  ..f  interior  lines  m' 

eoinmiinii-ation.  .-nppn-ed  •«  he  pn--i  — ed  liy  the  <  'mit'ederaii iuii,.in.i-'i--.  which  arc  moi-e 

-pet-ion.-  tliMii  «oii!id.     Tic-    M;--i.--ip|ii   lii\  er  divided  the  <  'iint'edcnii  •>   in:n  n\.>  p.-e 
the  immense  naval  power  of  the  enemy  enabled  him  to  render  eommmiieation  across  that 
river,  ait'ter  tin- I-.-- of  N..«  Qrleann  an.i  Memphis,  always  difflcalt,  and  finally  to  i;et  entire 
-ion  ff  it.      I  Hi  the  eastern  side  of  it,  the  raiii'o;id  communications  ueiv  luirrly  siitli- 
eient   for  the  traiispiirtiitioii   of  *upplie-.  an  1  the   transportation   «i   iroop-   oTer   tin  in  \\.i- 
nlways  tedious  and   difticult.      The  nhio  L'uei.  in   tir-  \\  e-t.  and   the   I'otoma".  in  1 1- 
with   thr'  mountains  ..f  AVe-t«-ni  \'iririni:i.  rendei.  d   it   impo--il.le   for  :m  invadinir  army  (•> 
march  into  t  lie  enemy's  country,  except  ut  one  or  t\\o  ford-  on  the  Potomac.  ji:-t  e.-ivt  ofth- 
nine  liidse.  and  two  or  three  fords  above  Harper'-  Kerry.     'I  h«   pO«8i  --ion   of  the   seas  aii'i 

(h*>  blockade  of  our  ports,  a*  well  as  the  po--e— .ion  of  tha  MiMiBHlppi,  the  Ohio  and  I'oto- 
niae  b'i\  fj-s.  with  the  Baltimore  and  <  »!iio  llailroad,  and  the  railroads  throii^n  I'enn-ylvaiiia. 
Oiiio,  Indiana,  Illinois.  Kentucky  an<l  Temi« •--.•,•.  .-n.-.i.li  <i  the  enemy  to  transport  troop-. 
from  the  mo-t  remote  point-,  with  more  e;l-e  and  rapidity  than  they  eoiild  be  tran-; 

o\  er  the  i-ailroads  under  th< ntrol   ol  the  Confederate  Ooremment,  all   of  which  «• 

i. nd  I'oiidition.     The  enemy  therefore,  in  fact,  had  all  the  advantages  .,f  interior  lines;  th.-.i 
is  rapidity  ol"  eoniniuni'-atioi\  and  concentration,  with  the  advantage.  a|.o.  of  Mii 
communieation  with  all  tlie  world,  which  hi-  naval  pou.'r  ^ave  him. 


CAMPAIGN  IN  MARYLAND 

AND 

THE  VALLEY  OF  ArIB,GINlA. 


INTRODUCTION 

The  Valley  of  Virginia,  in  its  largest  sense,  embraces  all 
that  country  lying  between  the  Blue  Ridge  and  Alleghany 
Mountains,  which  unite  at  its  south-western  end. 

The  Shenandoah  Valley,  which  is  a  part  of  the  Valley  of 
Virginia,  embraces  the  Counties  of  Augusta,  Rockingham, 
Shenandoah,  Page,  Warren,  Clarke,  Frederick,  Jefferson,  and 
Berkeley.  This  valley  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  the  Poto- 
mac, on  the  south  by  the  County  of  Rockbridge,  on  the  east 
by  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  on  the  west  by  the  Great  North  Moun- 
tain and  its  ranges. 

The  Shenandoah  River  is  composed  of  two  branches,  called, 
respectively,  the  "North  Fork"  and  the  "South  Fork,"  which 
unite  near  Front  Royal  in  Warren  County.  The  North  Fork 
rises  in  the  Great  North  Mountain,  and  runs  eastwardly  to 
within  a  short  distance  of  New  Market  in  Shenandoah  County, 
and  thence  north-east  by  Mount  Jackson  to  Strasburg,  where 
it  turns  east  to  Front  Royal.  The  South  Fork  is  formed  by 
the  union  of  North  River,  Middle  River,  and  South  River. 
North  River  and  Middle  River,  running  from  the  west,  unite 
near  Port  Republic  in  Rockingham  County.  South  River  rises 
in  the  south-eastern  part  of  Augusta,  and  runs  by  Waynes- 
boro',  along  the  western  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  to  Port  Re- 
public, where  it  unites  with  the  stream  formed  by  the  junction 
of  the  North  and  Middle  rivers.  From  Port  Republic,  the 


30  INTRODUCTION. 

South  Fork  of  the  Shenaudoah  runs  north-east,  through  the 
eastern  border  of  Rockingham  and  the  county  of  Pago,  to 
Front  Royal  in  AVarren  county. 

The  North  Fork  au<l  South  Fork  are  separated  hy  the  Mas- 
sanutten Mountain,  which  is  connected  with  no  other  moun- 
tain, but  terminates  abruptly  at  both  cuds.  Its  northern  etui 
is  washed  at  its  base,  just  below  Strasbtirg,  by  the  North  Fork. 
Its  southern  end  terminates  near  the  road  between  Ilarrisun- 
burg  and  Conrad's  Store  on  the  South  Fork,  at  which  latter 
place  the  road  through  Swift  Run  (lap  in  the  Blue  Ridge 
crosses  that  stream.  Two  valleys  are  thus  formed,  the  one  on 
the  North  Fork  being  called  "The  Alain  A'alley,"  and  the 
other  on  the  South  Fork,  and  embracing  the  County  of  Page 
and  part  of  the  County  of  AVarren,  being  usually  known  by 
the  name  of  "The  Luray  Valley."  The  Luray  Valley  unites 
with  the  Alain  A'alley  at  both  ends  of  the  mountain.  There  is 
a  good  road  across  Massanutten  Mountain,  from  one  valley  t« 
the  other,  and  through  a  gap  near  New  Market.  South  of  this 
gap  there  is  no  road  aero.-s  the  mountain,  and  north  of  it 
the  roads  are  very  rugged  and  not  practicable  for  the  march  of 
a  large  army  with  its  trains.  At  the  northern  or  lower  end  of 
Massanutten  Mountain,  and  between  two  branches  of  it,  is  a 
valley  called  "  Powell's  Fort  A'alley  "  or  more  commonly  "The 
Fort."  This  valley  is  accessible  only  by  the  very  rugged  roads 
over  the  mountain  which  have.1  been  mentioned,  and  through 
a  ravine  at  its  lower  end.  From  its  isolated  position,  it  was 
not  the  theatre  of  military  operations  of  any  consequence,  but 
merely  furnished  a  refuge  for  deserter-,  stragglers,  and  fugi- 
tives, from  the  battle-fields. 

From  Front  Royal  the  Shenandoah  River  runs  along  the 
western  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge  to  Harper's  Ferry,  where  it 
unites  with  the  Potomac,  which  here  bursts  through  the  moun- 
tains. The  mountain  in  extension  of  the  range  of  the  Blue 
Ridge  from  this  point  through  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  is 
called  "South  Mountain." 

Strictly  speaking,  the  County  of  Berkeley  and  the  greater 
part  of  Frederick  are  not  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah. 
The  Opeqnon,  rising  south-west  of  Winchester,  and  crossing 


INTRODUCTION.  37 

the  Valley  Pike  four  or  five  miles  south  of  that  place,  turns  to 
the  north  and  empties  into  the  Potomac  some  distance  above 
its  junction  with  the  Shenandoah;  the  greater  part  of  Frede- 
rick and  nearly  the  whole  of  Berkeley  being  on  the  western 
side  of  the  Opequou. 

Little  North  Mountain,  called  in  the  lower  valley  "North 
Mountain,"  runs  north-east,  through  the  western  portions  of 
Shenandoah,  Frederick,  and  Berkeley  Counties,  to  the  Poto- 
mac. At  its  northern  end,  where  it  is  called  North  Mountain, 
it  separates  the  waters  of  the  Opequon  from  those  of  Back 
Creek. 

Cedar  Creek  rises  in  Shenandoah  County,  west  of  Little 
North  Mountain,  and  running  north-east  along  its  western 
base,  passes  through  that  mountain,  four  or  live  miles  from 
Strasburg,  and,  then  making  a  circuit,  empties  into  the  North 
Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  about  two  miles  below  Strasburg. 

The  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  crosses  the  Potomac  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  passing  through  Martinsburg  in  Berkeley 
County,  crosses  Back  Creek  near  its  mouth,  runs  up  the  Poto- 
mac, crossing  the  South  Branch  of  that  river  near  its  mouth, 
and  then  the  North  Branch  to  Cumberland  in  Maryland. 
From  this  place  it  runs  into  Virginia  again  and,  passing 
through  North  Western  Virginia,  strikes  the  Ohio  river  by 
two  stems  terminating  at  Wheeling  and  Parkersburg,  re- 
spectively. * 

There  is  a  railroad  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Winchester, 
called  "The  Winchester  and  Potomac  Railroad,"  and  also  one 
from  Manassas  Junction  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Rail- 
road, through  Manassas  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge,  by  Front 
Royal  and  Strasburg,  to  Mount  Jackson,  called  "The  Manas- 
sas Gap  Railroad ; "  but  both  of  these  roads  were  torn  up  and 
rendered  unserviceable  in  the  year  1862,  under  the  orders  of 
General  Jackson. 

From  Staunton  in  Augusta  County,  there  is  a  fine  macadam- 
ized road  called  "  The  Valley  Pike,"  running  through  Mount 
Sidney,  Mount  Crawford,  Harrisonburg,  New  Market,  Mount 
Jackson,  Edinburg,  Woodstock,  Strasburg,  Middletown,  New- 


38  INTRODUCTION, 

town,  Bartonsville,  and  Kernstown  to  Winchester  in  Frederick 
County,  and  crossing  Middle  River  seven  miles  from  Staunton, 
Xortli  River  at  Mount  Crawford  eighteen  miles  from  Staunton, 
the  isbrth  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah  at  Mount  Jackson,  Cedar 
Creek  hetween  Strasburg  and  Middletown,  and  the  Opequon 
at  Bartonsville,  four  or  five  miles  from  Winchester.  There  is 
also  another  road  west  of  the  Valley  Pike,  connecting  these 
several  villages,  called  the  "Hack  Road."  und,  in  some  places, 
another  road  between  the  Valley  Pike  and  the  Back  Road, 
which  is  called  the  "Middle  Road." 

From  Winchester  there  is  a  macadamized  road,  via  Mar- 
tinsburg,  to  Williamsport  on  the  Potomac  in  Maryland,  and 
another,  via  Berryville  in  Clarke  County,  and  Charlestowu  in 
.Jefferson  County,  to  Harper's  Ferry.  There  is  also  a  good 
pike  from  Winchester  to  Front  Royal,  which  crosses  both  forks 
of  the  Slienandoah  just  above  their  junction  :  and  from  Front 
! loyal  there  are  good  roads  up  the  Luray  Valley,  and  by  the 
way  of  Conrad's  Store  and  Port  Republic,  to  Harrisonburg 
and  Staunton. 

From  Staunton,  south,  there  are  good  roads  passing  through 
Lexington,  in  Rockbridge  County,  and  Buchanan,  in  Bote- 
tourt  County,  to  several  points  on  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee 
Railroad;  and  others  direct  from  Staunton  and  Lexington  to 
Lynchburg. 

The  Central  Railroad,  from  Richmond,  passes  through  the 
Blue  Ridge,  with  a  tunnel  at  Rocl-rfish  Gap,  and  runs  through 
\Vaynesboro  and  Stauntou,  westwardly  to  Jackson's  River, 
which  is  one  of  the  head-streams  of  James  River. 

This  description  of  the  country  is  given  in  order  to  render 
the  following  narrative  intelligible  without  too  much  repetition. 

In  the  spring  of  1864,  before  the  opening  of  the  campaign, 
the  lower  Slienandoah  Valley  was  held  by  the  Federal  troops, 
under  Major-General  Sigel,  with  his  head-quarters  at  Win- 
chester, while  the  upper  Valley  was  held  by  Brigadier-General 
Imboden,  of  the  Confederate  Army,  with  one  brigade  of 
cavalry,  or  mounted  infantry,  and  a  battery  of  artillery. 
When  the  campaign  opened,  Sigel  moved  up  the  Valley,  and 


INTRODUCTION  39 

Major-General  Breekenridge  moved  from  South-Western  Vir- 
ginia, with  two  brigades  of  infantry  and  a  battalion  of  artil- 
lery, to  meet  him.  Breckenridge,  having  united  his  forces 
with  Imboden's,  met  and  defeated  Sigel,  at  Xew  Market,  on 
the  15th  day  of  May,  driving  him  back  towards  Winchester. 
Breekenridge  then  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  joined  Gen- 
eral Lee,  at  Hanover  Junction,  with  his  two  brigades  of  in- 
fantry and  the  battalion  of  artillery.  Subsequently,  the  .Fede- 
ral General  .Hunter  organized  another  and  larger  force  than 
Sigel's,  and  moved  up  the  Valley;  and,  on  the  5th  day  of 
June,  defeated  Brigadier-General  William  E.  Jones,  at  Pied- 
mont, between  Port  Republic  and  Staunton — Jones'  force- 
being  composed  of  a  very  small  body  of  infantry,  and  a  cavalry 
force  which  had  been  brought  from  South- Western  Virginia, 
after  Brcckenridge's  departure  from  the  Valley.  Jones  was 
killed,  and  the  remnant  of  his  force,  under  Brigadier-General 
Vaughan,  fell  back  to  Waynesboro.  Hunter's  force  then 
united  with  another  column  which  had  moved  from  Lewis- 
burg,  in  Western  Virginia,  under  the  Federal  General  Crook. 
As  soon  aa  information  was  received  of  Jones'  defeat  and 
death,  Breekenridge  was.._so*t  back  to  the  Valley,  with  the 
force  he  had  brought  with  him. 


MAUCIE  TO  LVNCHBUKG,  AND  PURSUIT  OF 
HUNTER. 

on  the  l^th  of  June,  while  the  2nd  Corps  (Kwell's)  of  the 
Ann v  of  Northern  A'irginia  was  lying  near  Games7  Mill,  in 
rear  of  Hill's  line  at  Cold  Harbour,  I  received  verbal  order- 
from  General  Lee  to  hold  the  corps,  with  two  of  the  battalions 
of  artillery  attached  to  it,  in  readiness  to  ni<>\v  t«»  the  Shemm- 
doah  Valley.  Nelson's  and  Braxton's  battalions  were  selectetl. 
and  Brigadier-General  Long  was  ordered  to  accompany  me  as 
Chief  of  Artillery.  After  dark,  on  the  same  day.  written  in- 
structions were  given  me  by  General  Lee,  by  which  I  was 
directed  to  move,  with  the  force  designated,  at  '!  o'clock  m\i 
morning,  for  the  Valley,  by  way  of  Louisa  ('.  1L  and  Char- 
lottesville,  and  through  Brown's  or  Swift  Run  Gap  in  the  Blue 
Ridge,  as  I  might  find  most  advisable:  to  strike  Hunter'- 
force  in  the  rear,  and,  if  possible,  destroy  it :  then  to  move 
down  the  Valley,  cross  the  Potomac  near  Leesburg  in  London 
County,  or  at  <>r  above  Harper's  Ferry,  as  1  might  find  m<»! 
practicable,  and  threaten  Washington  City.  \  was  further 
directed  to  communicate  with  General  Bre.ckenridge.  who 
won  Id  CO-Operate  with  me  in  the  attack  on  Hunter,  and  the  ex- 
pedition into  Maryland. 

At  this  time  the  railroad  and  telegraph  lines  between  Char- 
lottesville  and  Lynchbtirg  had  been  cut  by  a  cavalry  force  from 
Hunter's  army;  and  those  between  Richmond  and  Charlotte— 
ville  had  been  cut  by  Sheridan's  cavalry,  from  Grant's  army; 
so  that  there  was  no  communication  with  Breckcnridge. 
Hunter  was  supposed  to  be  at  Staunton  with  his  whole  fore.  , 
and  Breckenridge  was  supposed  to  be  at  Wayneshoro,  or  Rock- 
iisli  Gap.  If  such  had  been  the  case,  the  route  designated  by 
General  Lee  would  have  carried  me  into  the  A 'alley  in  Hun- 
ter's rear. 

The  2nd  Corps  now  numbered  a  little  over  8,000  musketrf 


MARCH  TO  LYNCHBUKG.  41 

for  duty.  It  had  been  on  active  and  arduous  service  in  the 
field  for  forty  days,  and  had  been  engaged  in  all  the  great 
battles  from  the  "Wilderness  to  Cold  Harbour,  sustaining  very 
heavy  losses  at  Spotsylvania  C.  II.  where  it  lost  nearly  an 
entire  division,  including  its  commander,  Major-General  John- 
son, who  was  made  prisoner.  Of  the  Brigadier-Generals  with 
it  at  the  commencement  of  the  campaign,  only  one  remained 
in.  command  of  his  brigade.  Two  (Gordon  and  Eamseur)  had 
been  made  Major-Generals ;  one  (G.  II.  Steuart)  had  been  cap- 
tured; four  (Pegram,  Hays,  J.  A.  Walker,  and  R.  D.  John- 
ston) had  been  severely  wounded:  and  four  (Stafford,  J.  M. 
Jones,  Daniel,  and  Doles)  had  been  killed  in  action.  Constant 
exposure  to  the  weather,  a  limited  supply  of  provisions,  and 
two  weeks'  service  in  the  swamps  north  of  the  Chickahominy 
had  told  on  the  health  of  the  men.  Divisions  were  not 
stronger  than  brigades  ought  to  have  been,  nor  brigades  than 
regiments. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  at  2  o'lclock,  we  commenced 
the  march ;  and,  on  the  16th,  arrived  at  the  Rivanna  River, 
near  Charlottesville,  having  marched  over  eighty  miles  in  four 
days.* 

From  Louisa  C.  II.  I  had  sent  a  dispatch  to  Gordonsville,  to 
l»i-  forwarded,  by  telegraph,  to  Breckenridge  ;  and,  on  my  ar- 
rival at  Charlottesville,  on  the  16th,  to  Avhich  place  I  rode  in 
advance  of  the  troops,  I  received  a  telegram  from  him,  dated 
at  Lynchburg,  informing  me  that  Hunter  was  then  in  Bedford 
county,  about  twenty  miles  from  that  place,  and  moving  on  it. 

The  railroad  and  telegraph  between  Charlottesville  and 
Lynchburg  had  been,  fortunately,  but  slightly  injured  by  the 


*(>n  the  ir.th,  we  passed  over  the  ground,  near  Trevillia.n's  dcpoi,  on  which  Hampton  and 
Sheridan  had  fought,  oil  the  llth  stud  12th.  Hampton  had  defeated  Sheridan,  :md  wjis  then 
in  pursuit  of  him.  (Irani  claims,  in  his  report,  that,  on  the  llth,  Sheridan  drove  our  cavalry 
'•  from  the  tield,  in  complete  rout;"  and  says,  when  lie  advanced  towards  Gordonsville,  on 
rlie  I 'Jill,  "he  found  the  enemy  reinforced  l>y  infantry,  behind  well-constructed  ride-pits, 
.•itioiit  five  miles  from  the  latter  pl:\cc,  and  too  strong  to  successfully  assault." 

This  is  us  thoroughly  a  fancy  sketch  as  can  well  be  manufacuired.  There  was  not  an  iu- 
t'.mtry  «oldier  in  arms  nearer  the  scene  of  action  than  with  (ieueral  Lee's  army,  near  rold 
Harbour;  and  the  "well-constructed  rifle-pits"  were  nothing  more  than  rails  put  up  in  the 
manner  in  which  c^ualry  wore,  accustomed  to  arrange  them  to  prevent  a  charge.  Sheridan 
mistook  some  of  Hampton's  cavalry,  dismounted  <ind  fighting  on  foot,  lor  infantry;  and  tii« 
statement  was  made  to  cover  his  defeat. 
F 


42  MARCH  TO  LYNCHBURG. 

enemy's  cavalry,  and  had  been  repaired.  The  distance  \><-.- 
tween  the  two  places  was  sixty  miles,  and  there  were  no  train- 
at  Charlottesville,  except  one  which  belonged  to  the  Central 
road,  and  was  about  starting  for  Waynesboro.  I  ordered  this 
to  be  detained,  and  immediately  directed,  by  telegram,  all  the 
trains  of  the  two  roads  to  be  sent  to  me  with  all  dispatch,  for 
the  purpose  of  transporting  my  troops  to  Lynchburg.  The 
trains  were  not  in  readiness  to  take  the  troops  on  board  until 
sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  and  then  only  enough 
were  furnished  to  transport  about  half  my  infantry.  Ram- 
seur's  division,  one  brigade  of  <  lordoirs  division,  and  part  of 
another  were  put  on  the  trains,  as  soon  they  were  ready,  and 
-tarred  for  Lynchburg.  liodes'  division,  and  the  residue  of 
Gordon's,  were  ordered  to  move  along  the  railroad,  to  mei-t 
the  trains  on  their  return.  The  artillery  and  wagon  train- 
had  been  started  <>n  the  ordinary  roads  at  daylight. 

I  accompanied  Uamseur's  division,  going  on  tin-  fnmt  train, 
but  tin-  road  and  rolling  stork  were  in  such  bad  condition  that 
I  did  not  reach  Lyiichburg  until  about  one  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, and  the  other  trains  were  much  later.  I  found  General 
l>reckenridge  in  bed.  -uttering  from  an  injury  received  by  the 
fall  of  a  horse  killed  under  him  in  action  near  Cold  Harbour. 
!!«•  had  moved  from  Koektish  Gap  to  Lynchbnrg  by  a  forced 
march,  us  soon  as  Hunter's  m.ivenn-iit  towards  that  place  \\a- 
di-cdvered.  When  1  -bowed  him  my  instructions,  he  ver\ 
readily  and  cordially  ottered  to  co-operate  with  me,  and  sei-\i 
under  my  command. 

Hunter's  advance  trom  Staunton  luid  been  impeded  by  " 
brigade  of  cavalry,  under  Brigadier-*  General  MeCausIand. 
which  had  been  managed  with  great  skill,  and  kept  in  hi> 
1'nmt  all  the  way.  and  he  was  reported  to  be  then  advancing 
on  the  old  stone  turnpike  from  Liberty,  in  Bedford  County, 
by  New  London,  and  watched  by  Imboden  with  a  small  for.-.- 
"f  cavalry. 

As  General  IJreektn ridge  wa.-  unable  to  go  out,  at  his  iv- 
•{uest,  General  1).  II.  Hill,  who  happened  to  be  in  town,  had 
made  arrangements  for  the  defence  of  the  city,  with  sue! 


OPERATIONS  AT  LYNCHBURG.  4* 

troops  as  were  at  hand.  Brigadier-General  Hays,  who  was  an 
invalid  from  a  wound  received  at  Spotsylvania  Court  House, 
had  tendered  his  services  and  also  aided  in  making  arrange- 
ments for  the  defence.  I  rode  out  with  General  Hill  to  ex- 
amine the  line  selected  by  him,  and  make  a  reconnoissance  of 
the  country  in  front.  Slight  works  had  been  hastily  thrown 
up  on  College  Hill,  covering  the  turnpike  and  Forest  roads 
from  Liberty,  which  were  manned  by  Breckenridge's  infantry 
and  the  dismounted  cavalry  of  the  command  which  had  been 
with  Jones  at  Piedmont,  The  reserves,  invalids  from  the  hos- 
pitals, and  the  cadets  from  the  Military  Institute  at  Lexington, 
occupied  other  parts  of  the  line.  An  inspection  satisfied  me 
that,  while  this  arrangement  was  the  best  which  could  be  made 
under  the  circumstances  which  General  Hill  found  himself, 
yet  it  would  leave  the  town  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery,  should  he  advance  to  the  attack,  and  I  therefore  de- 
termined to  meet  the  enemy  with  my  troops  in  front. 

We  found  Imboden  about  four  miles  out  on  the  turnpike, 
near  an  old  Quaker  church,  to  which  position  he  had  been 
gradually  forced  back  by  the  enemy's  infantry.  My  troops,  as 
they  arrived,  had  been  ordered  in  front  of  the  works  to 
bivouac,  and  I  immediately  sent  orders  for  them  to  move  out 
on  this  road,  and  two  brigades  of  liamseur's  division  arrived 
just  in  time  to  be  thrown  across  the  road,  at  a  redoubt  about 
two  miles  from  the  city,  as  Imbodeii's  command  was  driven 
back  by  vastly  superior  numbers.  These  brigades,  with  two 
pieces  of  artillery  in  the  redoubt,  arrested  the  progress  of  the 
enemy,  and  Ramseur's  other  brigade,  and  the  part  of  Gordon's 
division  which  had  arrived,  took  position  on  the  same  line. 
The  enemy  opened  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  on  us,  but,  as  night 
soon  came  on,  he  went  into  camp  on  our  front.* 

*  Hunter's  delay  in  advancing  from  Staunton  had  been  most  remarkable,  and  can  be  ac- 
counted for  only  by  the  fact,  that  indulgence  in  petty  acts  of  malignity  and  outrage  upon 
private  citizens  wns  more  congenial  to  his  nature  than  bold  operations  in  the  field.  He  had 
defeated  Jones'  small  force  at  Piedmont  about  ten  miles  from  Staunton,  on  the  6th,  and 
united  with  Crook  on  the  8th,  yet  he  did  not  arrive  in  front  of  Lynchburg  until  near  night 
on  the  17th.  The  route  from  Staunton  to  Lynchburg  by  which  he  moved,  >vhich  was  by 
Lexington,  Buchanan,  the  Peaks  of  Otter,  and  Liberty,  is  about  one  hundred  miles  in  dis- 
tance. It  is  true  McCausland  had  delayed  his  progress  by  keeping  constantly  in  his  front, 
but  an  energetic  advance  would  have,  brushed  away  MoOiusland's  small  foitw,  arid  LynoO- 


44  OPERATIONS  AT    f.YNX'IIBURH. 

On  my  arrival  at  .Lynchburg,  orders  had  been  given  for  tin- 
immediate  return  of  the  trains  for  the  rest  of  my  infantry, 
and  I  expected  it  to  arrive  l»y  the  morning  of  the  18th,  but  it 
did  not  get  to  Lynchburg  until  late  in  the  afternoon  of  thai 
day.  Hunters  force  was  considerably  larger  than  mint'  would 
have  been,  had  it  all  been  up,  and  as  it  was  of  the  utmost  con- 
seiMience  to  the  army  at  Richmond  that  he  should  not  get  into 
Lynchburg,  I  did  not  feel  justified  in  attacking  him  until  1 
could  do  so  with  a  fair  prospect  of  succcs^  1  contented  my- 
self therefore  with  acting  on  the  defensive  on  the  18th,  throw- 
ing 33  reckon  ridge's  infantry  and  a  part  of  his  artillery  on  the 
front  line,  while  that  adopted  by  (leneral  Hill  was  occupied  by 
the  dismounted  cavalry  and  the  irregular  troops.  During  the 
day,  there  was  artillery  tiring  and  skirmishing  along  the  line, 
and,  in  the  afternoon,  an  attack  was  made  on  our  line,  to  the 
right  of  the  turnpike,  which  w:-s  handsomely  repulsed  with 
considerable  loss  to  the  enemy.  A  demonstration  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  on  the  Forest  road,  wav  checked  by  part  of 
Breckenridge's  infantry  under  Wharton,  and  MeCausland's 
cavalry. 

On  the  iii-rival  of  the  cars  from  Richmond  this  day,  Major- 
'  Jeue-rals  El/ey  and  "Ransom  reported  for  duty,  the  former  to 
command  the  infantry  and  dismounted  cavalry  of  Brecken- 
ridge's command,  and  the  latter  to  command  the  cavalry. 
The  mounted  cavalry  consisted  of  the  remnants  of  several  bri- 
gades divided  into  two  commands,  one  under  Jmboden,  ami 
the  other  under  McCausland.  It  was  badly  mounted  and 
armed,  and  its  efficiency  much  impaired  by  the  defeat  at  Pied- 
mont, and  the  arduous  service  it  had  recently  gone  through. 

As  soon  as  the  remainder  of  my  infantry  arrived  by  the 
railroad,  though  none  of  my  artillery  had  gotten  up,  arrange- 
ments were  made  for  attacking  Hunter  at  daylight  on  the  19th, 
but,  sometime  after  midnight,  it  was  discovered  that  he  was 
moving,  though  it  was  not  known  whether  he  was  retreating, 
<>r  moving  so  as  to  attack  Lynchburg  on  the  south  where  it 


burg,  with  all  its  niaiuii'acturinj;  establishments  and  .stores,  would  huve  fallen  before  ussis- 
tanee  arrived.  A  .subsequent  imssago  over  the  greater  part  of  the  sumu  route  showed  how 
Humor  had  boon  employed. 


PURSUIT  OF  HUNTER.  45 

was  vulnerable,  or  to  attempt  to  join  Grant  on  the  south  side 
of  James  River.  Pursuit  could  not,  therefore,  be  made  at 
once,  as  a  mistake,  if  either  of  the  last  two  objects  had  been 
contemplated,  would  have  been  fatal.  At  light,  however,  the 
pursuit  commenced,  the  2nd  Corps  moving  along  the  turnpike, 
over  which  it  was  discovered  Hunter  was  retreating,  and 
Elzey's  command  on  the  right,  along  the  Forest  road,  while 
Ransom  was  ordered  to  move  on  the  right  of  Elzey,  with  Mc- 
Causland's  cavalry,  and  endeavor  to  strike  the  enemy  at 
Liberty  or  the  Peaks  of  Otter.  Imboden,  who  was  on  the 
road  from  Lynchburg  to  Campbell  Court  House,  to  watch  a 
body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  had  moved  in  [that  direc- 
tion the  day  before,  was  to  have  moved  on  the  left  towards 
Liberty,  but  orders  did  not  reach  him  in  time.  The  enemy's 
rear  was  overtaken  at  Liberty,  twenty-live  miles  from  Lynch- 
burg, just  before  night,  and  driven  through  that  place,  after  a 
brisk  skirmish,  by  Ramseur's  division.  The  days  march  on 
the  old  turnpike,  which  was  very  rough,  had  been  terrible. 
McCausland  had  taken  the  wrong  road  and  did  not  reach  Lib- 
erty until  after  the  enemy  had  been  driven  through  the  town. 

It  was  here  ascertained  that  Hunter  had  not  retreated  on 
the  route  by  the  Peaks  of  Otter,  over  which  he  had  advanced, 
but  had  taken  the  road  to  Buford's  depot,  at  the  foot  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  which  would  enable  him  to  go  either  by  Salem, 
Fincastle,  or  Buchanan.  Ransom  was,  therefore,  ordered  to 
take  the  route,  next  day,  by  the  Peaks  of  Otter,  and  endeavour 
to  intercept  the  enemy  should  he  move  by  Buchanan  or  Fin- 
castle.  The  pursuit  was  resumed  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
20th,  and  on  our  arrival  in  sight  of  Buford's,  the  enemy's  rear 
guard  was  seen  going  into  the  mountain  on  the  road  towards 
Salem.  As  this  left  the  road  to  Buchanan  open,  my  aide, 
Lieutenant  Pitzer,  was  sent  across  the  mountain  to  that  place, 
with  orders  to  Ransom  to  move  for  Salem.  Lieutenant  Pitzer 
was  also  instructed  to  ride  all  night  and  send  directions,  by 
courier  from  Fincastle,  and  telegraph  from  Salem,  to  have  the 
road  through  the  mountains  to  Lewisburg  and  South-Western 
Virginia  blockaded.  The  enemy  was  pursued  into  the  rnoun- 
taina  at  Buford's  Gap,  but  he  had  taken  possession  of  the  crest 


46  PURSUIT  OF  HUNTER. 

of  the  .Blue  Ridge,  and  put  batteries  in  position  commanding  a 
gorge,  through  which  the  road  passes,  where  it  was  impossible 
for  a  regiment  to  move  in  line.  I  had  endeavored  to  ascertain 
if  there  was  not  another  way  sicross  the  mountain  by  which  I 
could  get  around  the  enemy,  but  all  the  men,  except  the  old 
ones,  had  gotten  out  of  the  WHY,  and  the  latter,  as  well  as  the 
women  and  children,  were  in  such  a  state  of  distress  and 
alarm,  that  no  reliable  information  could  be  obtained  from 
them.  We  tried  to  throw  forces  up  the  sides  of  the  moun- 
tains to  get  at  the  em-my,  but  they  were  so  rugged  that  night 
i-ame  on  before  anything  could  be  accomplished,  and  we  had 
to  desist,  though  not  until  a  very  late  hour  in  the  night. 

By  a  mistake  of  the  messenger,  who  was  sent  with  orders  to 
General  Rodes,  who  was  to  be  in  the  lead  next  morning,  there 
was  some  delay  in  his  movement  on  the  ^Ist,  but  the  pursuit 
was  resumed  very  shortly  after  sun-rise.  At  the  Big  Lick,  it 
was  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  turned  off  from  Salem 
towards  Lewisburg  on  a  road  which  passes  through  the  moun- 
tains at  a  narrow  pass  called  the  "  Hanging  Rock,"  and  my 
column  was  immediately  turned  towards  that  point,  but  on 
arriving  there  it  was  ascertained  that  the  enemy's  rear  guard 
had  passed  through  the  gorge.  McCausland  had  struck  his 
column  at  this  point  and  captured  ten  pieces  of  artillery,  some 
waggons,  and  a  number  of  prisoners;  but,  the  enemy  having 
brought  up  a  heavy  force,  McCausland  was  compelled  to  fall 
back,  carrying  oft',  however,  the  prisoners,  and  a  part  of  the 
artillery,  and  disabling  the  rest  so  that  it  could  not  be  removed. 
As  the  enemy  had  got  into  the  mountains,  where  nothing  use- 
ful could  be  accomplished  by  pursuit,  I  did  not  deem  it  proper 
to  continue  it  farther.  A  great  part  of  my  command  had  had 
nothing  to  eat  for  the  last  two  days,  except  a  little  bacon  which 
was  obtained  at  Liberty.  The  cooking  utensils  were  in  the 
trains,  and  the  effort  to  have  bread  baked  at  Lynchburg  had 
failed.  Neither  the  waggon  trains,  nor  the  artillery  of  the 
2nd  Corps,  were  up,  and  I  knew  that  the  country,  through 
which  Hunter's  route  led  for  forty  or  fifty  miles,  was,  for  the 
most  part,  a  desolate  mountain  region ;  and  that  his  troops 
were  taking  everything  in  the  way  of  provisions  and  forage 


PURSUIT  OF  HUNTER.  47 

which  they  could  lay  their  hands  on.  My  field  officers,  except 
those  of  Breckenridge's  command,  were  on  foot,  as  their 
horses  could  not  be  transported  on  the  trains  from  Charlottes- 
vilie.  I  liad  seen  our  soldiers  endure  a  great  deal,  but  there 
was  a  limit  to  the  endurance  even  of  Confederate  soldiers.  A 
stern  chase  of  infantry  is  a  very  difficult  one,  and  Hunter's 
men  were  inarching  for  their  lives,  his  disabled  being  carried 
in  his  provision  train  which  was  now  empty.  My  cavalry  was 
not  strong  enough  to  accomplish  anything  of  importance,  and 
a  further  pursuit  could  only  have  resulted  in  disaster  to  my 
command  from  want  of  provisions  and  forage. 

I  was  glad  to  see  Hunter  take  the  route  to  Lewisburg,  as  I 
knew  he  could  not  stop  short  of  the  Kanawha  River,  and  he 
was,  therefore,  disposed  of  for  some  time.  Had  he  moved  to 
South-Western  Virginia  he  would  have  done  us  incalculable 
mischief,  as  there  was  no  troops  of  any  consequence  in  that 
quarter,  but  plenty  of  supplies  at  that  time.  I  should,  there- 
fore, have  been  compelled  to  follow  him.* 

My  command  had  marched  sixty  miles,  in  the  three  da\> 
pursuit,  over  very  rough  roads,  and  that  part  of  it  from  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  had  no  rest  since  leaving 
Games'  Mill.  I  determined,  therefore,  to  rest  on  the  22nd,  so 
as  to  enable  the  waggons  and  artillery  to  get  up,  and  prepare 
the  men  for  the  long  inarch  before  them.  Imboden  had  come 
np,  following  on  the  road  through  Salem  after  the  enemy,  and 
the  cavalry  was  sent  through  Fincastle,  to  watch  the  enemy 


:;i>nmt,  in  lii.s  report  .says:  "Cieneral  Hunter,  owing  to  u  want  of  ammunition  to  give  bat- 
tle, retired  from  before  the  place"  (Lynchhurg).  This  is  a  little  remarkable,  as  it  appears 
'.h:it  this  expedition  hail  br»n  long  contemplated  and  was  one  of  the  prominent  features  of 
the  campaign  of  JSC4.  Sheridan,  witli  his  cavalry,  was  to  have  united  with  Hunter  at  Lyneh- 
'•urg,  and  the  two  together  were  to  have  destroyed  General  Lee's,  communications  and 
depots  oi'  ^upplies,  and  then  have  joined  Grant.  Can  it  be  believed  that  Hunter  set  out  on  so 
important  an  expedition  with  an  insufficient  supply  of  ammunition?  He  had  fought  onl\ 
i  lie  buttle  of  I'iedniont,  with  a  part  of  his  force,  and  it  was  not  a  very  severe  one,  as  Jone>' 
force  was  a  small  one  and  composed  mostly  of  cavalry.  Crook's  column  not  being  there 
-.vas  not  engaged.  Had  Sheridan  defeated  Hampton  at  Trevillian's.  he  would  have  reached 
I. \ncbburg  after  destroying  the  railroad  on  the  way,  and  1  could  not  have  reached  there  in 
time  to  do  any  good.  l>nt  Hampton  defeated  Sheridan,  and  the  latter  saw  "infantry"'  "too 
-ti'ong  to  successfully  assault."  Hud  Hunter  moved  on  Lynehburg,  with  energy,  that  place 
would  have  fallen  before  it  was  possible  for  me  to  get  there.  But  he  tarried  on  the  way  for 
purposes  which  will  hereafter  appear,  and  when  he  reached  there,  his  heart  failed  him  and 
he  was  afraid  to  fight  an  inferior  force,  and  then  there  was  discovered,  "A  want  of  ammuni- 
tion to  give  battle." 


48  MARCH  DOWN  THE  VALLEY. 

and  annoy  him  as  he  passed  through  the  mountains  towards 
Lewisburg,  and  also  ascertain  whether  he  would  endeavor  to 
get  into  the  Valley  towards  Lexington  or  Staunton. 


MARCH  DOWN    THE  VALLEY,  ANTI>    OPERATIONS 
IX  THE  LOWER.  VALLEY  AND  MARYLAND. 

At  Lynchhurg,  1  had  received  it  telegram  from  General 
Lee,  directing  me,  after  ^disposing  of  Hunter,  either  to  return 
to  his  army  or  carry  out  the  original  plan,  as  1  might  di-em 
most  expedient  under  the  circumstance-  in  which  I  found  m\- 
self.  After  the  pursuit  had  ceased,  1  received  another  dispatch 
from  him,  submitting  it  to  my  judgment  whether  tin-  condition 
of  my  troops  would  permit  the  expedition  across  the  J'otomac 
to  be  carried  out,  and  I  determined  to  take  the  responsibility 
6f  continuing  it.  On  the  23rd,  tlic  march  was  resumed  and 
\\v  readied  Buchanan  that  night,  \vhcrc  \\e  struck  again  the 
route  over  which  Hunter  had  advanced.*  Ransom".-  cavalry 
moved  by  Clifton  Forge,  through  the  \vrstrrn  part  of  K'ock- 
l»  ridge,  to  keep  a  lookout  for  Hunter  and  asm-tain  if  he  should 
attempt  to  get  into  the  Valley  again. 


*Thf  se.-ii..,  (iii  Hunter'H  route  :i..m  I.\  ii.-hi.uri;  had  i-  •  n  truly  h.-an-rfiiiding.  ii 
had  been  burned,  aii'l  h'-lple**  women  aiid  children  left  »  ithont  -belter.  Tin-  country  hu.i 
neen  stripped  oi'  provisions  :m«l  many  familie*  lett  w  iilr.ut  a  mor*el  to  eat.  Kuniitur.-  HUM 
bedding  Mad  been  .-ut  to  [lin-.-s.  Mini  oM  in>  n  :«inl  \\nincn  an«l  ••liililr>-ii  rulilH-d  of  nil  tin- 
olothing  they  liad  except  that  un  their  >iack.«.  Ludies  trunk-  II.-.M  <•<•<•!(  rirlf.i  aii.l  their 
.Ir-----.  •-  tnru  to  pie.'»"i  in  iiKTi-  want..'  _-irl>  had  ln-t  their  little  tin.-r>  . 

U  a  tniM  hinl  ri'iii-wi-i  «  vi.i.-m-.--  "(  the  •n1trau.-.-i  .-.  .ininittfd  hy  UiinterV  <irder<  in  l.urniug 
mid  (ilnndi-rinK  private  li..u  —  •-.  \\  •  -:<u  the  iuin>  ol'  a  niiiniier  of  houses  t<>  whieh  tin 
ti.reh  had  b*en  applied  I'V  hi-^  m  -m-:  -.  \t  I.--  \iinri'.  n  h--  hud  luirned  tin  Military  lii^titni', 
-.vith  all  ol'  its  eonteut.-.  iiielndiiiK  it^  lihrarj-  and  -eji-iitifie  ap]Kii-iiiii>  :  and  \Va<hiiiu(i>n  i'nl- 
le^e  had  been  plundered  and  the  .-tatne  <>f  \\  a~hini£t"n  stolen.  The  reside  nee  of  KX-'H.M  i 
II-T  l.etoher  at  that  jilaee  had  lic-eu  luirned  l>y  orders,  and  lint  a  few  minute*  jrhf-n  Mr-. 
ami  her  Cunily  to  leSTA  the  house.  In  the  -;.|m-  .•i.nnty  it  nio-i  execlleiu  ehri.-tiaii 
n.  n  Mr.  I'reiuh.  had  l.i-.-n  liun^.  I.eean-...  .,n  a  !'••  rim  -r  ...-,-;,  ~inn.  he  had  killed:. 
and  marauding  Kedei;.:  «..  Idler  w  hil"  in  the  aei  (,f  insiiltiu^  and  niitra^iiiK  the 
<A  hi*  family.  Tlie>r  are  1'iit  .-..ni.-  ..[  the  .nirra*;.-*  e.ininiitted  by  Hiintur  or  lii«- 
•r.l.  -I-,  and  I  will  not  iiiMtlt  the  ineiimry  i.f  the  ancient  )>:irbarian*  <it  ihe  North  by  calling 
flu  in  "ants  «>f  Vandalism."  It"  tin.-.-  ..Id  barbarian*  were  -aval,'-  and  ernel,  they  at  le.-t*t  h;c] 
'he  man  line**  and  ilarini:  "!  '  nidi  ><>liiiei>.  with  ne.  a*ic>nal  trait*-  nf  iiiaKiianiinity.  Ifnnii  i  - 
;.  e<l*  \vere  those  ,,{  a  maliiciiaiit  and  ci.uardly  fanatic.  «  ho  wa*  better  ijualilied  to  make  \\ar 
;ipon  lielpless  women  and  c'liildren  than  upon  armed  soldiers.  The  time  Consumed  in  the 
perpetration  of  those  deed*,  was  the  salvation  of  Lynchburg,  with  it*  stores,  foundri"*,  .m.i 
factories,  which  were  so  necessary  to  our  army  at  Richmond. 


MAKCH  '.DOWN  THE  VALLEY*  49 

On  the  26th,  I  reached  Staunton  in  advance  of  the  troops, 
and  the  latter  came  up  next  day,  which  was  spent  in  reducing 
transportation  and  getting  provisions  from  Waynesboro,  to 
which  point  they  had  been  sent  over  the  railroad.  Some  of 
the  guns  and  a  number  of  the  horses  belonging  to  the  artillery 
\vere  now  unlit  for  service,  and  the  best  of  each  were  selected, 
and  about  a  battalion  taken  from  Breckenridge's  artillery, 
under  Lt.  Col.  King,  to  accompany  us,  in  addition  to  the  two 
battalions  brought  with  the  2nd  Corps.  The  rest  were  left 
behind  with  a  portion  of  the  officers  and  men  in  charge  of 
them.  The  dismounted  cavalry  had  been  permitted  to  send 
for  their  horses  which  had  been  recruiting,  and  Col.  Bradley 
T.  Johnson,  who  had  joined  me  at  this  place  with  a  battalion 
of  Maryland  Cavalry,  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  Jones' 
brigade,  with  the  temporary  rank  of  Brigadier-General,  that 
brigade  having  been  reorganized  and  the  two  Maryland  bat- 
talions attached  t@  it.  General  Breckenridge  had  accompanied 
us  from  Lynchburg,  and,  to  give  him  a  command  commensu- 
rate with  his  proper  one,  and  at  the  same  time  enable  me  to 
control  the  cavalry  more  readily,  Gordon's  divison  of  infantry 
was  assigned  to  his  command  in  addition  to  the  one  under 
Elzey,  and  Kansorn,  in  charge  of  the  cavalry,  was  ordered  to 
report  to  me  directly.  Major-General  Elzey  was  relieved  from 
duty  at  his  own  request,  and  the  division  under  him  was  left 
under  the  temporary  command  of  Brigadier-General  Vaughan. 

The  official  reports  at  this  place  showed  about  two  thousand 
mounted  men  for  duty  in  the  cavalry,  which  was  composed  of 
four  small  brigades,  to  wit :  Imboden's,  McCausland's,  Jack- 
son's, and  Jones'  (now  Johnson's).  Vaughan's  had  not  been 
mounted  but  the  horses  had  been  sent  for  from  South-western 
Virginia.  The  official  reports  of  the  infantry  showed  10,000 
muskets  for  duty,  including  Vaughan's  dismounted  cavalry. 
Nearly,  if  not  quite  half  of  the  company  officers  and  men 
were  barefooted  or  nearly  so,  and  a  dispatch  had  been  sent 
t'roru  Salem  by  courier,  and  Lynchburg  by  telegraph,  to  Rich- 
mond, requesting  shoes  to  be  sent  to  Stauntou,  but  they  had 
not  arrived. 

Another  telegram  was  received  here  from  General  Lee,  stut- 


50  MARCH  DOWN  THE  VALLKY. 

ing  that  the  circumstances  under  which  my  original  order* 
were  given  had  changed,  and  again  submitting  it  to  my  judg- 
ment, in  the  altered  state  of  tilings,  whether  the  movement 
down  the  Valley  and  across  the  Potomac  should  be  made. 
The  accession  to  my  command  from  Breekenridge's  forces  had 
not  been  as  great  as  (General  Lee  .supposed  it  would  be,  on 
imt  of  the  disorganization  consequent  on  Jones'  defeat  at 
Piedmont,  and  the  subsequent  rapid  movement  to  Lynehburg 
from  Roekh'sh  Gap,  but  I  determined  to  carry  out  the  original 
design  at  all  hazards,  and  telegraphed  to  General  Lee  mypur- 
po>e  to  conrinue  the  movement. 

The  march  was  resumed  on  the  ^.sth  with  live  days'  ration- 
in  the  waggons  ami  two  day-  in  haversacks,  empty  waggons 
being  left  to  bring  the  shoea  when  they  arrived.  Imboden  was 
-ent  through  Brock's  Gap  in  the  Great  North  Mountain  to  the 
Valley  of  the  South  1  .ranch  of  the  Potomac,  with  his  brigade 
of  cavalry  and  a  battery  of  horse  artillery,  to  de-troy  the  rail- 
road bridge  over  that  stream  and  all  the  bridges  on  the  Balti- 
more and  Ohio  railroad  from  that  point  to  Martinsburg.  The 
Telegraph  line  was  repaired  TO  Xcw  Market  as  we  marched 
down  the  Valley,  and  communication--  kept  up  with  that  point 
iiy  signal  station-.  On  the  lind  of  .luly  we  reached  Winche>- 
i-T.  •'  and  I  here  received  a  dispatch  from  General  Lee.  direct- 
ing me  to  remain  in  the  lower  Valley  until  everything  was  in 
readiness  to  cross  the  I'otomac.  and  to  destroy  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  railroad  and  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  ('anal  as  far 
as  possible.  This  was  in  accordance  with  my  previous  deter- 
mination, and  its  policy  was  obvious.  My  provisions  were 
nearly  exhausted  and  if  I  had  moved  through  London,  it  would 
have  been  necessary  for  me  to  halt  and  thresh  wheat  and  have 
it  ground,  as  neither  bread  nor  Hour  could  be  otherwise  ol>- 

'•<  >n  1 1  ii.-  da\  we  pa-sed  through  New  town  where  several  lioii-i--.  including  that  "la  M'-tii- 
o,ii-t  minister,  had  Keen  luiriH'd  V«y  Hunter's  orders,  licoail-o  a  part  of  Mo-l.y'-  eoiiiiniiini 
had  attacked  a  train  of  supplies  l'"i-  sip-l'-  t'. ,ree,  at  thi.-  plaee.  Tlif  ..i-j-ina]  urdi-r  \\ast.i 
'•urn  tin-  u  Imle  tmvn,  l.ut  the  ..tlieer  sent  to  exeeim.-  it  had  revolted  at  the  cruel  mandate  ..( 

In'-  Miperior.  and  another  had  I i  -eiit  who  lint  partially  executed  it. alter  hax  iu>f  force. 1  tl,. 

j.e.iple  to  t.iKi-  all  oath  ot  alleiiiaiier  to  tlic  I'uited  -tate-  to  -a\e  their  hoi:-,--..  M,,-l,y'-  o:ii- 
lalinii.  thotijrli  called  "  guerilla-  "  Iiy  the  enemy,  was  a  regular  oritaui/.ation  in  the  Cont'edc- 
!•:•!.•  Army,  and  was  merely  serving  on  detached  duty  under  lieiif-ral  Leo's  orders.  The  attack 
on  tin-  train  \va-  an  act  of  legitimate  warfare,  and  the  order  to  litirn  Newtouti,  and  the  Imrn- 
ii\K  <>!'  the  houses  mentioned  «••!•••  most  «antuti.  cruel,  unjustitia'ile,  ami  cowardly. 


OPERATIONS  IN  THE  LOWER  VALLEY.  5 . 

tained ;  which  would  have  caused  much  greater  delay  than  was 
required  on  the  other  route,  where  we  could  take  provisions 
from  the  enemy.  Moreover  unless  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
railroad  was  torn  up,  the  enemy  would  have  been  able  to  move 
troops  from  the  West  over  that  road  to  Washington. 

On  the  night  of  the  2nd,  McCausland  was  sent  across  North 
Mountain,  to  move  down  Back  Creek,  and  burn  the  railroad 
bridge  at  its  mouth,  and  then  to  move  by  North  Mountain 
depot  to  Ilainesville,  on  the  road  from  Martinsburg  to  Wil- 
liamsport;  and,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  3rd,  Bradley 
Johnson  was  sent  by  Smithfield  and  Leetown,  to  cross  the  rail- 
road at  Kearneysville,  east  of  Martinsburg,  and  unite  with 
McCausland  at  Ilainesville,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  Sigel, 
who  was  at  Martinsburg  with  a  considerable  force.  Brecken- 
ridge  moved,  on  the  same  morning,  direct  for  Martinsburg, 
with  his  command  preceded  by  Gilmor's  battalion  of  cavalry, 
while  I  moved,  with  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions,  over  the 
route  taken  by  Johnson,  to  Leetown.  On  the  approach  of 
Breckenridge,  Sigel,  after  very  slight  skirmishing,  evacuated 
Martinsburg,  leaving  behind  considerable  stores,  which  fell 
into  our  hands.  McCausland  burned  the  bridge  over  Back 
Creek,  captured  the  guard  at  North  Mountain  depot,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  Ilainesville;  but  Johnson  encountered  a 
force  at  Leetown,  under  Mulligan,  which,  after  hard  fighting, 
he  drove  across  the  railroad,  when,  Sigel,  having  united  with 
Mulligan,  Johnson's  command  was  forced  back,  just  before 
night,  on  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions,  which  had  arrived 
at  Leetown,  after  a  march  of  twenty-four  miles.  It  Avas  too 
late,  and  these  divisions  were  too  much  exhausted,  to  go  after 
the  enemy;  and,  during  the  night,  Sigel  retreated  across  the 
Potomac,  at  Shepherdstown,  to  Maryland  Heights. 

On  the  4th,  Shepherdstown  was  occupied  by  a  part  of  Ran- 
som's cavalry.  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions  moved  to 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  from  Bolivar 
Heights,  and  the  Village  of  Bolivar,  to  an  inner  line  of  works 
under  the  cover  of  the  guns  from  Maryland  Heights.  Breck- 
enridge, after  burning  the  railroad  bridges  at  Martinsburg, 
and  across  the  Opequon,  moved  to  Duffield's  depot,  live  miles 


52  M-'KF;.vnO\^    r\   MARYLAND. 

from  Harper's  Ferry,  destroying  the  road  us  he  moved.  Dur- 
ing the  night  of  the  4th,  the  enemy  evacuated  Harper's  Ferry, 
hurning  the  railroad  and  pontoon  bridges  across  the  Potomac. 

It  was  not  possible  to  occupy  the  town  of  Harper's  Pom, 
except  with  skirmishers,  as  it  was  thoroughly  commanded  by 
the  heavy  guns  on  Maryland  Heights :  and  the  .">th  was  spent 
by  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions  in  demonstrating  at  that 
place.  In  the  afternoon,  Breckenridge's  command  crossed  the 
river  at  Shepherdstown,  and  Gordon's  division  was  advanced 
over  the  Antietam,  toward-  .Maryland  Heights.  At  night,  con- 
siderable stores,  which  had  been  abandoned  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
were  secured;  and,  before  day,  Rodes'  and  Ramsenr's  divisions 
moved  to  Shepherdstown,  and  crossed  the  Potomac  early  on 
the  6th,  Lewis'  brigade,  of  Ramseur's  division,  being  left  to 
occupy  Harper's  Ferry  with  skirmishers. 

On  this  day  (the  6th)  Gordon's  division  advanced  toward^ 
Maryland  Heights,  and  drove  tin-  enemy  into  his  works. 
Working  parties  were  employed  in  destroying  the  aqueduct  of 
the  canal  over  the  Antietam,  and  the  locks  and  canal  boats. 

On  the  7th,  Rodes  moved  through  Rohersvillc,  on  the  road 
to  Crampton's  Gap  in  South  Mountain,  and  skirmished  with  a 
small  force  of  the  enemy,  while  Breckenridge  demonstrated 
against  Maryland  Heights,  with  Gordon's  division,  supported 
by  his  other  division,  now  under  Brigadier-General  Echols, 
who  had  reported  for  duty. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on,  McCausland  had 
occupied  Hagerstown,  and  levied  a  contribution  of  $20,000, 
and  Boonsboro'  had  been  occupied  by  Johnson's  cavalry.  On 
the  6th  I  received  a  letter  from  General  Lee,  by  special  courier, 
informing  me  that,  on  the  12th,  an  effort  would  be  made  to 
release  the  prisoners  at  Point  Lookout,  and  directing  me  to 
take  steps  to  unite  them  with  my  command,  if  the  attempt  was 
successful;  but  I  was  not  informed  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  attempt  would  be  made — General  Lee  stating  that  he  was 
not,  himself,  advised  of  the  particulars. 

Mv  desire  had  been  to  manoeuvre  the  enemv  out  of  Marv- 

•  ~  „' 

land  Heights,  so  aa  to  enable  me  to  move  directly  from  t  liar- 


OPERATIONS  IN  MARYLAND.  53 

per's  Ferry  for  Washington;  but  he  had  taken  refuge  in  his 
strongly-fortified  works,  and,  as  they  could  not  be  approached 
without  great  difficulty,  and  an  attempt  to  carry  them  by  as- 
sault would  have  resulted  in  greater  loss  than  the  advantage 
to  be  gained  would  justify,  I  determined  to  move  through 
the  gaps  of  South  Mountain  to  the  north  of  the  Heights.  On 
the  7th,  the  greater  portion  of  the  cavalry  was  sent  across  the 
mountain  in  the  direction  of  Frederick ;  and,  that  night,  the 
expected  shoes  having  arrived  and  .been  distributed,  orders 
were  given  for  a  general  move  next  morning ;  and  an  officer 
(Lieut.-Col.  Goodwin,  of  a  Louisiana  Regiment,)  was  ordered 
back  to  Winchester,  with  a  small  guard,  to  collect  the  strag- 
glers at  that  place,  and  prevent  them  from  following. 

Imboden  had  reached  the  railroad,  at  the  South  Branch  of 
the  Potomac,  and  partially  destroyed  the  bridge,  but  had  not 
succeeded  in  dislodging  the  guard  from  the  block-house  at  that 
place.  He  had  been  taken  sick,  and  very  little  had  been  ac- 
complished by  the  expedition ;  and  his  brigade,  now  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  George  H.  Smith,  had  returned. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  the  whole  force  moved ; 
Rodeg,  through  Crampton's  Gap,  to  Jefferson ;  Breckenridge, 
through  Fox's  Gap;  and  Ramseur,  with  the  trains,  through 
Boonsboro'  Gap,  followed  by  Lewis'  brigade,  which  had  started 
from  Harper's  Ferry  the  night  before,  after  burning  the  trestle- 
work  on  the  railroad,  and  the  stores  which  had  not  been 
brought  oft'.  Breckenridge  and  Ramseur  encamped  near  Micl- 
dletown,  and  Rodes  near  Jefferson.  Ransom  had  occupied 
Catoctan  Mountain,  between  Middletown  and  Frederick,  with 
his  cavalry,  and  had  skirmished  heavily  with  a  body  of  the 
enemy  at  the  latter  place.  McCausland  was  ordered  to  move 
to  the  right,  in  the  afternoon,  and  the  next  day  cut  the  tele- 
graph and  railroad  between  Maryland  Heights  and  Washing- 
ton and  Baltimore — cross  the  Monocacy,  and,  if  possible,  oc- 
cupy the  railroad  bridge  over  that  stream,  at  the  Junction  near 
Frederick. 

Early  on  the  9th,  Johnson  with  his  brigade  of  cavalry,  and  a 
battery  of  horse  artillery,  moved  to  the  north  of  Frederick, 


54  BATTLE  OP  MONOOACY. 

with  orders  to  strike  the  railroads  from  Baltimore  to  Harris- 
burg  and  Philadelphia,  burn  the  bridges  over  the  Gunpowder, 
also  to  cut  the  railroad  between  Washington  and  Baltimore, 
and  threaten  the  latter  place:  and  then  to  move  towards  Point 
Lookout  for  the  purpose  of  releasing  the  prisoners,  il'  we 
should  succeed  in  getting  into  Washington.  The  other  troop-; 
also  moved  forward  towards  Monocacy  Junction,  and  Kam- 
seurs  division  parsed  through  Frederick,  driving  a  force  of 
skirmishers  before  it. 


BATTLE  OF  MONOCACY. 

The  enemy  in  considerable  force  under  General  Lew  Wal- 
lace, was  found  strongly  posted  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the 
Monocacy  near  the  Junction,  with  an  earthwork  and  two  block 
houses  commanding  both  the  railroad  bridge  and  the  bridge 
on  the  Georgetown  pike.  Ramseur's  division  was  deployed  in 
front  of  the  enemy,  after  driving  his  skirmisher-;  across  the 
river,  and  several  batteries  were  put  in  position,  when  a  sharp 
artillery  fire  opened  from  both  side>.  Kodes'  division  had 
come  up  from  Jefferson  and  was  placed  on  liamseiir's  left,  cov- 
ering the  roads  from  Baltimore  and  the  crossings  of  the  Mo- 
nocacy above  the  Junction.  Brecken ridge's  command,  with 
the  trains,  was  in  the  rear  between  Frederick  and  the  Junction, 
while  the  residue  of  the  cavalry  was  watching  a  force  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  which  had  followed  from  Maryland  Height-. 
The  enemy's  position  was  too  strong,  and  the  difficulties  of 
crossing  the  Monocacy  under  fire  too  great,  to  attack  in  front 
without  greater  loss  than  I  was  willing  to  incur.  I  therefore 
made  an  examination  in  person  to  find  a  point  at  which  the 
river  could  be  ero-sed,  so  as  to  take  the  enemy  in  flank. 
\Vhile  1  was  engaged  in  making  this  examination  to  rny  right. 
1  discovered  McCausland  in  the  act  of  crossing  the  river  with 
his  brigade.  As  soon  as  he  crossed  he  dismounted  his  men? 
and  advanced  rapidly  against  the  enemy's  left  flank,  which  he 


BATTLE  OF  MONOCACY.  .V, 

threw  into  confusion,  and  he  came  very  near  capturing  a  bat- 
tery of  artillery,  but  the  enemy  concentrated  on  him,  and  he 
was  gradually  forced  back  obstinately  contesting  the  ground. 
McCausland's  movement  which  was  very  brilliantly  executed, 
solved  the  problem  for  me,  and,  as  soon  as  I  discovered  it, 
orders  were  sent  to  Breckenridge  to  move  up  rapidly  with  Gor- 
don's division  to  McCausland's  assistance,  and  to  follow  up  his 
attack.  This  division  crossed  at  the  same  place,  and  Gordon 
was  ordered  to  move  forward  and  strike  the  enemy  on  his  left 
Hank,  and  drive  him  from  the  positions  commanding  the  cross- 
ings in  Ramseur's  front,  so  as  to  enable  the  latter  to  cross. 
This  movement  was  executed  under  the  personal  superinten- 
dence of  General  Breckenridge,  and,  while  Ramseur  skir- 
mished with  the  enemy  in  front,  the  attack  was  made  by  Gor- 
don in  gallant  style,  and,  with  the  aid  of  several  pieces  of 
King's  artillery  which  had  been  crossed  over,  and  Xelson's 
artillery  from  the  opposite  side,  he  threw  the  enemy  into  great 
confusion  and  forced  him  from  his  position.  Ramseur  imme- 
diately crossed  on  the  railroad  bridge  and  pursued  the  enemy's 
flying  forces,  and  Rodes  crossed  on  the  left  and  joined  in  the 
pursuit.  Kchols'  division  which  had  been  left  to  guard  the 
trains,  was  ordered  up  during  the  engagement,  but  was  not 
needed.  The  pursuit  was  soon  discontinued,  as  Wallace's  entire 
force  had  taken  the  road  towards  Baltimore,  and  I  did  not 
want  prisoners.  Wallace's  force  I  estimated  at  8,000  or  10,000 
men,  and  it  was  ascertained  that  one  division  of  the  6th  Corps 
(Rickett's)  from  Grant's  army,  was  in  the  fight.  Between  600 
and  700  unwounded  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands,  and  the 
enemy's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  very  heavy.  Our  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  was  about  700,  and  among  them  were 
Urigadier-General  Evans  wounded,  and  Colonel  Lamar  of  the 
61st  Georgia  regiment,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Tavener,  of  the 
17th  Virginia  Cavalry,  and  Lieutenant  Hobson,  of  Xelson's 
artillery,  killed.  The  action  closed  about  sunset,  and  we  had 
inarched  about  fourteen  miles  before  it  commenced.  All  the 
troops  and  trains  were  crossed  over  the  Monocacy  that  night, 
so  as  to  resume  the  march  early  next  day.  Huch  of  our 
wounded  as  could  not  be  moved  in  ambulances  or  otherwise. 


56  OPERATIONS  IN  FRONT  OF  WASHINGTON 

were  sent  to  the  hospitals  at  Frederick  under  charge  of  com- 
petent medical  officers,  and  our  dead  were  buried.  During 
the  operations  at  Monocacy,  a  contribution  of  $200,000  in 
money,  was  levied  on  the  city  of  Frederick,  and  some  needed 
supplies  were  obtained. 


OPERATIONS   IN    FKOXT    OF   WASHINGTON,   A\J> 
KKCROSSING  THE  POTOMAC. 

On  the  10th,  the  march  was  resumed  ;u  daylight,  and  wo 
bivouacked  four  miles  from  Rockville,  on  the  Georgetown 
pike,  having  marched  twenty  miles.  Kamscnr's  division 
which  had  remained  behind  for  a  short  Time  TO  protect  a  work- 
ing party  engaged  in  destroying  tin-  railroad  bridge,  wa*  de- 
tained, for  a  time  in  driving  off  the  party  of  cavalry  which  liad 
been  following  from  Maryland  Heights,  and  did  not  get  up 
until  one  o'clock  at  night.  McC'aushtnd,  moving  in  fronton 
this  day,  drove  a  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  he-tore  him,  and 
had  quite  a  brisk  engagement  at  Kockville,  where  lie  •  -n- 
camped  after  defeating  and  driving  off  the  enemy. 

We  moved  at  daylight  on  the  llth  :  McCausland  moving  <>n 
the  Georgetown  pike,  while  the  infantry,  preceded  by  Im- 
hoden's  cavalry  under  Colonel  Smith,  turned  to  the  left  at 
Uockville,  so  as  to  reach  the  7th  street  pike  which  runs  by 
Silver  Spring  into  Washington,  Jackson's  cavalry  moved  on 
the,  left  flank.  The  previou.-  day  had  been  very  warm,  and 
the  roads  wer«-  ••.\eeedingly  diisiy,  MS  there  had  been  no  rain 
for  several  weeks.  The  heat  during  the  night  had  be.-n  very 
oppressive,  and  but  little  re>t  had  b.-.-n  obtained.  This  day 
was  an  exceedingly  hot  «me.  and  tin-re  \\a-no  air  stirring. 
While  marching,  the  men  were  enveloped  in  a  Mitlociiting 
cloud  of  dust,  and  many  of  them  fell  by  the  way  from  exhaus- 
tion. Our  progress  was  therefore  very  much  impeded,  but  I 
pushed  on  as  rapidly  as  possible,  hoping  to  get  into  the  fortiti- 


OPERATIONS  IN  FRONT  OF  WASHINGTON.  57 

cations   around  Washington  before  thev  could  be  manned. 

O  «/ 

Smith  drove  a  small  body  of  cavalry  before  hirn  into  the  works* 
on  the  7th  street  pike,  and  dismounted  his  men  and  deployed 
them  as  skirmishers.  I  rode  ahead  of  the  infantry,  and  arrived 
in  sight  of  Fort  Stevens  on  this  road  a  short  time  after  noon, 
when  I  discovered  that  the  works  were  but  feebly  manned. 

Rodes,  whose  division  was  in  front,  was  immediately  ordered 
to  bring  it  into  line  as  rapidly  as  possible,  throw  out  skirmish- 
ers, and  move  into  the  works  if  he  could.  My  whole  column 
was  then  moving  by  flank,  which  was  the  only  ^practicable 
mode  of  marching  on  the  road  we  were  on,  and  before  Rodes' 
division  could  be  brought  up,  we  saw  a  cloud  of  dust  in  the 
rear  of  the  works  towards  Washington,  and  soon  a  column  of 
the  enemy  iiled  into  them  on  the  right  and  left,  and  skirmish- 
ers were  thrown  out  in  front,  while  an  artillery  fire  was  opened 
on  us  from  a  number  of  batteries.  This  defeated  our  hopes  of 
getting  possession  of  the  works  by  surprise,  and  it  became 
necessary  to  reconnoitre. 

Rodes'  skirmishers  were  thrown  to  the  front,  driving  those 
<>f  the  enemy  to  the  cover  of  the  works,  and  we  proceeded  to 
examine  the  fortifications  in  order  to  ascertain  if  it  was  prac- 
ticable to  carry  them  by  assault.  They  were  found  to  be  ex- 
•  •eediiigly  strong,  and  consisted  of  what  appeared  to  be  en- 
closed forts  for  heavy  artillery,  with  a  tier  of  lower  works  in 
front,  of  each  pierced  for  an  immense  number  of  guns,  the 
whole  being  connected  by  curtains  with  ditches  in  front,  and 
strengthened  by  palisades  and  abattis.  The  timber  had  been 
felled  within  cannon  range  all  around  and  left  on  the  ground, 
making  a  formidable  obstacle,  and  every  possible  approach 
was  raked  by  artillery.  On  the  right  was  Rock  Creek,  run- 
ning through  a  deep  ravine  which  had  been  rendered  impas- 
sable by  the  felling  of  the  timber  on  each  side,  and  beyond 
were  the  works  on  the  (ieorgetown  pike  which  had  been  re- 
ported to  be  the  strongest  of  all.  On  the  left,  as  far  as  the  eye 
i-onld  reach,  the  works  appeared  to  be  of  the  same  impregnable 
character.  The  position  was  naturally  strong  for  defence,  and 
the  examination  showed,  what  might  have  been  expected,  that 
every  appliance  of  science  and  unlimited  means  had  been  used 
H 


58  OPERATIONS  IN  FRONT  OF  WASHINGTON. 

to  render  the  fortifications  around  "Washington  as  strong  as 
possible.  This  reconnoissance  consumed  the  balance  of  the 
dav. 

The  rapid  marching  which  had  broken  down  a  number  of 
the  men  who  were  barefooted  or  weakened  by  previous  expo- 
sure,  and  had  been  left  in  the  Valley  and  directed  to  be  col- 
lected at  'Winchester,  and  the  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  ;it 
Harper's  Ferry,  Maryland  Height*,  and  Monocacy,  had  re- 
duced my  infantry  to  about  SJIHU  muskets.  Of  those  remain- 
ing, a  very  large  number  wen-  greatly  exliausred  by  the  last 
two  days  marching,  ^>me  having  fallen  by  sunstroke,  and  I 
was  satisfied,  when  we  arrived  in  front  of  the  t'ortilieations. 
that  not  more  than  one-third  of  my  force  could  have  been 
•  •arried  into  action.  I  had  about  forty  pieces  of  field  artillery, 
of  which  the  largest  were  1^  plunder  Napoleons,  besides  a  fe\\ 
pieees  of  horse  artillery  with  the  cavalry.  Mc('ausland  re- 
ported the  works  on  the  (Georgetown  pike  too  strongly  manned 
for  him  to  assault.  We  eould  not  move  to  the  right  or  tin- 
left  without  its  being  discovered  from  a  signal  station  on  the 
top  of  the  "Soldier's  Home,"  which  overlooked  the  country. 
and  the  enemy  would  have  been  enabled  to  move  in  his  work- 
to  meet  us.  l'nder  the  circumstances,  to  have  rushed  mv  men 

t  " 

blindly  against    the  fortifications,  without  understanding  the 

Mate  of  tliing>.  would  have  been  worse  than  folly.  If  we  had 
anv  friends  in  Washington,  none  of  them  came  out  to  <nve  u- 

•  i>  (j 

information,  and  this  >ati<tied  me  that  the  place  \\-is  not  un- 
defended. [  knew  that  troops  had  arrived  from  ( irant's  arm\. 
for  prisoners  had  been  e;lptured  from  Uickett's  division  of  the 
fitli  Corps  at  Monoeacy.  From  Sharpshurg  I  had  sent  a  me- 
sage  to  Mosby.  by  one  of  his  men.  requesting  him  to  cross  the 
Potomac  below  Harper's  Ferry,  cut  the  railroad  and  telegraph, 
and  endeavour  to  find  out  the  condition  of  things  in  "Washing- 
ton, but  hf  had  not  ci-nsscd  the  river  and  I  had  received  no  in- 
formation from  him.  A  northern  paper,  which  was  obtained. 
'_rave.  the  information  that  Hunter,  after  moving  up  the  Ohio 
River  in  steamboats,  was  passing  over  the  Baltimore  and  <  )hio 
railroad,  and  I  knew  that  he  would  be  at  Harper's  Ferry  soon, 
as  Imboden  had  done  very  little  damage  to  the  road  west  of 


OPERATIONS  IN  FRONT  OP  WASHINGTON.  59 

Martinsburg.  After  dark  on  the  llth,  I  held  a  consultation 
with  Major-Generals  Breckenridge,  Rodes,  Gordon  and  Rarn- 
seur,  in  which  I  stated  to  them  the  danger  of  remaining  where 
we  were,  and  the  necessity  of  doing  something  immediately, 
as  the  probability  was  that  the  passes  of  the  South  Mountain 
and  the  fords  of  the  upper  Potomac  would  soon  be  closed 
against  us.  After  interchanging  views  with  them,  being  very 
reluctant  to  abandon  the  project  of  capturing  Washington, 
I  determined  to  make  an  assault  on  the  enemy's  works  at  day-  «/ 
light  next  morning,  unless  some  information  should  be  re- 
ceived before  that  time  showing  its  impractibility,  and  so 
informed  those  officers.  During  the  night  a  dispatch  was  re- 
ceived from  Gen.  Bradley  Johnson  from  near  Baltimore,  in- 
forming me  that  he  had  received  information,  from  a  reliable 
source,  that  two  corps  had  arrived  from  Gen.  Grant's  army, 
and  that  his  whole  army  was  probably  in  motion.  This  caused 
rne  to  delay  the  attack  until  I  could  examine  the  works  again, 
and,  as  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  to  see,  I  rode  to  the  front 
and  found  the  parapets  lined  with  troops.  I  had,  therefore, 
reluctantly,  to  give  up  all  hopes  of  capturing  Washington, 
after  I  had  arrived  in  night  of  the  dome  of  the  Capitol,  and 
given  the  Federal  authorities  a  terrible  fright. 

Grant  in  his  report  says,  in  regard  to  the  condition  of  things 
when  I  moved  towards  Washington  :  "  The  garrisons  of  Balti- 
more and  Washington  were  at  this  time  made  up  of  heavy 
artillery  regiments,  hundred  days  men,  and  detachments  from 
the  invalid  corps."  And,  in  regard  to  the  force  of  Wallace  at 
Monocacy,  he  says :  "  His  force  was  not  sufficient  to  ensure 
success,  but  he  fought  the  enemy  nevertheless,  and  although  it 
resulted  in  a  defeat  to  our  arms,  yet  it  detained  the  enemy  and 
thereby  served  to  enable  Geri.  Wright  to  reach  Washington 
with  two  divisions  of  the  6th  Corps,  and  the  advance  of  the 
19th  Corps,  before  him."  Btanton  says  in  his  report:  "Here 
(at  Washington)  they  (we)  were  met  by  troops  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  consisting  of  the  i!th  Corps  under  Genera! 
Wright,  a  part  of  the  8th  Corps  under  General  Gilmore,  and 
a  part  of  the  19th  Corps,  just  arrived  from  New  Orleans  under 
General  Emory."  Taking  Grant's  statement  of  the  trooj>> 


60  OPERATIONS  TN  FRONT  OF  WASHINGTON. 

which  had  arrived  from  his  army  as  the  most  reliable,  they 
were  sufficient  to  hold  the  works  against  my  troops,  at  lea.-t 
until  others  could  arrive.  But,  in  addition  to  those  which  had 
alreadv  arrived,  there  were  the  detachments  from  the  invalid 
corps,  called,  I  believe,  the  "  Veteran  Meserves  "  (of  which  I 
was  informed  there  were  about  .">,00o),  the  heavy  artillery  regi- 
ments, the  hundred  days'  men.  and.  I  suppose,  the  part  of  the 
8th  Corps  mentioned  by  Stanton.  To  all  these  may  he  added 
the  local  troop-,  or  militia,  and  the  government  employee*. 
ome  of  the  northern  paper.-  stated  that,  between  Saturday 
and  Monday,  I  could  have  entered  the  city:  but  on  Saturday 
F  was  lighting  at  Monoeaey,  thirty-five  miles  from  Washington, 
a  force  whieh  I  could  not  leave  in  my  rear:  and,  after  di-po>- 
ing  of  that  force  and  moving  as  rapidly  as  it  was  possible  for 
me  to  move.  I  did  not  arrive  in  front  of  the  fortitieations  until 
alter  noon  on  Monday,  and  then  my  troop-  were  exhausted, 
and  it  required  time  to  bring  them  up  into  line.  I  had  then 
made  a  march,  over  the  circuitous  route  by  Charlottesville. 
Lynchburg,  and  Salem,  down  the  Valley,  and  through  th.- 
passes  of  the  South  Mountain,  which,  notwithstanding  tin- 
delays  in  dealing  with  Hunter's,  Sigel's,  and  'Wallace's  forces, 
is,  for  its  length  and  rapidity,  I  believe,  without  a  parallel  in 
this  or  any  other  modern  war — the  unopposed  marauding  ex- 
cursion of  the  freebooter  Sherman  through  Georgia,  iu>t  ex- 
cepted.  My  small  force  had  been  thrown  np  to  the  very  wall.- 
of  the  Federal  Capital,  north  of  a  river  which  could  nol  la- 
forded  at  any  point  within  40  miles,  and  with  a  heavy  force 
and  the  South  Mountain  in  my  rear — the  pas.-e-  through  which 
mountain  could  be  held  by  a  small  number  of  troops.  A 
glance  at  the  map,  when  it  is  recollected  that,  the  Potomac  is  a 
wide  river,  and  navigable  to  Washington  for  the  largest  vessels, 
will  cause  the  intelligent  reader  to  wonder,  not  why  I  failed  to 
take  Washington,  but  why  I  had  the  audacity  to  approach  it 
as  1  did,  with  the  small  force  under  my  command.  It  wa* 
supposed  by  some,  who  were  not  informed  of  the  facts,  that  \ 
delayed  in  the  lower  Valley  longer  than  was  necessary:  but, 
an  examination  of  the  foregoing  narrative  will  show  that  not 
one  moment  was  spent  in  idleness,  but  that  every  one  was  em- 


RECROSSING  THE  POTOMAC.  61 

ployed  in  making  some  arrangement,  or  removing  some  diffi- 
culty in  rny  way,  which  it  was  necessary  to  make  or  remove, 
MO  as  to  enable  me  to  advance  with  a  prospect  of  success.  I 
could  not  move  across  the  Potomac  and  through  the  passes  of 
the  South  Mountain,  Avith  any  safety,  until  8igel  was  driven 
from,  or  safely  housed  in,  the  fortifications  at  Maryland  Heights. 

After  abandoning  the  idea  of  capturing  Washington,  I  de- 
termined to  remain  in  front  of  the  fortifications  during  the 
12th,  and  retire  at  night,  as  I  was  satisfied  that  to  remain  longer 
would  cause  the  loss  of  my  entire  force. 

.Johnson had  burned  the  bridges  over  the  Gunpowder,  on  the 
Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia  roads,  threatened  Baltimore,  and 
started  for  Point  Lookout,  but  I  sent  an  order  for  him  to  re- 
turn. The  attempt  to  release  the  prisoners  of  which  I  was  in- 
formed by  General  Lee,  was  not  made,  as  the  enemy  had 
received  notice  of  it  in  some  way.  Major  Harry  Gilmor,  who 
burned  the  bridge  over  the  Gunpowder  on  the  Philadelphia 
road,  captured  Major-General  Franklin  on  a  train  at  that 
point,  but  he  was  permitted  to  escape,  either  by  the  careless- 
ness or  exhaustion  of  the  guard  placed  over  him,  before  I  -was 
informed  of  the  capture. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th,  a  heavy  recounoitering  force 
was  sent  out  by  the  enemy,  which,  after  severe  skirmishing, 
was  driven  back  by  Rodes'  division  with  but  slight  loss  to  us. 
About  dark  we  commenced  retiring  and  did  so  without  moles- 
tation.* Passing  through  Rockville  and  Poolsville,  we  crossed 
the  Potomac  at  White's  Ford,  above  Leesburg  in  London 
County,  on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  bringing  off  the  prisoners 
captured  at  Monocacy  and  everything  else  in  safety.  There 
was  some  skirmishing  in  the  rear  between  our  cavalry  and  that 
of  the  enemy  which  was  following,  and,  on  the  afternoon  of 

*  Grant  says:  "On  the  12th,  a  reconnoissaiieo  was  thrown  out  in  front  of  Fort  Stevens  to 
ascertain  the  enemy's  position  and  force.  A  severe  skirmish  ensued,  in  which  we  lost  280 
n  killed  and  wounded.  The  enemy's  loss  was  probably  greater.  He  commenced  retiring 
luring  the  night."  In  regard  to  the  same  affair,  Stanton  says  :  "  By  these  troops  (Wright's, 
lilmore's,  and  Emory's)  the  enemy  was  driven  back  from  Washington  and  retreated  hastily 
o  Virginia,  pursued  by  our  forces  under  General  Wright."  Grant's  statement  is  correct, 
vith  the  exception  of  the  estimate  he  places  oa  our  loss.  Comment  on  Stanton's  is  uunec- 
cessary  when  it  is  compared  with  that  of  Grant. 


62  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  VALLEY. 

the  14th,  there  was  some  artillery  tiring  by  the  enemy,  across 
the  river,  at  our  cavalry  which  was  watching  the  fords.  Besides 
the  money  levied  in  Hagerstown  and  Frederick,  which  was 
subsequently  very  useful  in  obtaining  supplies,  we  brought  off 
quite  a  large  number  of  beef  cattle,  and  the  cavalry  obtained  ;i 
number  of  horses,  some  being  also  procured  for  the  artillery.* 


RETURN  TO  TIIK   VALLEY,  AND  OPERATIONS 

TJTKKK. 

\\'e  rested,  011  the  14th  and  15th,  near  Leesburg,  and,  on 
the  morning  of  the  16th,  resumed  the  march  to  the  Valley, 
through  Snicker's  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge.  Hunter  had  arrived 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  united  with  Sigcl,  and  the  whole  force 
had  moved  from  that  place,  under  <  'n  H  >k,  to  Hillsboro',  in  Lou- 
don,  and  a  body  of  cavalry  from  it  made  a  dash  on  our  train, 
as  we  were  moving  towards  the  Valley,  and  .-ucceeded  in  setting 
tire  to  a  few  waggons,  but  was  soon  driven  off  by  troops  from 
Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions,  and  one  piece  of  artillery  was 
captured  from  the  enemy. 

*On  the  night  of  the  12th,  the  house  of  Postmaster-General  Blair  near  Silver  Spring  was 
burned,  and  it  was  assumed  by  the  enemy  that  it  u:m  burned  by  my  orders.  Tin-  iin-t  i-. 
rhat  I  had  nothing  to  do  with  it,  and  do  not  yot  know  how  the  burning  occurred.  Though  J 
relieved  that  retaliation  was  fully  justified  by  the  previous  acts  of  the  enemy,  yet  I  did  imt 
wish  to  incur  the  risk  of  any  license  on  the  part  of  my  troops,  and  it  was  obviously  impolitic 
10  set  the  house  on  fire  when  we  were  retiring,  as  it  amounted  to  notice  of  our  movement. 
Some  of  my  officers  thought  the  burning  was  done  by  some  person  in  the  neighborhood, 
who  took  advantage  of  our  presence  to  commit  tin-  JUT  with  impunity.  It  may  have  been 
occasioned  by  a  shell  from  the  enemy'.-  .nun.-,  smut-  ot  which  went  in  that  direction  late  in 
the  day,  or  it  may  have  been  the  act  of  some  <if  my  men;  and  a  number  of  them  had  abund- 
ant provocation  for  the  act,  in  the  sight  of  their  own  devastated  homes  as  they  marched 
down  the  Valley  on  Hunter's  track.  In  retaliation  for  the  burning  of  this  house,  two  Kedt- 
ral  gunboats  with  a  body  of  soldiera  on  board  were  sent  up  the  Rappahannock  River,  on 
which  there  was  not  a  Confederate  soldier,  to  burn  the  house  of  the  widow  of  the  brother  of 
the  Hon.  James  A.  Seddon,  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  and  she  and  her  little  children 
were  turned  out  of  doors,  and  the  house  with  all  its  contents  consigned  to  the  flame*.  A 
•  ••ird  w:is  left,  signed  by  Hutler  or  his  order,  stating  that  the  house  was  burned  in  retaliation 
lor  the  burning  of  the  Hon.  Montgomery  Blair'*  hou-e.  This  retaliation  upon  a  widowed 
l;i(ly  and  her  orphan  children,  by  a  combined  military  and  naval  expedition,  was  worthy  ol 
rhf  agent  selected,  and  the  cause  in  which  he  was  engaged.  But,  though  it  was  very  con- 
genial to  his  nature,  I  do  not  regard  Butler  n«  alone  rc-.sponsible  for  this  act.  The  odium  ol 
it  should  attach  to  his  superiors  Lincoln  and  Grant,  he  being  the  favorite  of  the  former,  and 
the  subordinate  of  the  latter,  and  at  that  time,  serving  under  his  immediate  orders. 


OPERATIONS  IN  THE  VALLEY.  63 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  we  crossed  the  Shenandoah,  at 
Snicker's  or  Castleman's  Ferry,  and  took  position  near  Berry- 
ville — Breckenridge  covering  the  ford  at  the  ferry,  and  the 
river  above  and  below,  and  Rodes'  and  Ramseur's  divisions 
the  roads  from  Harper's  Ferry. 

On  the  18th,  the  enemy,  having  moved  through  Snicker's 
Gap,  appeared  on  the  banks  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  there  was 
some  skirmishing.  In  the  afternoon,  a  heavy  column  of  his 
infantry  made  a  dash  at  Parker's  Ford,  one  mile  below  the 
feury,  and  crossed  over,  after  driving  back  the  picket  of  one 
hundred  men  at  that  point.  Breckenridge  moved  Gordon's 
and  Echols'  divisions  to  the  front,  and  held  the  enemy  in  check, 
while  Rodes'  division  was  brought  np  from  the  left,  and  at- 
tacked arid  drove  him  across  the  river,  with  heavy  loss,  and  in 
great  confusion. 

On  the  19th,  the  enemy's  main  body  still  occupied  the  east- 
ern bank  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  smaller  columns  moved  up 
and  down  the  river,  to  effect  a  crossing.  Imboden,  with  his 
own  and  McCausland's  cavalry,  resisted  and  repulsed  one  of 
these  columns,  which  attempted  to  cross  at  Berry's  Ferry,  with 
considerable  loss  to  the  enemy.  The  horses  of  Vaughan:  s 
cavalry  having  been  brought  from  South-western  Virginia,  his 
small  force  had  been  now  mounted.  ( )n  this  day  I  received 
information  that  a  column  under  Averill  was  moving  from 
Martinsburg  towards  Winchester,  and,  as  the  position  I  held 
near  Berryville  left  my  trains  exposed  to  expeditions  in  the 
rear  from  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry,  I  determined  to 
concentrate  my  force  near  Strasburg,  so  as  to  enable  me  to  put 
the  trains  in  safety,  and  then  move  out  and  attack  the  enemy. 
This  movement  was  commenced  on  the  night  of  the  19th ; 
Ramseur's  division,  with  a  battery  of  artillery,  being  sent  to 
Winchester,  to  cover  that  place  against  Averill,  while  the  stores, 
and  the  sick  and  wounded  were  being  removed,  and  the  other 
divisions  moving  through  Millwood  and  "White  Post  to  the 
Valley  Pike  at  Xewtown  and  Middletown. 

Vaughan'sand  Jackson's  cavalry  had  been  watching  Averill, 
and,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  it  was  reported  to  General 


64  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  VALLEY. 

Ilamseiir,  by  General  Yaughan,  that  Averill  was  at  Stephen- 
son's  depot,  with  an  inferior  force,  which  could  he  captured, 
and  Ttarnseur  moved  out  from  Winchester  to  attack  him  :  bin, 
reiving  on  the  accuracy  of  the  information  he  had  received, 
General  Ramseur  did  not  take  the  proper  precautions  in  ad- 
vancing, and  his  division,  while  moving  by  the  flank,  was  sud- 
denly met  by  a  larger  force,  under  Averill,  advancing  in  line 
of  battle,  and  the  result  was  that  Ramseur' s  forcu  was  thrown 
into  confusion,  and  compelled  to  retire,  with  the  loss  of  four 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  a  number  in  killed  and  wounded — 
Brigadier-Generals  Lewis  and  Lilly  being  among  the  wounaed, 
and  Col.  Board,  of  the  58th  Virginia  Regiment,  among  the 
killed.  Colonel  Jackson  made  a  vigorous  charge  with  his 
•  •avalry,  which  enabled  Iiam.«,eurto  rally  his  men,  restore  order, 
and  arrest  the  progress  of  Averill  before  he  reached  AVinch es- 
ter. The  error  committed,  on  this  occasion,  by  this  most  gal- 
lant officer,  was  nobly  retrieved  in  the  subsequent  part  of  the 
campaign.  I  received,  at  Xewtown,  the  news  of  Uamseur's 
misfortune,  and  immediately  moved  to  his  assistance  Avirh 
Kodes*  division :  but,  on  arriving  at  Winchester,  f  found  that  the 
enemy,  after  being  checked,  had  fallen  hack  a  short,  distance  : 
and,  as  another  ami  much  larger  column  was  moving  through 
Berryville,  I  did  not  LP<>  after  Averill.  but  moved  the  whole 
command  to  Newiown — The  stores,  and  such  of  the  wounded 
and  sick  us  could  he  Transported,  having  been  gotten  otf. 

On  the  21st,  my  whole  infantry  force  was  concentrated  m-ai 
Middletown:  and,  on  the  22nd,  it  was  m»ved  across  Cedar 
< 'reek,  towards  Strashurg,  and  >o  posted  a>  To  cover  all  tin- 
roads  from  the  direction  of  Winchester. 

A  report  having  been  >cnt  to  me  from  Mi.  Jack^m,  that  a 
force  of  the  enemy  wa>  moving  from  the  Valley  of  the  South 
Branch  of  the  Potomac  to  that  place.  Imboden  wa.-  sent  to 
ascertain  its  truth,  and  it  proved  to  !..•  fal>e.  \Ve  r.--red  on 
the  2Hrd,  while  waiting  to  ascertain  the  movement-  of  th.- 
enemy,  and  during  the  day  a  report  wa>  received  from  the 
cavalry  in  front,  that  a  large  portion  of  the  force  sent  after  n- 
from  Washington,  was  returning,  and  that  Crook  and  Averill 
had  united,  and  were  at  Kernatown,  near  Winchester. 


BATTLE  OF  KERNSTOWtf. 

On  the  reception  of  the  foregoing  information,  I  determined 
to  attack  the  enemy  at  once ;  and,  early  on  the  morning  of  the 
24th,  my  Avhole  force  was  put  in  motion  for  Winchester.  The 
enemy,  under  Crook,  consisting  of  the  "  Army  of  West  Vir- 
ginia," and  including  Hunter's  and  Sigel's  forces,  and  Averill's 
cavalry,  was  found  in  position  at  Ivernstown,  on  the  same 
ground  occupied  by  Shields,  at  the  time  of  General  Jackson's 
light  with  him,  on  the  23rd  of  March,  1862.  Ramseur's  divi- 
sion was  sent  to  the  left,  at  Bartonsville,  to  get  around  the 
enemy's  right  flank,  while  the  other  divisions  moved  along  the 
Valley  Pike,  and  formed  on  each  side  of  it.  Ransom's  cavalry 
was  ordered  to  move  in  two  columns ;  one  on  the  right  along 
the  road  from  Front  Royal  to  Winchester;  and  the  other  on 
the  left,  and  west  of  Winchester,  so  as  to  unite  in  rear  of  the 
latter  place,  and  cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat.  After  the  ene- 
my's skirmishers  were  driven  in,  it  was  discovered  that  his 
left  flank,  extending  through  Kernstown,  was  exposed,  and 
General  Breckenridge  was  ordered  to  move  Echols'  division, 
now  under  Brig.-Gen.  Wharton,  under  cover  of  some  ravines 
on  our  right,  and  attack  that  flank.  This  movement,  which 
was  made  under  Gen.  Breckenridge's  personal  superinten- 
dence, was  handsomely  executed,  and  the  attacking  division 
struck  the  enemy's  left  flank  in  open  ground,  doubling  it  up 
and  throwing  his  whole  line  into  great  confusion.  The  other 
divisions  then  advanced,  and  the  rout  of  the  enemy  became 
complete.  He  was  pursued,  by  the  infantry  and  artillery, 
through  and  beyond  Winchester;  and  the  pursuit  was  con- 
tinued by  Rodes'  division  to  Stephen  son's  depot,  six  miles  from 
Winchester — this  division  then  having  marched  twenty-seven 
miles  from  its  position  west  of  Strasburg.  The  cavalry  had 
not  been  moved  according  to  my  orders;  and  the  enemy,  hav- 
ing the  advantage  of  an  open  country  and  a  wide  macadamized 

road,  was  enabled  to  make  his  escape  with  his  artillery  and 

I 


68  BATTLE  OF  KERNSTOWN. 

most  of  his  waggons.  General  Ransom  had  been  in  very  bad 
health  since  he  reported  to  me  at  Lynchburg,  and  unable  to 
take  the  active  command  in  the  lield;  and  all  my  operations 
had  been  impeded  for  the  want  of  an  efficient  and  energetic 
cavalry  commander.  T  think,  if  I  had  had  one  on  this  occa- 
sion, the  greater  part  of  the  enemy's  force  would  have  been 
captured  or  destroyed,  for  the  rout  was  thorough.  Our  loss, 
in  this  action,  was  very  light.  The  enemy's  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  severe,  and  two  or  three  hundred  prisoners  fell 
into  our  hands;  and,  among  them,  Colonel  Mulligan,  in  com- 
mand <if  a  division,  mortally  wounded.  The  infantry  was  too 
much  exhausted  to  continue  the  pursuit  on  the  25th,  and  only 
moved  to  Hunker  Hill,  twelve  miles  from  Winchester.  The 
pursuit  was  continued  by  our  cavalry,  and  the  enemy's  rear 
guard  of  cavalry  was  encountered  at  Martinsburg;  but,  after 
slight  skirmishing,  it  evacuated  the  phu-e.  The  whole  de- 
feated force  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  took  refuge  at  Maryland 
Heights  and  Harper's  Ferry.  The  road  from  Winchester,  via 
.\fartinsburg,  to  Williamsport,  was  strewed  with  debris  of  the 
rapid  retreat — twelve  caissons  and  seventy-two  waggons  hav- 
ing been  abandoned,  and  most  <>t  them  burned.* 


KXTKDITIOX  INTO   MAKYLAXF)  AND  PKXXSYL- 
VAXIA— BUKXIXG  OF  CH AMP.KKSP.l'Kii. 

On  the  •JGth  we  moved  to  Martin^hurg,  the  cavalry  going  t«. 
the  Potomac.  The  i!7th  and  I'sth  were  employed  in  destroy- 
in-'  the  railroad,  it  having  been  repaired  since  we  pa>sed  over 
it  at  the  beginning  of  the  month.  'While  at  Martinsburg,  it 
was  ascertained,  beyond  all  doubt,  that  Hunter  had  been  again 
indulging  in  his  favourite  mode  of  warfare,  and  that,  after  hi> 


.t.  iii  hi>  rc|.iii-t.  •  nth-fly  iniu.re*  tlii>  ».»ttl.>.  in  which  the  enciiu  -  .    MI(.. 

ri«'i'  to  mine,  aiirl  nierely  >ay«  :  -Atu.ut  the  -.'.jlh  it  heeaine  ovi-lenr  that  the  enemy  \\a-  aRain 
;i'l\uncinK'  upon  Mavyl.-in«i  and  Pennsylvania,  and  tin-  I'.lh  curi^.  'A'ni.'li  -A  a"  n'  A\  :i^)iingfi.n, 
wa*  onl'%red  back  to  the  vicinity  of  H»rp»r  «  Kerry." 


EXPEDITION  INTO  MARYLAND  AND  PENNSYLVANIA.          67 

return  to  the  Valley,  while  we  were  near  Washington,  among 
other  outrages,  the  private  residences  of  Mr.  Andrew  Hunter, 
u  member  of  the  Virginia  Senate,  Mr.  Alexander  R.  Boteler, 
an  ex-member  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  as  well  as  of  the 
United  States  Congress,  and  Edmund  I.  Lee,  a  distant  relative 
of  General  Lee,  all  in  Jefferson  County,  with  their  contents, 
had  been  burned  by  his  orders,  only  time  enough  being  given 
for  the  ladies  to  get  out  of  the  houses.  A  number  of  towns 
in  the  South,  as  well  as  private  country  houses,  had  been 
burned  by  the  Federal  troops,  and  the  accounts  had  been  her- 
alded forth  in  some  of  the  Northern  papers  in  terms  of  exul- 
tation, and  gloated  over  by  their  readers,  while  they  were  re- 
ceived with  apathy  by  others.  I  now  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  we  had  stood  this  mode  of  warfare  long  enough,  and  that 
it  was  time  to  open  the  eyes  of  the  people  of  the  North  to  its 
enormity,  by  an  example  in  the  way  of  retaliation.  I  did  not 
select  the  cases  mentioned,  as  having  more  merit  or  greater 
claims  for  retaliation  than  others,  but  because  they  had  occur- 
red within  the  limits  of  the  country  covered  by  my  command, 
and  were  brought  more  immediately  to  my  attention.* 

The  town  of  Chambersburg  in  Pennsylvania  was  selected  as 
the  one  on  which  retaliation  should  be  made,  and  McCausland 
was  ordered  to  proceed  with  his  brigade  and  that  of  Johnson 
and  a  battery  of  artillery  to  that  place,  and  demand  of  the 
municipal  authorities  the  sum  of  §100,000  in  gold,  or  $500,000 
in  United  States  currency,  as  a  compensation  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  houses  named  and  their  contents;  and,  in  default 
of  payment,  to  lay  the  town  in  ashes,  in  retaliation  for  the 

*  I  had  otten  seen  delicate  ladies,  who  had  been  plundered,  insulted  and  rendered  deso- 
late by  the  acts  of  our  most  atrocious  enemies,  and  while  they  did  not  call  for  it,  yet  in  the 
anguished  expressions  of  their  features  while  narrating  their  misfortunes,  there  was  a  mutr 
appeal  to  every  manly  sentiment  of  my  bosom  for  retribution  which  I  could  no  longer  with- 
stand. On  my  passage  through  the  lower  Valley  into  Maryland,  a  lady  had  said  to  me,  with 
tears  in  her  eyes,  "Our  lot  is  a  hard  one  and  we  see  no  peac«- ;  but  there  are  a  few  green 
spots  in  our  lives,  and  they  are,  when  the  Confederate  soldiers  come  along  and  we  ean  do 
something  for  them."  May  God  defend  and  bless  those  noble  women  of  the  Valley,  who  s<. 
often  ministered  to  the  wounded,  sick  and  dying  Confederate  soldiers,  and  gave  their  last 
morsel  of  bread  to  the  hungry!  They  bore  with  heroic  courage  the  privations,  sufferings, 
persecutions  and  dangers,  to  which  the  war  which  was  constantly  waged  in  their  midst  ex- 
posed them,  and  upon  no  portion  of  the  Southern  people  did  the  disasters  which  titnilly  >•<  - 
fell  our  army  and  country,  fc.ll  with  more  crushing  effect  than  upon  them. 


08  EXPEDITION   INTO  MARYLAND  AND   PENNSYLVANIA. 

burning  of  those  houses  and  others  in  Virginia,  as  well  as  for 
the  towns  which  had  been  burned  in  other  Southern  mates. 
A  written  demand  to  that  effect  was  sent  to  the  municipal 
authorities,  and  they  were  informed  what  would  be  the  result 
of  a  failure  or  refusal  to  comply  with  it.  I  desired  to  give  the 
people  of  ChambersI  Mirg  an  opportunity  of  saving  their  town, 
by  making  compensation  for  part  of  the  injury  done,  and 
hoped  that  the  payment  of  such  a  sum  would  have  the  desired 
effect,  and  open  the  eyes  of  the  people  of  other  towns  at  the 
North,  to  the  necessity  of  urging  upon  their  government  the 
adoption  of  a  different  policy.  M«-(';Misland  wa>  also  directed 
to  proceed  from  Chambersburg  towards  Cumberland  in  Mary- 
land, and  levy  rontributions  in  money  upon  that  and  other 
towns  able  to  bear  them,  and  if  possible  destroy  tin-  machinery 
at  the  coal  pits  near  Cumberland,  and  the  machine  shops,  de- 
pots, and  bridges  on  the  .Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad  as  far  as 
practicable. 

On  the  29th,  McCausland  crossed  the  Potomac  near  Clear 
Spring,  above  \Yilliamsport,  and  I  moved  with  JJodes'  and 
liamseur'a  divisions  and  Yanghan's  cavalry  to  the  latter  place, 
while  Imboden  demonstrated  with  his  and  Jackson's  cavalry 
towards  Harper's  Ferry,  in  order  to  withdraw  attention  from 
McCausland.  Breckenridge  remained  at  Martinsburg  and 
continued  the  destruction  of  the  railroad.  Yaughan  drove  a 
force  of  cavalry  from  \Yilliamsport,  and  went  into  Hagerstown, 
\vhere  he  capered  and  destroyed  a  train  of  ,-ars  loaded  with 
supplies.  One  of  Kodes'  brigades  \\-;is  crossed  over  at  Wil- 
liamsport and  >ub>c!juciitry  withdrawn.  On  the  :>0th,  Mc- 
Causland being  well  underway,  1  moved  back  to  Martinsburg, 
and  on  the  :>lst  the  whole  infantry  force  was  moved  to  Bunker 
Hill,  where  we  remained  on  the  1st.  lind,  and  :Jrd  of  August. 

On  the  4th,  in  order  to  enable  McCausland  to  retire  from 
Pennsylvania  and  Maryland,  and  to  keep  Hunter,  who  had 
been  reinforced  by  the  6th  and  19th  Corps,  and  had  been  oscil- 
lating between  Harper's  Ferry  and  Monocacy  Junction,  in  a 
state  of  uncertainty,  I  again  moved  to  the  Potomac  with  the 
infantry  and  Vaughan's  and  Jackson's  cavalry,  while  Imboden 
demonstrated  towards  Harper's  Ferry.  On  the  5th  Bodes'  and 


EXPEDITION  INTO  MARYLAND  AND  PENNSYLVANIA.          69 

llamseur's  divisions  crossed  at  AVilliamsport  and  took  position 
near  St.  James'  College,  and  Vaughan's  cavalry  went  into 
Hagerstown.  Breckenridge,  with  his  command,  and  Jackson's 
cavalry,  crossed  at  Shepherdstown,  and  took  position  at  Sharps- 
burg.  This  position  is  in  full  view  from  Maryland  Heights, 
and  a  cavalry  force  was  sent  out  by  the  enemy  to  reconnoitre, 
which,  after  skirmishing  with  Jackson's  cavalry,  was  driven 
off  by  the  sharpshooters  of  Gordon's  division.  On  the  6th, 
the  whole  force  recrossed  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport,  and 
moved  towards  Martinsburg ;  and  on  the  7th  we  returned  to 
Bunker  Hill.* 

>:  While  at  Sharpsburg  on  this  occasion,  I  rode  over  the  ground  on  which  the  battle  of 
.Sharpsburg,  or  Antietam  as  it  is  called  by  the  enemy,  was  fought,  and  I  was  surprised  to  see 
how  few  traces  remained  of  that  great  battle.  In  the  woods  at  the  famous  Dunkard  or 
Tanker  Church,  where,  from  personal  observation  at  the  battle,  I  expected  to  find  the  trees 
terribly  broken  and  shattered,  a  stranger  would  find  difficulty  in  identifying  the  marks  of 
the  bullets  and  shells. 

1  will  take  occasion  here  to  say  that  the  public,  North  or  South,  lias  never  known  how 
.-mall  was  the  force  with  which  General  Lee  fought  that  battle.  McClellan's  estimate  is  very 
wide  of  the  mark.  From  personal  observation  and  conversation  with  other  officers  engaged, 
including  Gen.  Lee  himself,  I  am  satisfied  that  the  latter  was  not  able  to  carry  30,000  men 
into  action.  The  exhaustion  of  our  men  in  the  battles  around  Richmond,  the  subsequent  bat- 
tlesnear  Manassas,  and  on  the  march  to  Maryland,  when  they  were  for  days  without  anything 
to  eat  except  green  corn,  was  so  great  that  the  straggling  was  frightful  before  we  crossed  the 
Potomac.  As  an  instance  of  our  weakness,  and  a  reminiscence  worthy  ot  being  recorded, 
which  was  brought  very  forcibly  to  my  mind  while  riding  over  the  ground,  I  will  state  the 
following  facts:  In  the  early  part  of  the  day,  all  of  Gen.  Jackson's  troops  on  the  field  except 
my  brigade  (A.  P.  Hill  had  not  then  arrived  from  Harper's  Ferry)  were  driven  from  the  field 
in  great  disorder,  and  Hood  had  taken  their  place  with  his  division.  My  brigade,  which 
was  on  the  extreme  left  supporting  some  artillery  with  which  Stuart  was  operating,  and  had 
not  been^engaged,  was  sent  for  by  General  Jackson  and  posted  in  the  left  of  the  woods  at 
the  Dunkard  Church.  Hood  was  also  forced  back,  and  then  the  enemy  advanced  to  this 
woods— Sumner's  Corps,  which  was  fresh,  advancing  on  our  left  flank.  My  brigade,  then 
numbering  about  1000  men  for  duty,  with  two  or  three  hundred  men  of  Jackson's  own  di- 
vision, who  had  been  rallied  by  Colonels  Grigsby  and  Stafford,  and  when  there  was  an  inter- 
val of  at  least  one  halt  a  mile  between  us  and  any  other  part  of  our  line,  held  Sumner's 
corps  in  check  for  some  time,  until  Green's  division  of  Mansfield's  Corps  penetrated  into 
the  interval  in  the  woods  between  us  and  the  rest  of  our  line,  when  I  was  compelled  to  move 
by  the  flank  and  attack  it.  That  division  was  driven  out  of  the  woods  by  my  brigade,  while 
Grigsby  and  Stafford  skirmished  with  Sumner's  advancing  force,  when  we  turned  on  it,  and, 
with  the  aid  of  three  brigades — to  wit :  Anderson's,  Semmes',  and  Barksdale's — which  had 
just  arrived  to  our  assistance,  drove  it  from  the  woods  in  great  confusion  and  with  heavy 
loss.  So  great  was  the  disparity  in  the  forces  at  this  point  that  the  wounded  officers  who 
were  captured  were  greatly  mortified,  and  commenced  making  excuses  by  stating  that  the 
troops  in  their  front  were  raw  troops,  who  stampeded  and  produced  confusion  in  their 
ranks.  McClellan,  in  his  report,  says  that  Sumner's  corps  and  Green's  division  encoun- 
tered, in  this  woods,  "overwhelming  numbers  behind  breastworks,"  and  he  assigns  the 
heavy  losses  and  consequent  demoralization  in  Sumner's  Corps  as  one  of  the  reasons  for 
not  renewing  the  fight  on  the  18th.  We  had  no  breastworks  nor  anything  like  them  in  thai 
woods  on  the  17th,  and,  OH  our  part,  it  was  a  stand-up  fight  there  altogether.  The  slight 
breastworks  subsequently  seen  by  McClellan  were  made  on  the  18th,  when  we  were  expect- 
ing a  renewal  of  the  battle. 


70  BURNING  OP  CHAMBERSBURG. 

On  the  30th  of  July  McCausland  reached  Charnbersburg, 
and  made  the  demand  as  directed,  reading  to  such  of  the  au- 
thorities as  presented  themselves  the  paper  sent  by  me.  The 
demand  was  not  complied  with,  the  people  stating  that  they 
were  not  afraid  of  having  their  town  burned,  and  that  a  Fede- 
ral force  was  approaching.  The  policy  pursued  by  our  army 
on  former  occasions  had  been  so  lenient,  that  they  did  not  sup- 
pose the  threat  was  in  earnest  this  time,  and  they  hoped  for 
speedy  relief.  McCausland,  however,  proceeded  to  carry  out 
his  orders,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  town  was  laid  in  ashes.* 
He  then  moved  in  the  direction  of  Cumberland,  but,  on  ap- 
proaching that  town,  he  found  it  defended  by  a  force  under 
Kelly  too  strong  for  him  to  attack,  and  he  withdrew  towards 
Hampshire  County  in  Virginia,  and  crossed  the  Potomac  near 
the  mouth  of  the  South  Branch,  capturing  the  garrison  at  that 
place  and  partially  destroying  the  railroad  bridge.  He  then 
invested  the  post  on  the  railroad  at  Xew  Creek,  but  finding  it 
too  strongly  fortified  to  take  by  assault,  he  moved  to  Moore- 
tield  in  Hardy  County,  near  which  place  he  halted  to  rest  and 
recruit  his  men  and  horses,  as  the  command  was  now  consid- 
ered safe  from  pursuit.  Averill,  however,  had  been  pursuing 
from  Chambersburg  with  a  body  of  cavalry,  and  Johnson's 
brigade  was  surprised  in  camp,  before  day,  on  the  morning  of 
the  7th  of  August,  and  routed  by  AverilPs  force.  This  re- 
sulted also  in  the  rout  of  McCausland's  brigade,  and  the  loss 
of  the  artillery  (4  pieces)  and  about  300  prisoners  from  the 
\vhole  command.  The  balance  of  the  command  made  its  way 
to  Mount  Jackson  in  great  disorder,  and  much  weakened. 
This  affair  had  a  very  damaging  effect  upon  my  cavalry  for  the 
rest  of  the  campaign.f 


*  For  this  act  I,  alone,  am  responsible,  as  the  officers  engaged  in  it  were-  simply 
my  orders,  and  had  no  discretion  left  thorn.  Notwithstanding  the  lapse  of  time  which  ha* 
ocrurred,  and  the  result  of  the  wnr,  1  am  perfectly  .-rttisfu-d  with  my  conduct  on  this  OOOH- 
sion,  and  see  no  reason  to  regret  it. 

t Grant  says,  in  reference  to  this  expedition  under  MuCaunland  :  "They  were  met  and  de- 
I'.'ut.'d  by  General  Kelly;  and,  with  diminished  numbers,  escaped  into  the  mountains  of 
West  Virginia  ;"  and  he  makes  no  allusion  whatever  to  Averill's  affair.  There  was  no  d«- 
teat  by  Kelly,  but  there  was  one  by  Averill,  as  I  have  stated.  This  shows  how  loose  Gruiu  i- 
ns  to  his  facts.  So  far  as  we  were  concerned,  the  defeat  by  Averill  was  worse  than  it  could 
hav«  been  by  Kelly. 


RETREAT   TO  FISHER'S   HILL,  AND  SUBSEQUENT 

OPERATIONS,  UNTIL   THE  BATTLE  OF 

WINCHESTER. 

On  the  9th,  Iinboden  reported  that  a  large  force  had  been 
concentrated  at  Harper's  Ferry,  consisting  of  the  6th,  19th, 
and  Crook's  Corps,  under  a  new  commander,  and  that  it  was 
moving  towards  Berryville,  to  our  right.  The  new  comman- 
der proved  to  be  Major-General  Sheridan,  from  Grant's  army. 
On  the  10th,  we  moved  from  Bunker  Hill  to  the  east  of  "Win- 
chester, to  cover  the  roads  from  Charlestown  and  Berryville  to 
that  place  ;  and  Ramseur's  division  was  moved  to  Winchester, 
to  cover  that  place  against  a  force  reported  to  be  advancing 
from  the  west ;  but,  this  report  proving  untrue,  it  was  sub- 
sequently moved  to  the  junction  of  the  Millwood  and  Front 
Royal  roads.  On  the  rnerning  of  the  llth,  it  was  discovered 
that  the  enemy  was  moving  to  our  right,  on  the  east  of  the 
Opequon,  and  my  troops,  which  had  been  formed  in  line  of 
battle  covering  Winchester,  were  moved  to  the  right,  towards 
Xewtown,  keeping  between  the  enemy  and  the  Valley  Pike. 
Ramseur  had  a  brisk  skirmish  with  a  body  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  on  the  Millwood  Road,  and  drove  it  back.  Imboden's 
and  Vuughan's  brigades  had  a  severe  tight  with  another  body 
of  cavalry  at  the  double  toll-gate,  at  the  intersection  of  the 
Front  Royal  road  with  the  road  from  White  Post  to  Xewtown ; 
and  it  was  discovered  that  there  had  been  a  considerable  acces- 
sion to  that  arm  from  Grant's  army.  Just  before  night,  Gor- 
don had  heavy  skirmishing  near  Xewtown,  with  a  large  forcr 
of  cavalry,  which  advanced  on  the  road  from  the  double  toll- 
gate,  and  drove  it  oft'.  We  encamped  near  Xewtown ;  and,  on 
the  morning  of  the  12th,  moved  to  Hupp's  Hill,  between  Stras- 
burg  and  Cedar  Creek.  Finding  that  the  enemy  was  advanc- 
ing in  much  heavier  force  than  I  had  yet  encountered,  I  de- 
termined to  take  position  at  Fisher's  Hill,  above  Strasburg, 


72  RETREAT  TO  FISHER'S  HILL. 

and  await  his  attack  there.  Imboden,  with  his  brigade,  was 
sent  to  Luray  Valley,  to  watch  that  route ;  and,  in  the  after- 
noon, we  moved  to  Fisher's  Hill.  I  had  received  information 
a  few  days  before,  from  General  Lee,  that  General  Anderson 
had  moved  with  Kershaw's  division  of  infantry  and  Fit/,  Lee's 
division  of  cavalry  to  Culpeper  C.  II. ;  and  I  sent  a  dispatch 
to  Anderson,  informing  him  of  the  state  of  things,  and  re- 
questing him  to  move  to  Front  "Royal,  so  as  to  guard  the  Luray 
Valley. 

Sheridan's  advance  appeared  on  the  banks  of  Cedar  Creek, 
on  the  12th,  and  there  was  some  skirmishing  with  it.  My 
troops  were  posted  at  Fisher's  Hill,  with  the  right  resting  on 
the  North  Fork  of  tin-  Shenandoah,  and  the  left  extending  to- 
wards Little  Xorth  Mountain:  and  we  awaited  the  advaiu-e  <>t' 
the  enemy.  <  leneral  Anderson  moved  to  Front  Royal,  in  com- 
pliance with  my  request,  and  took  position  to  prevent  an  ad- 
vance of  the  enemy  on  that  route.  Shortly  after  I  took  posi- 
tion at  Fisher's  Hill,  Major-General  Loinax  reported  to  me  to 
relieve  Ransom,  in  command  of  the  cavalry,  and  McCausland 
and  Johnson  joined  us  with  the  remnants  of  their  brigades. 
Sheridan  demonstrated  at  Ilupp's  Hill,  within  our  view,  for 
several  days,  and  some  severe  skirmishing  ensued. 

rpon  taking  position  at  Fi>her's  Hill,  I  had  established  a 
signal-station  on  the  end  of  Three  Top  Mountain,  a  branch  of 
Massanutten  Mountain,  near  Mrasluirg,  which  overlooked  both 
camps  and  enabled  me  to  communicate  readily  with  General 
Anderson,  in  the  Luray  Valley.  A  small  force  from  Sheri- 
dan's army  ascended  the  mountain  and  drove  off  our  signal- 
men, and  possession  was  taken  of  the  station  by  the  enem\ , 
who  was  in  turn  driven  away:  when  several  small  but  severe 
tights  ensuedlover  the  station,  possession  of  it  being  finally 
gained  and  held  by  a  force  of  one  hundred  men  under  Cap- 
tain Keller  of  Gordon's  division. 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  it  was  discovered  that  the  ene- 
my was  falling  back,  and  I  immediately  moved  forward  in 
pursuit,  requesting  General  Anderson,  by  signal,  to  cross  the 
river  at  Front  Royal,  and  move  towards  Winchester.  Ju*t 


NjS  IX  THE   LOW Kll  VALLlaY.  73 

before  night,  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  u  body  of  infantry, 
reported  to  be  a  division,  was  encountered  between  Kernstown 
and  Winchester,  and  driven  through  the  latter  place,  after  a 
sharp  engagement,  in  wThich  Wharton's  division  moved  to  the 
left,  and  attacked  the  enemy's  infantry,  and  drove  it  from  a 
strong  position  on  Bower's  Hill,  south  of  Winchester,  while 
Ilamseur  engaged  it  in  front,  and  Gordon  advanced  against  the 
cavalry  on  the  right.* 

On  the  18th  we  took  position  to  cover  Winchester,  and  Gen. 
Anderson  came  up  with  Kershaw's  division  of  infantry,  Cut- 
shaw's  battalion  of  Artillery,  and  two  brigades  of  cavalry 
under  Fit/  Lee.  General  Anderson  ranked  me,  but  he 
declined  to  take  command,  and  offered  to  co-operate  in  any 
movement  I  might  suggest.  We  had  now  discovered  that  Tor- 
hert's  and  Wilson's  divisions  of  cavalry  from  Grant's  army,  had 
joined  Sheridan's  force,  and  that  the  latter  was  very  large. 

On  the  19th,  my  main  force  moved  to  Bunker  Hill  and 
Lornax's  cavalrv  made  recoimoissances  to  Martinsbursr  and 

i/  O 

Shepherdstown,  while  Anderson's  whole  force  remained  near 
Winchester. 

On  the  20th,  our  cavalry  had  some  skirmishing  with  the 
enemy's  on  the  Opequon,  and  on  the  21st,  by  concert,  there 

When  Hunter  was  relieved  I  had  hoped  that  an  end  was  put  to  his  mode  of  warfare,  but 
I  had  now  to  learn  how  the  new  commander  proposed  to  carry  on  the  war  in  behalf  of  "  th« 
best  government  the  world  ever  saw."  (so  called).  Sheridan  had  commenced  burning  barns, 
mills  and  stacks  of  small  grain  and  hay.  and  the  whole  country  was  smoking.  Among  many 
others,  the  barn  of  a  respectable  fanner  near  Xewtown,  whoso  name  was  (,'hrisman,  had  been 
burned  within  a  tew  steps  of  his  house,  ami  the  latter  saved  with  great  difficulty,  notwith- 
standing the  1'act  that  Mr.  Clirisnuui  had  received  from  General  Torbert,  in  command  of  the 
1-Vdcral  cavalry,  a  written  protection  stating  that  for  some  weeks  he.  had  taken  care  of,  and 
showed  great  kindness  to,  a  badly  wounded  Federal  soldier.  In  passing  through  Middle- 
low  n.  i  was  informed  that  one  of  my  soldiers  had  been  tried  and  hung  as  a  spy.  The  grave 
at  the  foot  of  the.  gallows  was  opened,  and  the  body  was  recognized  by  Ids  brother  and  the 
officer-  ol  his  company  as  a  private  of  the  Otth  North  Carolina  regiment.  This  man  had 
been  found  by  the  enemy  in  Middletown,  in  attendance  on  a  Confederate  soldier  whose  leg 
<vas  amputated,  and  he  had  claimed  to  be  a  citizen,  luit  a  paper  was  found  on  his  person 
-MOW  in-;  that  he  bad  been  formerly  detailed  as  a  nurse  in  the  hospital.  On  this  state  of 
fads  lie  was  hung  as  a  spy.  He  was  not  employed  in  any  such  capacity,  and  he  was  so  illit- 
erate, not  being  able  to  read  or  write,  that  his  appearance  and  evident  want  of  intelligence 
precluded  the  idea  of  his  being  so  employed.  I  would  have  retaliated  at,  once  by  hanging  a 
commissioned  officer,  hut  the  enquiry  which  1  made  furnished  some  reason  for  believing 
that  the  man  had  remained  behind,  and  endeavored  to  pass  for  a  citizen  to  avoid  service  in 
our  army;  and  I  did  not  therefore  \\ish  to  risk  the'  lives  of  my  officers  and  men  who  were  in 
t  he  enemy's  hands,  by  making  his  a  ease  for  retaliation.  Jlis  execution  by  the  enemy,  how- 
ever, was  none  the  less  wanton  and  barbarous. 
K 


74  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  LOWER  YA3.: 

was  a  general  movement  towards  Harper's  Ferry — my  com- 
mand moving  through  Smithtield  towards  Oharlestown,  :uul 
Anderson's  on  the  direct  road  l>y  Summit  Point.  A  body  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry  was  driven  from  thu  Ope-pion,  and  wa- 
pursued  by  part  of  our  cavalry  towards  Summit  Point.  F  on- 
countered  Sheridan's  main  force  near  Cameron's  depot,  about 
three  miles  from  Chariestown,  in  a  position  which  he  com- 
menced fortifying  at  once.  Rode-'  and  IJamseur's  divisions 
were  advanced  to  the  front,  ami  very  heavy  skirmishing  en- 
sued and  was  continued  until  night,  but  i  waited  for  (ietierai 
Anderson  to  arrive  before  making  a  general  attack.  lie 
encountered  "Wilson's  division  of  cavalry  at  Summit  Point,  and, 
after  driving  it  o1f.  went  into  camp  at  that  place.  At  light 
next  morning,  it  wa.-  di.-coveivd  that  the  enemy  liad  retired 
during  the  night,  and  hi.-  rear  guard  of  cavalry  wa.-  driven 
through  Chariestown  towards  Hall-town,  where  Sheridan  had 
taken  a  -Iron-;  po-'uiou  under  the  protection  of  the  heavy  guns 
on  Maryland  Height.-.  I  demonstrated  on  the  enemy's  front 
on  the  22nd,  2'Jrd.  and  24th.  JUK!  there  was  ,-ome  skirmishing, 
(icnera!  Anderson  ti  •  nted  to  take  my  position  in  from 

of  Chariestown  amlamii-c  the  enemy  \vith  Ker.-haw's  division 
of  infantry,  supported  iiy  M-.-Causland's  brigade  of  cavalry  on 
the  left  and  a  regiment  of  Fit/  Lee's  cavalry  on  the  ri'/nt. 
while  1  moved  with  my  infantry  and  artillery  to  Shepherd  — 
town,  and  Kit/  Lee  with  the  rest  of  the  cavalry  to  Williams- 
port,  as  if  to  cross  into  Maryland,  in  order  to  keep  up  the  fear 
of  an  invasion  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania. 

On  the  2~>th  Fit/  Lee  started  by  the  w;<y  of  Lecfown  and 
Marti nsbnrg  to  Williamsport,  and  I  moved  through  Leetown 
and  crossed  the  railroad  at  Kearneysville  to  Shcpherdstown. 
After  Fit/  Lee  had  passed  on,  1  encountered  a  verv  lar^-e  fopee 
ol'  the  enemy's  cavalry  l>etween  Leetown  and  Kearneysville, 
which  was  moving  out  wi'h  several  days  forage  and  rations  for 
a  raid  in  our  rear.  After  a  sharp  engagement  with  small  arms 
and  artillery,  this  force  was  driven  back  through  Shepherds- 
town,  where  we  came  very  near  surrounding  and  capturing  a 
considerable  portion  of  it.  but.  it  succeeded  in  making  it- 
ocupe  across  the  Potomac.  Ciordon's  division,  which  wa- 


OPERATIONS  IN  THE  LOWER  VALLEY.  75 

moved  around  to  intercept  the  enemy,  became  heavily  engaged, 
and  cut  oft'  the  retreat  of  part  of  his  force  by  one  road,  but  it 
made  its  way  down  the  river  to  the  ford  by  another  and  thus 
escaped.  In  this  affair,  a  valuable  officer,  Colonel  Monaghan 
of  the  6th  Louisiana  Regiment,  was  killed.  Fitz  Lee  reached 
AVilliamsport,  and  had  some  skirmishing  across  the  river  at 
that  place,  and  then  moved  to  Shepherdstown. 

On  the  26th  I  moved  to  Leetowu,  and  on  the  27th  I  moved 
back  to  Bunker  Hill;  while  Anderson  who  had  confronted 
Sheridan,  during  the  two  days  of  my  absence,  with  but  a  di- 
vision of  infantry  and  a  brigade  and  a  regiment  of  cavalry, 
moved  to  Stephenson's  Depot. 

On  the  28th,  our  cavalry,  which  had  been  left  holding  a  line 
from  Charlestown  to  Shepherdstown,  Avas  compelled  to  retire 
across  the  Opequon,  after  having  had  a  brisk  engagement  with 
the  enemy's  cavalry  at  Smithfield.  On  the  29th,  the  enemy's 
cavalry  crossed  the  Opequon  near  Smithfield,  driving  in  our 
cavalry  pickets,  when  I  advanced  to  the  front  with  a  part  of 
my  infantry,  and  drove  the  enemy  across  the  stream  again,  and 
after  a  very  sharp  artillery  duel,  a  portion  of  my  command  was 
crossed  over  and  pursued  the  enemy  through  Smithfield  towards 
Charlestown.  "We  then  retired,  leaving  a  command  of  cavalry 
at  Smithfield,  but  it  was  compelled  to  recross  the  Opequou,  on 
the  advance  of  a  heavy  force  from  the  direction  of  Charlestown. 

Quiet  prevailed  on  the  30th,  but  on  the  31st  there  were  some 
.demonstrations  of  cavalry  by  the  enemy  on  the  Opequon, 
which  were  met  by  ours.  On  this  day,  (31st),  Anderson  moved 
to  Winchester,  and  Rodes  with  his  division  went  to  Martins- 
burg  on  a  reconnoissance,  drove  a  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
from  that  place,  interrupted* the  preparations  for  repairing  the 
railroad,  and  then  returned. 

There  was  quiet  on  the  1st  of  September,  but,  on  the  2nd,  1 
broke  up  my  camp  at  Bunker  Hill,  and  moved  with  three 
divisions  of  infantry  and  part  of  McCausland's  cavalry  under 
Col.  Ferguson,  across  the  country  towards  Summit  Point,  on  a 
reconnoissance,  while  the  trains  under  the  protection  of  Rodes' 
division  were  moved  to  Stepheuson's  depot,  After  I  had 


:r,  OPTT.ATTOXS  ix  THE  LOWER  Y.M.I. rv. 

crossed  the  Opequon  and  was  moving  towards  Summit  Point, 
Averill's  cavalry  attacked  and  drove  back  iu  some  confusion, 
first  yauirhair's.  and  then  Johnson's  cavalrv,  whicli  were  <>n 

O  « 

the  Martinsburg  road,  and  the  Opequon,  but  Kodes  returned 
towards  Bunker  Hill  and  drove  the  enemy  back  in  turn.  This 
affair  arrested  my  march,  and  I  recrossed  the  Opequon  and 
moved  to  Stephensdh's  depot,  where  I  established  my  camp. 

On  the  3d  Rodes  moved  to  "Bunker  Hill  in  support  of  Lo- 
max's  cavalry,  and  drove  the  enemy's  cavalry  from  and  be- 
yond that  place. 

A  letter  had  been  received  from  General  Lee  requesting 
that  Kershaw's  division  should  he  returned  to  him,  as  he  was 
very  much  iu  need  of  troops,  and,  after  consultation  with  me, 
General  Anderson  determined  to  recross  the  Blue  Kidge  with 
that  division  and  Fit/  Lee's  cavalry.  <  )n  the  3rd  he  moved 
towards  Berry ville  for  the  purpose  of  crossing  the  mountain 
at  Ashby's  Gap,  and  I  was  to  have  moved  towards  Charles- 
town  next  day.  to  occupy  tin-  enemy's  attention  during  An- 
derson's movement.  Sheridan,  however,  had  started  two  di- 
visions of  cavalry  through  lierryville  and  White  1'ost,  on  a 
raid  to  our  rear,  and  his  main  force  had  moved  towards  l>cr- 
ryville.  Anderson  encountered  Crook's  corps  at  the  latter 
place,  and,  after  a  sharp  engagement,  drove  it  back  on  the 
main  body,  Receiving  information  of  this  affair,  I  moved  a: 
daylight  next  morning,  with  three  divisions,  to  Anderson's  ;i<- 
sistance,  Gordon's  division  being  left  to  cover  Winchester.  1 
found  Ivershaw's  division  extended  out  in  a  strong  skirmish 

O 

line  confronting  Sheridan's  main  force,  which  had  taken  posi- 
tion in  rear  of  LJerryville,  across  the  road  from  Charlestown  to 
that  place,  and  was  busily  fortifying,  while  the  cavalrv  force 
which  had  started  on  the  raid  was  returning  and  passing  be- 
tween Berry  ville  and  the  river  to  Sheridan's  rear.  As  mav  be 
supposed,  Anderson's  position  was  one  of  great  peril,  if  the  en- 
emy had  possessed  any  enterprise,  and  it  presented  the  appear- 
ance of  the  most  extreme  audacity  for  him  thus  to  confront  a 
force,  so  vastly  superior  to  his  own,  while,  too,  his  trains  were 
at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  had  the  latter  known  it. 
Placing  one  of  my  divisions  in  line  on  Kershaw's  left,  I  moved 


OPERATIONS  TN  THE  LOWER  VALLEY.  77 

with  the  other  two  along  the  enemy's  front  towards  his  right, 
for  the  purpose  of  reconnoitring  and  attacking  that  flank,  if  a 
suitahle  opportunity  offered.  After  moving  in  this  way  for 
two  miles,  I  reached  an  elevated  position  from  which  the  ene- 
my's line  was  visible,  and  within  artillery  range  of  it.  I  at 
tirst  thought  that  I  had  reached  his  right  flank,  and  was  about 
making  arrangements  to  attack  it,  when  casting  my  eye  to  my 
left,  I  discovered,  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach  with  the  aid  of 
Held  glasses,  a  line  extending  towards  Summit  .Point.  The 
position  the  enemy  occupied  was  a  strong  one,  and  he  was 
busily  engaged  fortifying  it,  having  already  made  considera- 
ble progress.  It  was  not  until  I  had  had  this  view  that  I  real- 
ixed  the  size  of  the  enemy's  force,  and  as  I  discovered  that  his 
line  was  too  long  for  me  to  get  around  his  flank,  and  the  posi- 
tion was  too  strong  to  attack  in  front,  I  returned  and  informed 
General  Anderson  of  the  condition  of  things.  After  consul- 
tation with  him,  we  thought  it  not  advisable  to  attack  the  en- 
emy in  his  intrenched  lines,  and  we  determined  to  move  our 
forces  back  to  the  west  side  of  the  Opequon,  and  see  if  he 
would  not  move  out  of  his  works.  The  waggon  trains  were 
sent  back  early  next  morning  (the  5th)  towards  Winchester, 
and  about  an  hour  by  sun  Kershaw's  division,  whose  place  had 
been  taken  by  one  of  my  divisions,  moved  towards  the  same 
point.  About  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  my  troops  were 
withdrawn,  and  moved  back  to  Stephenson's  depot.  This 
withdrawal  was  made  while  the  skirmishers  were  in  close 
proximity  and  firing  at  each  other ;  yet  there  was  no  effort  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy  to  molest  us.  Just  as  my  front  division 
(Rodes')  reached  Stephenson's  depot,  it  met,  and  drove  back, 
and  pursued  for  some  distance,  AverilFs  cavalry,  which  was 
forcing  towards  Winchester  that  part  of  our  cavalry  which 
had  been  watching  the  Martinsburg  road. 

It  was  quiet  on  the  6th,  but  on  the  7th  the  enemy's  cavalry 
made  demonstrations  on  the  Martinsburg  road  and  the  Ope- 
quon at  several  points,  and  was  repulsed. 

On  the  8th  it  was  quiet  again,  but  on  the  9th  a  detachment 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  came  to  the  Opequon  below  Brucetown, 


78  OPEEATIONS  IN  THE  LOWER  VALLEY. 

burned  some  mills,  and  retreated  before  a  division  of  infantry 
sent  out  to  meet  it. 

On  the  10th,  my  infantry  moved  by  Bunker  Hill  to  Darkes- 
ville  and  encountered  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy's  rav- 
alry,  which  was  driven  oft',  and  then  pursued  by  Lomax 
through  Marti  nsburg  across  the  Opequon.  We  then  returned 
to  Bunker  Hill,  and  the  next  day  to  fStephenson's  depot,  and 
there  was  quiet  on  the  12th. 

On  the  13th  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's  ravalry,  reported  to 
be  supported  by  infantry,  advanced  on  the  road  from  Summit 
Point  and  drove  in  our  pickets  from  the  Opequon,  when  two 
divisions  of  infantry  were  advanced  to  the  front,  driving  the 
enemy  across  the  Opequon  again.  A  very  sharp  artillery  duel 
across  the  creek  then  took  place,  and  some  of  my  infantry 
crossed  over,  when  the  enemy  retired. 

On  the  14th  General  Anderson  again  started,  with 
shaw's  division  and  Cutshaw's  battalion  of  artillery,  to 
the  Blue  Ridge  by  the  way  of  Front  Royal,  and  was  not  mo- 
lested. Fitz  Lee's  cavalry  was  left  with  me,  and  Ramseur's 
division  was  moved  to  Winchester  to  occupy  Ivershaw's 
position. 

There  was  an  affair  between  one  of  Kershaw's  brigades  and 
a  division  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  while  I  was  at  Fisher's  Hill 
and  Anderson  at  Front  Royal,  in  which  some  prisoners  were 
lost ;  and,  subsequently,  there  were  two  affairs,  in  which  the 
outposts  from  Kershaw's  command  were  attacked  and  cap- 
tured by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  one  in  front  of  Winchester  and 
the  other  in  front  of  Charlestown,  which  I  have  not  underta- 
ken to  detail,  as  they  occurred  when  General  Anderson  was 
controlling  the  operations  of  that  division,  but  it  is  proper  to 
refer  to  them  here  as  part  of  the  operations  in  the  Valley. 

On  the  loth  and  16th  my  troops  remained  in  camp 
undisturbed. 

The  positions  of  the  opposing  forces  were  now  as  follows  : 
Ramseur's  division  and  Nelson's  battalion  of  artillery  were  on 
the  road  from  Berry ville  to  Winchester,  one  mile  from  the 
latter  place.  Rodes',  Gordon's  and  Wharton's  divisions,  (the 


POSTTION3  AND  STRENGTH  OTT  THE  TWO  ARMIES.  79 

last  two  being  under  Breckenridge,)  and  Braxton's  and  King's 
battalions  of  artillery  were  at  Stephenson's  depot  on  the  Win- 
chester and  Potomac  railroad,  which  is  six  miles  from  Win- 
chester. Lomax's  cavalry  picketed  in  my  front  on  the  Ope- 
quon, and  on  rny  left  from  that  stream  to  Xorth  Mountain, 
while  Fitz  Lee's  cavalry  watched  the  right,  having  small  pick- 
ers su-ross  to  the  Shenandoah.  Four  principal  roads,  from  po- 
sitions held  by  the  enemy,  centered  at  Stephenson's  depot,  to 
wit :  the  Martinsburg  road,  the  road  from  Charlestown  via 
Smithtield,  the  road  from  the  same  place  via  Summit  Point, 
and  the  road  from  Berry ville  via  Jordan's  Springs.  Sheridan's 
main  force  was  near  Berry  ville,  at  the  intrenched  position 
which  has  been  mentioned,  while  Averill  was  at  Martinsburg 
with  a  division  of  cavalry.  Berry  ville  is  ten  miles  from  Win- 
chester, nearly  east,  and  Martinsburg  twenty-two  miles  nearly 
north.  The  crossing  of  the  Opequon  on  the  Berryville  road  is 
four  or  five  miles  from  "Winchester.  From  Berryville  there 
are  two  good  roads  to  Front  Royal,  via  Millwood  and  White 
Post,  and  from  Millwood  there  is  a  macadamized  road  to  Win- 
chester, and  also  good  roads  via  White  Post  to  the  Valley  pike 
at  Newtown  and  Middletown,  the  last  two  roads  running  east 
of  the  Opequon.  The  whole  country  is  very  open,  being  ii 
limestone  country,  which  is  thickly  settled  and  well  cleared, 
and  affords  great  facilities  for  the  movement  of  troops  and  the 
operations  of  cavalry.  From  the  enemy's  fortifications  on 
Maryland  Heights,  the  country  north  and  east  of  Winchester, 
and  the  main  roads  through  it,  are  exposed  to  view. 

The  relative  positions  which  we  occupied  rendered  my  com- 
munications to  the  rear  very  much  exposed,  but  I  could  not 
avoid  it  without  giving  up  the  lower  Valley.  The  object  of  my 
presence  there  was  to  keep  up  a  threatening  attitude  towards 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  and  prevent  the  use  of  the  Balti- 
more and  Ohio  railroad,  and  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  canal, 
as  well  as  to  keep  as  large  a  force  as  possible  from  Grant's 
army  to  defend  the  Federal  Capital.  Had  Sheridan,  by  ;i 
prompt  movement,  thrown  his  whole  force  on  the  line  of  my 
communications,  I  would  have  been  compelled  to  attempt  to 
cut  my  way  through,  as  there  wras  no  escape  for  me  to  the  right 


80  fclTIOHSASDJ  PH  OF- THE  TWO  ARMIES. 

or  left,  and  my  force  was  too  weak  to  cross  the  Potomac  while 
he  was  in  my  rear.  I  knew  my  danger,  but  I  could  occupy 
no  other  ] 'option  that  would  have  enabled  me  to  accomplish 
ihe  desired  object.  If  I  had  moved  up  the  Valley  at  all,  1 
could  not  have  stopped  short  of  Xew  Market,  for  between  that 
place  and  the  country  in  which  1  was  there  was  no  forage  for 
my  horses;  and  this  would  have  enabled  the  enemy  to  resume 
the  use  of  the  railroad  and  canal,  and  return  all  the  troops  from 
(-} rant's  ;irmy  to  him.  .Being  compelled  to  occupy  the  position 
where  I  was,  and  being  aware  of  its  danger  a>  well  a>  apprized 
of  the  fact  that  very  great  odds  wei.-  opposed  to  me,  my  only 
resource  was  to  use  my  forces  .-.<.»  as  to  display  them  at  differ- 
ent points  with  great  rapidity,  and  thereby  keep  up  the  im- 
pression that  they  were  much  larger  than  they  really  \ver<\ 
The  events  of  the  last  month  had  satisfied  me  that  the  com- 
mander opposed  to  me  was  without  enterprise,  ami  pos.^ 
an  excessive  caution  which  amounted  to  timidity.  If  it  wa- 
hi*  policy  to  produce  the  impression  that  his  force  was  too 
weak  to  iight  me,  he  did  not  succeed,  but  if  it  was  to  convince 
me  that  he  was  not  an  able  or  energetic  commander,  his  strat- 
egv  was  a  complete  BHOG688,  I.IHI  subsequent  events  have  not 
changed  my  opinion. 

My  infantry  force  at  this  lime  co:i>iMed  of  TIM-  three  divisions 
pi'  the  2nd  Corps  of  the  Army  of  Xorthern  Virginia,  and 
Wharton's  division  of  Breckeiiridge's  command.  The  i>nd 
<  orps  numbered  a  little  over  s,ni)ii  muskets  when  it  was  de- 
tached in  pursuit  of  Hunter,  and  it  had  now  Keen  reduced  to 
about  7,000  muskets,  by  long  and  rapid  marches  and  the  vari- 
ous engagements  and  skirmishc<  in  which  it  had  participated. 
Wharton's  division  had  been  reduced  to  ahoiit  1,700  musket- 
by  the  same  causes.  Making  a  small  allowance  for  details 
and  those  unfit  for  duty.  I  had  about  N,.~><MI  muskets  for  duty. 
When  I  returned  from  Nfaryland,  my  cavalry  consisted  of  the 
remnants  of  rive  small  brigades,  to  wit  :  Imboden's  McCaus- 
land's.  Johnson's  Jackson's,  and  Vaughan's.  Van^han's  had 
now  been  ordered  to  South- Western  Virginia,  most  of  the  men 
having  left  without  permission.  The  surprise  and  rout  of 
McCatislaud's  and  Johnson's  brigades  by  Averill  at  Moorcticld, 


POSITIONS  AND  STRENGTH  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES.  31 

had  resulted  in  the  loss  of  a  considerable  number  of  horses 
and  men,  and  such  had  been  the  loss  in  all  the  brigades,  in  the 
various  fights  and  skirmishes  in  which  they  had  been  engaged, 
that  the  whole  of  this  cavalry,  now  under  Lomax,  numbered 
only  about  1,700  mounted  men.  Fitz  Lee  had  brought  with  mm 
two  brigades,  to-wit :  "Wickham's,  and  Lomax's  old  brigade  (now 
under  Colonel  Payne),  numbering  about  1,200  mounted  men. 
I  had  the  three  battalions  of  artillery  which  had  been  with  me 
near  Washington,  and  Fitz  Lee  had  brought  a  few  pieces  of 
horse  artillery.  "When  I  speak  of  divisions  and  brigades  of 
ray  troops,  it  must  be  understood  that  they  were  mere  skele- 
tons of  those  organizations. 

Since  my  return  from  Maryland,  my  supplies  had  been 
obtained  principally  from  the  lower  Valley  and  the  counties 
west  of  it,  and  the  money  which  was  obtained  by  contributions 
hi  Maryland  was  used  for  that  purpose.  Nearly  the  whole  of 
our  bread  was  obtained  by  threshing  the  wheat  and  then  hav- 
ing it  ground,  by  details  from  my  command,  and  it  sometimes 
happened  that  while  my  troops  were  fighting,  the  very  flour 
which  was  to  furnish  them  with  bread  for  their  next  meal  was 
being  ground  under  the  protection  of  their  guns.  Latterly 
our  flour  had  been  obtained  from  the  upper  Valley,  but  also 
by  details  sent  for  that  purpose.  The  horses  and  mules,  in- 
cluding the  cavalry  horses,  were  sustained  almost  entirely  by 
grazing. 

I  have  no  means  of  slating  with  accuracy  Sheridan's  force, 
and  can  only  form  an  estimate  from  such  data  as  I  have  been 
able  to  procure.  Citizens  who  had  seen  his  force,  stated  that 
it  was  the  largest  which  they  had  ever  seen  in  the  Valley  on 
either  side,  and  some  estimated  it  as  high  as  60,000  or  70,000, 
but  of  course  I  made  allowance  for  the  usual  exaggeration  of 
inexperienced  men.  My  estimate  is  from  the  following  data: 
In  Grant's  letter  to  Hunter,  dated  at  Monocacy,  August  5th, 
1864,  and  contained  in  the  report  of  the  former,  is  the  follow- 
ing statement :  "  In  detailing  such  a  force,  the  brigade  of  cav- 
alry now  en  route  from  "Washington  via  Rockville,  may  be  taken 
into  account.  There  are  now  on  their  way  to  join  you  three 
other  brigades  of  the  best  cavalry,  numbering  at  least  5,000 
L 


82  POSITIONS  AND  STRENGTH  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES. 

men  and  horses/'  Sheridan  relieved  Hunter  on  the  6th,  and 
Grant  says  in  his  report,  "  On  the  7th  of  August,  the  Middle 
Department  and  the  Departments  of  AVest  Virginia,  Washing- 
ton, and  the  Susquehauna  were  constituted  into  the  Middle 
Military  division,  and  Major-General  Sheridan  was  assigned  i<> 
rln-  temporary  command  of  the  same.  Two  divisions  of  eav- 
alry,  commanded  by  Generals  Torbert  and  AVilson  were  seni 
to  Sheridan  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  first  readied 
him  at  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  llth  of  August."  Before  this 
cavalry  was  sent  to  the  Valley,  there  was  already  a  divi.-ion 
there  commanded  liy  Averiil.  besides  some  detachments  which 
belonged  to  the  department  of  WeM  Virginia.  A  book  con- 
taining the  official  reports  of  the  chief  surgeon  of  the  cavalry 
corps  of  Sheridan's  army,  which  was  subsequently  captured  at 
Cedar  Creek  on  the  19th  of  October,  showed  that  there  were 
present  for  duty  in  that  Corps,  during  the  first  week  in  Sep- 
tember, over  11,000  men,  and  present  for  duty  during  the  week- 
ending the  17th  day  of  September,  10,100  men.  The  extract.- 
from  Grant's  report  go  to  confirm  this  statement,  as,  it'  three 
brigades  numbered  at  least  5,000  men  and  horses,  the  two 
divisions,  when  the  whole  of  them  arrived,  Avith  Averill's 
cavalry,  must  have  numbered  over  10,000.  I  think,  therefore, 
that  I  can  safely  estimate  Sheridan's  cavalry  at  the  battle  of 
Winchester,  on  the  10th  of  September,  at  10,0<>0.  11  is  infantrv 
consisted  of  the  fJth,  l!»th,  and  Crook's  Corps,  the  latter  bein«r 
composed  of  the  "Army  of  AVest  Virginia."  and  one  division 
"f  the  8th  Corps.  The  ruport  of  Secretary  Stanton  .-hows  that 
there  was  in  the  department  of  whicli  the  "•  Middle  Military 
division"  was  composed, the  following  "available  force  present 
for  duty  May  1st,  1804,"  to-wit: 

"  Department  of  Washington 4^,1^4." 

"  Department  of  AVest  Virginia :50,78±" 

"  Department  of  the  Sus<|uehanna J,!'^"-" 

"  Middle  Department .">,«i^7." 

making  an  aggregate  of  Xl,,">()::J ;  but,  as  the  Federal  Secretarv 
of  AVar  in  the  same  report  -ays.  "In  order  to  repair  the  losses 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  chief  part  of  the  force 
designed  to  guard  the  Middle  Department  and  the  Department 


. 

POSITIONS  AND  STRENGTH  OF  THE  TWO  AEMIES.  83 

of  Washington  was  called  forward  to  the  front,"  we  may 
assume  that  40,000  men  were  used  for  that  purpose,  which 
'  would  leave  41,503,  minus  the  losses  in  hattle  before  Sheridan 
relieved  Hunter,  in  the  Middle  Military  division,  exclusive  of 
the  6th  and  19th  Corps,  and  the  cavalry  from  Grant's  army. 
The  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  composed  of 
the  2nd,  5th,  and  6th  Corps,  on  the  1st  of  May,  1864,  arid 
Stanton  says  the  "  available  force  present  for  duty "  in  that 
army  on  that  day,  was  120,886  men.  Allowing  30,000  for  the 
artillery  and  cavalry  of  that  army,  which  would  be  a  very 
liberal  allowance,  and  there  would  still  be  left  90,385  infantry ; 
and  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  6th  Corps  numbered  one-third 
of  the  infantry,  that  is,  30,000  men  on  the  1st  of  May,  1864. 
If  the  losses  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  such  as  to 
reduce  the  6th  Corps  to  less  than  10,000  men,  notwithstanding 
the  reinforcements  and  recruits  received,  the  carnage  in  Grant's 
army  must  have  been  frightful  indeed.  The  19th  Corps  was 
just  from  the  Department  of  the  Gulf  and  had  not  gone  through 
a  bloody  campaign.  A  communication  which  was  among  the 
papers  captured  at  Cedar  Creek,  in  noticing  some  statement  of 
a  newspaper  correspondent  in  regard  to  the  conduct  of  that 
corps  at  "Winchester,  designated  it  as  "a  vile  slander  on  12,000 
of  the  best  soldiers  in  the  Union  army."  In  view  of  the  fore- 
going data,  without  counting  the  troops  in  the  Middle  Depart- 
ment and  the  Departments  of  Washington  and  the  Susque- 
hanna,  and  making  liberal  allowances  for  losses  in  battle,  and 
for  troops  detained  on  post  and  garrison  duty  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  West  Virginia,  I  think  that  I  may  assume  that  Sheri- 
dan had  at  least  35,000  infantry  against  me.  The  troops  of 
the  6th  Corps  and  of  the  Department  of  West  Virginia,  alone, 
without  counting  the  19th  Corps,  numbered  on  the  1st  of  May, 
1864,  60,782.  If  with  the  19th  Corps,  Sheridan  did  not  have 
35,000  infantry  remaining  from  this  force,  what  had  become 
of  the  balance  ?  Sheridan's  artillery  very  greatly  outnum- 
bered mine,  both  in  men  and  guns. 

Having  been  informed  that  a  force  was  at  work  on  the  rail- 
road at  Martinsburg,  I  moved  on  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  of 
September,  with  Kodes'  and  Gordon's  division,  and  Braxton's 


84  KXl'EDITJON  TO  MARTIN8BUBO. 

artillery  to  Bunker  Hill,  and,  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  with 
Gordon's  division  und  a  part  ot'  the  artillery  to  Martinsburg. 
preceded  by  a  ]>art  of  Lomax's  cavalry.  Averill's  division  of 
cavalry  was  driven  from  the  town  across  the  Opequon  in  the 
direction  of  Charlestowu,  and  we  then  returned  to  Bunker 
Mill.  Gordon  was  left  at  Bunker  Hill,  with  orders  to  move  to 
Stephenson's  depot  by  sunrise  next  morning,  and  Kodes'  divi- 
sion moved  to  the  hitter  place  thai  night,  to  which  1  also 
returned.  At  Martinsburg,  where  the  enemy  had  a  telegraph 
office,  I  learned  that  Grant  was  with  Sheridan  that  day,  and 
1  expected  an  early 


BATTLK  OF  WINCJIKSTKH. 

At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  l!»th,  our  cavalry  pickets  ai 
the  crossing  of  the  Opeqnon  on  the  Berry  ville  road  were  driven 
in,  and  information  having  been  sent  me  of  that  fact,  I  imme- 
diately ordered  all  the  troops  at  Stephenson's  depot  to  be  in 
readiness  to  move,  directions  being  given  for  Gordon,  who 
had  arrived  from  Bunker  Hill,  to  move  at  once:  but,  by  some 
mistake  on  the  part  of  my  staff  officer,  the  latter  order  was 
not  delivered  to  General  Breckenridge  or  Gordon.  I  rode  at 
once  to  Ramseurs  position,  and  found  his  troops  in  line  across 
the  Berryville  road  skirmishing  with  the  enemy.  Before 
reaching  this  point,  I  had  ascertained  that  Gordon  was  not 
moving,  and  sent  back  for  him,  and  now  discovering  that  tin- 
enemy's  advance  was  a  real  one  and  in  heavy  force,  I  sent 
orders  for  Breckenridge  and  Rodes  to  move  up  as  rapidly  as 
possible.  The  position  occupied  by  Ramseur  was  about  one 
mile  and  a  half  out  from  Winchester,  on  an  elevated  plateau 
between  Abraham's  Creek  and  Red  Bud  Run.  Abraham's 
Creek  crosses  the  Valley  Pike  one  mile  south  of  Winchester, 
and  then  crosses  the  Front  Royal  road  about  the  same  distance 
south-east  of  the  town,  and,  running  eastwardly,  on  the  south- 
ern side  of  the  Berryville  road,  crosses  that  road  a  short  dis- 
tance before  it  empties  into  the  Opequon.  Red  Bud  Run 


BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER.  85 

crosses  the  Martinsburg  road  about  a  mile  and  a  half  north  of 
Winchester,  and  runs  eastwardly,  on  the  northern  side  of  the 
Berry ville  road,  to  the  Opequon.  Ramseur  was  therefore  in 
the  obtuse  angle  formed  by  the  Martinsburg  and  Front  Royal 
roads.  In  front  of  and  to  the  right  of  him,  for  some  distance, 
the  country  was  open.  Abraham's  Creek  runs  through  a  deep 
valley,  and  beyond  it,  on  the  right,  is  high  open  ground,  at  the 
intersection  of  the  Front  Royal  and  Millwood  roads.  To 
Jlamseur's  left,  the  country  sloped  off  to  the  Red  Bud,  and 
there  were  some  patches  of  woods  which  afforded  cover  for 
troops.  To  the  north  of  the  Red  Bud,  the  country  is  very 
open,  affording  facilities  for  the  movement  of  any  kind  of 
troops.  Towards  the  Opequon,  on  the  front,  the  Berryville 
road  runs  through  a  ravine,  with  hills  and  woods  on  each  side, 
which  enabled  the  enemy  to  move  his  troops  under  cover,  and 
mask  them  out  of  range  of  artillery.  ^Nelson's  artillery  was 
posted  on  Ramseur's  line,  covering  the  approaches  as  far  as 
practicable;  arid  Lomax,  with  Jackson's  cavalry  and  part  of 
.Johnson's,  was  on  the  right,  watching  the  valley  of  Abraham's 
Creek  and  the  Front  Royal  road  beyond,  while  Fitz  Lee  was 
on  the  left,  across  the  Red  Bud,  with  his  cavalry  and  a  battery 
of  horse-artillery,  and  a  detachment  of  Johnson's  cavalry 
watched  the  interval  between  Ramseur's  left  and  the  Red  Bud. 
These  troops  held  the  enemy's  main  force  in  cheek  until  Gor- 
don's and  Rodes'  divisions  arrived  from  Stephenson's  depot. 
Gordon's  division  arrived  first,  a  little  after  ten  o'clock,  A.  M., 
and  was  placed  under  cover  in  rear  of  a  piece  of  woods  behind 
the  interval  between  Ramseur's  line  and  the  Red  Bud,  the  de- 
tachment of  Johnson's  cavalry  having  been  removed  to  the 
right.  Knowing  that  it  would  not  do  for  us  to  await  the  shock 
of  the  enemy's  attack,  Gordon  was  directed  to  examine  the 
ground  on  the  left,  with  a  view  to  attacking  a  force  of  the  enemy 
which  had  taken  position  in  a  piece  of  wood  in  front  of  him, 
and  while  he  was  so  engaged  Rodes  arrived  with  three  of  his 
brigades,  and  was  directed  to  form  on  Gordon's  right,  in  rear  of 
another  piece  of  woods.  While  this  movement  was  being  exe- 
cuted, we  discovered  very  heavy  columns  of  the  enemy,  which 
had  been  massed  under  cover  between  the  Red  Bud  and  the 


86  BATTLE  6F  WINCHESTER. 

Berryville  road,  moving  to  attack  Raiuseur  on  his  left  flank, 
while  another  force  pressed  him  in  front.  It  was  a  moment  of 
imminent  and  thrilling  danger,  as  it  was  impossible  for  Ram- 
seur's  division,  which  numbered  only  about  1,700  muskets,  to 
withstand  the  immense  force  advancing  against  it.  The  only 
chance  for  us  was  to  hurl  Rodes  and  Gordon  upon  the  tlank  of 
the  advancing  columns,  and  they  were  ordered  forward  at 
once  to  the  attack.  They  advanced  in  most  gallant  sty  It- 
through  the  woods  into  the  open  ground,  and  attacked  with 
great  vigor,  while  Nelson's  artillery  on  the  right,  ami  Uraxton's 
on  the  left,  opened  a  destructive  tire.  But  Evans'  brigade  0f 
(Cordon's  division,  which  was  on  the  extreme  left  of  our 
infantry,  received  a  check  from  a  cohimn  of  the  enemy,  and 
was  forced  back  through  the  woods  from  behind  which  it  bad 
advanced,  the  enemy  following  to  the  very  rear  of  the  woods, 
and  to  within  musket  range  of  seven  pieces  of  Braxton's  artil- 
lery which  were  without  support.  This  caused  a  pause  in  our 
advance,  and  the  position  was  most  critical,  for  it  was  apparent 
that  unless  this  force  was  driven  back  the  day  was  lost.  Brax- 
ton's guns,  in  which  now  was  our  only  hope,  resolutely  stood 
their  ground,  and,  under  the  personal  superintendence  of 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Braxtou  and  Colonel  T.  H.  Carter,  my 
then  Chief  of  Artillery,  opened  with  canister  on  the  enemy. 
This  fire  was  so  rapid  and  well-directed  that  the  enemy  stag- 
gered, halted,  and  eommenced  falling  back,  leaving  a  battle- 
Hag  on  the  ground,  whose  bearer  was  cut  down  by  a  canister 
shot.  .lust  then,  Battle's  brigade  of  Rodes'  division,  which 
had  arrived  and  been  formed  in  line  for  the  purpose  of  advan- 
cing to  the  support  of  the  rest  of  the  division,  moved  forward 
and  swept  through  the  woods,  driving  the  enemy  before  it, 
while  Evans'  brigade  was  rallied  and  brought  back  to  the 
charge.  Our  advance,  which  had  been  suspended  for  a  mo- 
ment, was  resumed,  and  the  enemy's  attacking  columns  were 
thrown  into  great  confusion  and  driven  from  the  field.  This 
attacking  force  of  the  enemy  proved  to  be  the  Sixth  and  Nine- 
teenth corps,  and  it  was  a  grand  sight  to  see  this  immense  body 
hurled  back  in  utter  disorder  before  my  two  divisions,  num- 
bering a  very  little  over  5000  muskets.  Ramseur'a  division 


. 
BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER.  87 

had  received  the  shock  of  the  enemy's  attack,  and  been  forced 
back  a  little,  but  soon  recovered  itself.  Lomax,  on  the  right, 
had  held  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  check,  and,  with  a  part  of  his 
force,  had  made  a  gallant  charge  against  a  body  of  infantry, 
when  Ramseur's  line  was  being  forced  back,  thus  aiding  the 
latter  in  recovering  from  the  momentary  disorder.  Fitz  Lee 
on  the  left,  from  across  the  Red  Bud,  had  poured  a  galling  fire 
into  the  enemy's  columns  with  his  sharpshooters  and  horse- 
artillery,  while  jSTelson's  and  Braxton's  battalions  had  per- 
formed wonders.  This  affair  occurred  about  11  A.  M.,  and 
a  splendid  victory  had  been  gained.  The  ground  in  front 
was  strewn  with  the  enemy's  dead  and  wounded,  and  some 
prisoners  had  been  taken.  But  on  our  side,  Major  General 
liodes  had  been  killed,  in  the  very  moment  of  triumph, 
while  conducting  the  attack  of  his  division  with  great  gal- 
lantry and  skill,  and  this  was  a  heavy  blow  to  me.  Briga- 
dier-General Godwin,  of  Ramseur's  division,  had  been  killed, 
and  Brigadier-General  York,  of  Gordon's  division,  had  lost 
an  arm.  Other  brave  men  and  officers  had  fallen,  and  we 
could  illy  bear  the  loss  of  any  of  them.  Had  I  then  had 
a  body  of  fresh  troops  to  push  our  victory,  the  day  would 
have  been  ours,  but  in  this  action,  in  the  early  part  of  the 
day,  I  had  present  only  about  7000  muskets,  about  2000  cav- 
alry, and  two  battalions  of  artillery  with  about  30  guns ;  arid 
they  had  all  been  engaged.  Whartoirs  division  and  King's 
artillery  had  not  arrived,  and  Imboden's  cavalry  under  Colonel 
Smith,  and  McCausland's  under  Colonel  Ferguson,  were 
watching  the  enemy's  cavalrv  on  the  left,  on  the  Mar- 

O  v  *-  7 

tinsburg  road  and  the  Opequon.  The  enemy  had  a  fresh  corps 
which  had  not  been  engaged,  and  there  remained  his  heavy 
force  of  cavalry.  Our  lines  were  now  formed  across  from 
Abraham's  Creek  to  Red  Bud  and  were  very  attenuated.  The 
Qnemy  was  still  to  be  seen  in  front  in  formidable  force,  and 
away  to  our  right,  across  Abraham's  Creek,  at  the  junction  of 
the  Front  Royal  and  Millwood  roads,  he  had  massed  a  division 
of  cavalry  with  some  artillery,  overlapping  us  at  least  a  mile, 
while  the  country  was  open  between  this  force  and  the  Valley 
Pike,  and  the  Cedar  Creek  Pike  back  of  the  latter ;  which 


88  BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER. 

roads  furnished  my  only  means  of  retreat  in  the  event  of  dis- 
aster. My  line  did  not  reach  the  Front  Royal  road  on  the 
right,  or  the  Martinsburg  road  on  the  left. 

AVhen  the  order  was  sent  for  the  troops  to  move  from  Ste- 
phenson's  depot,  General  Breckenridge  had  moved  to  the  front, 
with  "Wharton's  division  and  King's  artillery,  to  meet  a  cavalry 
force/which  had  driven  our  pickets  from  the  Opequon  on  the 
Charlestown  road,  and  that  division  had  become  heavily  en- 
gaged with  the  enemy,  and  sustained  and  repulsed  several 
determined  charges  of  his  cavalry,  while  its  own  flanks  were 
in  great  danger  from  the  enemy's  main  force  on  the  right,  and 
a  column  of  his  cavalry  moving  up  the  Martinsburg  road  on 
the  left.  After  much  difficulty  and  some  hard  fighting,  Gen. 
Breckenridge  succeeded  in  extricating  his  force  and  moving 
up  the  Martinsburg  road  to  join  me,  but  lie  did  not  reach  the 
field  until  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

In  the  meantime  there  had  been  heavy  skirmishing  along 
the  line,  and  the  report.-  from  the  front  were  that  the  enemy 
\\  a-  massing  for  another  attack,  but  it  was  impossible  to  tell 
where  it  would  fall.  As  the  danger  from  the  enemy's  cavalry 
on  the  right  was  very  great  and  Lomax'-  force  very  weak, 
Wickham's  brigade  of  Fitz  Lee's  cavalry  had  been  sent  from 
the  left  to  Lomax's  a--i.-tance.  When  Wharton's  division 
arrived,  I'atton's  brigade  of  that  division  was  left  to  aid  Fit/ 
Lee  in  guarding  the  Martinsburg  road,  against  the  force  of 
•  •avalry  which  was  advancing  on  that  road  watched  by  Lomax's 
two  small  brigades;  and  the  rest  of  the  division  was  formed  in 
rear  of  Kodes'  division  in  the  centre,  in  order  to  be  moved  tn 
any  point  that  might  be  attacked.  Late  in  the  afternoon,  two 
divisions  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  drove  in  the  -mall  force  which 
had  been  watching  it  on  the  Martinsburg  mad.  and  Crook's 
corps,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  advanced  ;it  the  same  time 
on  that  flank,  on  the  north  side  of  Red  I'>nd.  and,  before 
this  overwhelming  force,  I'atton'-  brigade  of  infantry  and 
Payne's  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Fitz  Lee  were  forced  back. 
A  considerable  force  of  the  enemy'-  cavalry  then  swept  along 
the  Martinsburg  road  to  the  very  skirts  of  Winchester,  thus 
getting  in  the  rear  of  our  left  flank.  AVharton's  two  other 


BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER.  *n 

brigades  were  moved  in  double  quick  time  to  the  left  and  rear, 
and,  making  a  gallant  charge  on  the  enemy's  cavalry,  with  the 
aid  of  King's  artillery,  and  some  of  Braxton's  guns  which 
were  turned  to  the  rear,  succeeded  in  driving  it  back.  The 
division  was  then  thrown  into  line  by  General  Breckenridge, 
in  rear  of  our  left  and  at  right  angles  with  the  Martinsburg 
road,  and  another  charge  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  hand- 
somely repulsed.  But  many  of  the  men  on  our  front  line, 
hearing  the  fire  in  the  rear,  and  thinking  they  were  flanked 
and  about  to  be  cut  oft',  commenced  falling  back,  thus  produ- 
cing great  confusion.  At  the  same  time,  Crook  advanced 
against  our  left,  and  Gordon  threw  Evans'  brigade  into  line  to 
meet  him,  but  the  disorder  in  the  front  line  became  so  great 
that,  after  an  obstinate  resistance,  that  brigade  was  compelled 
to  retire  also.  The  whole  front  line  had  now  given  way,  but 
a  large  portion  of  the  men  were  rallied  and  formed  behind  an 
indifferent  line  of  breastworks,  which  had  been  made  just  out- 
side of  Winchester  during  the  first  year  of  the  war,  and,  with 
the  aid  of  the  artillery  which  was  brought  back  to  this  posi- 
tion, the  progress  of  the  enemy's  infantry  was  arrested. 
Wharton's  division  maintained  its  organization  on  the  left, 
ai id  Rarnseur  fell  back  in  good  order  on  the  right.  Wick- 
ham's  brigade  of  cavalry  had  been  brought  from  the  right,  and 
was  in  position  on  Fort  Hill,  just  outside  of  Winchester  on  the 
west.  Just  after  the  advance  of  the  enemy's  infantry  was 
checked  by  our  artillery,  it  was  reported  to  me  that  the  enemy 
had  got  around  our  right  flank,  and  as  I  knew  this  was  per- 
fectly practicable,  and  \vas  expecting  such  a  movement  from 
the  cavalry  on  the  Front  Royal  road,  I  gave  the  order  to  re- 
tire, but  instantly  discovering  that  the  supposed  force  of  the 
onemy  was  Ramseur's  division,  which  had  merely  moved  back 
to  keep  in  line  with  the  other  troops,  I  gave  the  order  for  the 
latter  to  return  to  the  works  before  they  had  moved  twenty 
paces.  This  order  was  obeyed  by  Wharton's  division,  but  not 
so  well  by  the  others.  The  enemy's  cavalry  force,  however, 
was  too  large  for  us,  and  having  the  advantage  of  open  ground, 
it  again  succeeded  in  getting  around  our  left,  producing  great 
confusion,  for  which  there  was  no  remedy.  Nothing  was  now 

M 


90  BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER. 

left  for  us  but  to  retire  through  Winchester,  and  Ramseur's 
division,  which  maintained  its  organization,  was  moved  on  the 
east  of  the  town  to  the  south  side  of  it,  and  put  in  position, 
forming  the  basis  for  a  new  line,  while  the  other  troops  moved 
back  through  the  town.  "VTickhanvs  brigade,  with  some 
pieces  of  horse  artillery  on  Fort  Hill,  covered  this  movement 
and  checked  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  When  the 
new  line  was  formed,  the  enemy's  advance  was  checked  until 
night-fall,  and  we  then  retired  to  Xewtown  without  serious 
molestation.  Lomax  had  held  the  enemy's  cavuiry  on  the 
Front  Royal  road  in  check,  and  n  feeble  attempt  at  pursuit 
was  repulsed  by  Ramseur  near  Kernstown. 

As  soon  as  our  reverse  began,  orders  had  been  -cut  tor  the 
removal  of  the  trains,  stores,  and  sick  and  wounded  in  the 
hospitals,  to  Fisher's  Hill,  over  the  Cedar  Creek  Pike  and  the 
Back  Road.  This  was  done  with  >afety.  and  ail  the  wounded. 
except  such  as  were  not.  in  a  condition  to  be  moved,  and  tho-  • 
which  had  not  been  brought  from  the  field,  were  carried  to 
the  rear. 

This  battle,  beginning  with  the  >kirmish ing  in  I{ain>eur'>  front, 
had  lasted  from  daylight  until  dark,  and.  at  the  elose  of  it,  we 
had  been  forced  hack  two  mile-,  after  having  repulsed  the 
enemy's  first  attack  with  grvat  slaughter  to  him,  and  suhse- 
i|Uently  contested  every  inch  of  ground  with  unsurpa>-ed 
obstinacy.  \Ve  deserved  the  victory,  and  would  have  had  it, 
but  for  the  enemy's  immense  superiority  in  estvalry,  which 
j/lone  gave  it  to  him. 

Three  pieces  of  King's  artillery,  from  which  tin-  hor>c->  were 
shot,  and  which  therefore  could  not  he  brought  off.  were  lost. 
hut  the  enemy  claimed  five,  and,  if  he  captured  that  numher. 
two  were  lost  by  the  cavalry  and  not  reported  to  me.  My  loss 
in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners  was  severe  for  the  size  of  my 
force,  but  it  was  only  a  fraction  of  that  claimed  by  the  enemy. 
Owing  to  its  ohedience  to  order>in  returning  to  the  works,  the 
heaviest  loss  of  prisoners  was  in  Wharton's  division.  Among 
the  killed  were  Major  General  Rodes  and  Brigadier  General 
Godwin.  Colonel  G.  W.  Patton,  commanding  a  brigade,  wa> 


BATTLE  OP  WINCHESTER.  91 

mortally  wounded,  and  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
Major  General  Fitz  Lee  was  severely  wounded,  and  Brigadier 
General  York  lost  an  arm.  In  Major  General  Rodes  I  had  to 
regret  the  loss  not  only  of  a  most  accomplished,  skillful  and 
gallant  officer,  upon  whom  I  placed  great  reliance,  but  also  of 
a  personal  friend,  whose  counsels  had  been  of  great  service  to 
me  in  the  trying  circumstances  with  which  I  had  found  my- 
self surrounded.  He  fell  at  his  post,  doing  a  soldier's  and 
patriot's  duty  to  his  country,  and  his  memory  will  long  be 
cherished  by  his  comrades.  General  Godwin  and  Colonel 
Patton  were  both  most  gallant  and  efficient  officers,  and  their 
loss  was  deeply  felt,  as  was  that  of  all  the  brave  officers  and 
men  who  fell  in  this  battle.  The  enemy's  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  very  heavy,  and  some  prisoners  fell  into  our 
hands. 

A  skillful  and  energetic  commander  of  the  enemy's  forces 
would  have  crushed  Ramseur  before  any  assistance  could  have 
reached  him,  and  thus  ensured  the  destruction  of  my  whole 
force ;  and,  later  in  the  day,  when  the  battle  had  turned 
against  us,  with  the  immense  superiority  in  cavalry  which 
Sheridan  had,  and  the  advantage  of  the  open  country,  would 
have  destroyed  my  whole  force  and  captured  everything  I  had. 
As  it  was,  considering  the  immense  disparity  in  numbers  and 
equipment,  the  enemy  had  very  little  to  boast  of.  I  had  lost 
a  few  pieces  of  artillery  and  some  very  valuable  officers  and 
men,  but  the  main  part  of  my  force  and  all  my  trains  had 
been  saved,  and  the  enemy's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was 
far  greater  than  mine.  When  I  look  back  to  this  battle,  I  can 
but  attribute  my  escape  from  utter  annihilation  to  the  incapa- 
city of  my  opponent.* 

*  The  enemy  has  called  this  battle,  "The  Battle  of  the  Opequon,"  but  I  know  no  claim  it 
has  to  that  title,  unless  it  be  in  the  fact  that,  after  his  repulse  in  the  fore  part  of  the  day, 
some  of  his  troops  ran  back  across  that  stream.  I  have  always  thought  that  instead  of  being 
promoted,  Sheridan  ought  to  have  been  cashiered  for  this  battle.  lie  seems  to  be  a  sore  of 
pet  of  Grant's,  and  I  give  the  following  extracts  from  the  report  of  the  latter,  to  show  the 
strange  inconsistency  of  which  he  is  guilty  to  magnify  Sheridan's  services.  In  his  Monoc- 
nry  letter  to  Hunter,  Grant  says  :  "  From  Harper's  Ferry,  if  it  is  found  that  the  enemy  has 
moved  north  of  the  Potomac  in  large  force,  push  north,  following  him  and  attacking  him 
wherever  found;  follow  him  if  driven  south  of  the  Potomac  us  long  it*  it  is  salV  to  do  »o. 
If  it  is  ascertained  that  the  enemy  has  but  u  small  force  north  of  the  Potomac,  then  push 
south  with  the  main  force,  detaching,  under  a  competent  commander,  it  sufficient  force  to 


AFFAIR  AT  FISHER'S  HILL. 


At  light  on  tin-  morning  of  tin*  ^>rli,  my  Troops  moved  to 
Fisher's  Hill  without  molestation  from  the  enemy.  and  again 
tonic  position  at  that  point  on  the  old  line  —  Wharton's  division 
heing  on  the  right,  then  diordon's,  Ivamsenr's,  and  Rodcs',  in 
the  order  in  which  they  an-  mentioned.  Fit/  Lee's  cavalry. 
mm-  under  Brigadier-General  Wk-kham,  was  sent  up  the  LuntN 
Valley  to  ;i  narrow  pass  at  Millford,  to  try  and  hold  that  val- 
ley against  the  enemy's  rivalry.  <  General  Kamseur  was  trans- 


took  after  the  raider",  and  drivir  them  t<.  their  lion,..-.'      Ainl  fiirili'T  »it  in  tl><-  -aine  letter 
it  '•  Hear  in  mind,  tie- or,;.,  t  IB  to  drive  the  enemy  nonth,  and  to  do  thla,  you  want  :•• 

seep  him  always  in  Mght.     I'..-  guided  in  your  eour-e  l>y  tli nr-e  In-  take-."     \\hen  Sli.-i- 

idan  relieved  Hunter,  thia  letter  Of  in-trm-iion-  -.v;i<  ordered  to  he  turned  over  to  him.  ami 
u»o  division-  of  cavalry  •abaequenUy  joined  him:  yet  cram  says  in  i> -t:ard  to  shfridan'- 
..pi-nition- :  "IH-i  o]'»T:i;i«in-.  «lurinn  ilu-  nii.ntl.  .  >\  il,.-  l'.ir«-  ii:irl  <>i  S.-pt.-ni)..-:- 

•  •-lilting  in  many  seven-  skirinislifv, 
principally  by  the  cavalry, in  which  we  «••!•«•  general! jr  BUooeMfiil,  bal  :.  • -it::it'-- 

i  1 11 -lit  li'ck  1  1: Tin-  two  :i  Ml  lies  l.'iv  111  --Ili-li  :i  pixiliou.  tin-  enemy  i  m  the  West  Imtlk  of  the 

(  lpi'l|Uiili  ei-eel.  e.i \iTllllf  \\ 'illi'lll-Mer.  Hllil  utir  !\.|r.-,  ill   il'.'llt  (if  l',.-rryx  ll!f.  thill  either  COIlUI 

Ijrinjc  on  u  li:iti!e  .-a  :.ny  tiuu-.     lt.-t'e;tt  tn  u>  wniil.1  i.i.en  i,,  i  (,.•  enemy  the  Mutes  of  .M:iryl:m<i 

•  :nl  l'enii.-vlv:ini.-i  for  li.n  het  iiriny  ennl.l  ).<•  inti'rp<i—-.|  i»  e'n-ek  him. 
I  IIIUT  theso  circnn^t  i-i'-«  -.  I   lieMtut'-.l  iilmitt  ulluw  ing  tin-  initiative  to  In-  taken.     Finally 
the   Use   nf  the   IviUini'ire  ali'l   Ohio   Ilaili  ••:i> I   mi'!   ih-  •    :nnl   ohin  ('ansil.  wliieli 
were  l>oth  oljsxnii-t.'il  l,\  •        .  .  \,j  u^.  (mil  the  im- 
portance ot  relieving  I'i-nn>.yi-,                            -et  iVmii  continuoualy  threatened  invasion 

t,  that  I  determined  the  risk  -houiii  I.e  taken,    lint  i.-:u-iin:  to  i.  i.-^i-aph  tin-  order 
for  an  attack  without  knowing  more  than  I  <l\<l  <•(  <»eni  n<l  ."'ln-riilan'-.  leeiintrs  a>  ;. 
would  !>••  tlir  prol'iil'l'-  !c-!i)i.  1  1.  ii  ( "ity  I'liinl  on  the  l.'itli  of  SejiieiuJM-r  ;o  visit  him  at  hi< 
head-qtiitrtrrs,  to  ik-eMe  aln-r  i-onferetiee  with   him  what  shonM   I"-  ilmii  .     I   met  him  ;.t 
Charlestown,  and  h.-  poim.-ii  »,n  .-<i  •Mn-i-iiy  hov.  eaeli  jinny  lay,  u-kut  /<>.  i><>ul<l  dn  t/n  / 

imttttfrizcd,  ami  expre->,-il  ^n.-h  eonti'len f  -  \\,-r>:  but  two 

>M.[-,|,  Hi  in-triKMion  nee.--- ••( i > — ...  in."  In  the  letter  ;o  Jliint.-r  tiiei-e  j<  no  he«ji:iti<iii  almut 
the.  initintive,  and  yet.  ni,tuiih-tan«li:ii!;  thi~  letter  Wai  turin-1  over  to  .-in  rj.lan  for  hi- 
utlidani-c.  :,iid  two  divisions  of  ea\  airy  -iil^.-,juet,i|y  s-nt  to  him,  and  th^  flirtlier  fart  that  he 
h;id  been  operatini;  liotii  on  tlm  ojlcn.^'i-,  and  ilei--n-iv..- diiriai;  August  and  the  fore  part  ol 
September, the im]  •  ;hat  his  ardor  \v.---  byaomeaorl 

< ^f  orders,  of  which  no  mention  i-,  maite  in  d rant's  report.     Ke  illy  tlii>  is  verv  curious,  .-in.1 

•  i  rant's  admi^~iou  ul   hi-,  liesiiation  in  allow  ing  th-  initiative  to  lie  taken,  and  the  statement 
that    tlm    Baltimore   ami   <  »hio     Uailroad  and    the    i'h..-.a|«-ake    .-'lui    uhio    (anal    v.e,-,.    _,, 
•ji.stnicted.  and  tlie  iii\:'-n>!i  "I"  l'enn<yl\  ania  and  Maryland  so  conslantly  threatened,  a-  to 
e. impel  him  to  threw  off  that  heaitaUoo,  convejn  ^r>-.(i  >  oiir.iiinent  to  the  etiji-ienev  ot'm. 
-mall  1'oree.     The  railroad  i-  tueniv  -i,\  o  m:les  from  \\  inchester  at  lh"  ni-aie-t  point,  and  the 

•  \er  thirty  and  north  of  the  l'of.,mae,  while  >hi-rid:m  wa-i  much  nearer  to  l.oth.     l'i,  v. 

...id  find  it  in.-. ••.•-.-ary  io  >ay  to  .Siieridan.  ••  «'•  in!"   1  ean  w ell  bi-lieve,  but  thiit  the  1  U- 

u-r  was  panting  lor  th«  utteranee  of  tluit  classic  phrn.se,  I  must  Ije  allowed  to  regard  n-< 


AFFAIR  AT  FISHER'S  HILL.  K 

ferred  to  the  command  of  Rodes'  division,  and  Brigadier- 
General  Pegram  who  had  reported  for  duty  about  the  1st  of 
August,  and  been  in  command  of  his  brigade  since  that  time, 
was  left  in  command  of  the  division  previously  commanded  by 
Kamseur.  My  infantry  was  not  able  to  occupy  the  whole  line 
at  Fisher's  Hill,  notwithstanding  it  was  extended  out  in  an 
attenuated  line,  with  considerable  intervals.  The  greater  part 
of  Lomax's  cavalry  was  therefore  dismounted,  and  placed  on 
Ramseur's  left,  near  Little  Xorth  Mountain,  but  the  line  could 
not  then  be  fully  occupied. 

This  was  the  only  position  in  the  whole  Valley  ^here  a 
defensive  line  could  be  taken  against  an  enemy  moving  up  the 
Val  ley,  and  it  had  several  weak  points.  To  have  retired  beyond 
this  point,  would  have  rendered  it  necessary  for  me  to  fall 
back  to  some  of  the  gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  at  the  upper  part 
of  the  Valley,  and  I  determined  therefore  to  make  a  show  of 
a  stand  here,  with  the  hope  that  the  enemy  would  be  deter- 
red from  attacking  me  in  this  position,  as  had  been  the  case  in 
August. 

On  the  second  day  after  our  arrival  at  this  place,  General 
Breckenridge  received  orders  from  Richmond,  by  telegraph, 
to  return  to  South- Western  Virginia,  and  I  lost  the  benefit  of 
his  services.  He  had  ably  co-operated  with  me,  and  our  per- 
sonal relations  had  been  of  the  most  pleasant  character. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  20th,  Sheridan's  forces  appeared  on 
the  banks  of  Cedar  Creek,  about  four  miles  from  Fisher's 
Hill,  and  the  21st,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  22nd,  were 
consumed  by  him  in  reconnoitring  and  gradually  moving  his 
forces  to  my  front  under  cover  of  breast  works.  After  some 
skirmishing,  he  attained  a  strong  position  immediately  in  my 
front  and  fortified  it,  and  I  began  to  think  he  was  satisfied  with 
the  advantage  he  had  gained  and  would  not  probably  press  it 
further ;  but  on  the  afternoon  of  the  22nd,  I  discovered  that 
another  attack  was  contemplated,  and  orders  were  given  for 
my  troops  to  retire,  after  dark,  as  I  knew  my  force  was  not 
strong  enough  to  resist  a  determined  assault.  Just  before  sun- 
set, however,  Crook's  corps,  which  had  moved  to  our  left  on 
the  side  of  Little  North  Mountain,  and  under  cover  of  the 


94  AFFAIR  AT  FISHER'S  HILL. 

woods,  forced  back  Lomax's  dismounted  cavalry,  and  advan- 
ced against  Ramseur's  left.  Ramseur  made  an  attempt  to  meet 
this  movement  by  throwing  his  brigades  successfully  into  line 
to  the  left,  and  Wharton's  division  was  sent  for  from  the  right 
but  it  did  not  arrive.  Pegram's  brigades  were  also  thrown 
into  line  in  the  same  manner  as  Ramseur's,  but  the  movement 
produced  some  disorder  in  both  divisions,  and  us  soon  as  it  was 
observed  by  the  enemy,  he  advanced  along  his  whole  line,  and 
the  mischief  could  not  be  remedied.  After  a  very  brief  con- 
test, my  whole  force  retired  in  considerable  confusion,  but  the 
men  anjjl  officers  of  the  artillery  behaved  with  great  coolness, 
righting  to  the  very  last,  and  I  had  to  ride  to  some  of  the  offi- 
cers and  order  them  to  withdraw  their  guns,  before  they  would 
move.  In  some  cases,  they  had  held  out  so  long,  and  the  roads 
leading  from  their  positions  into  the  Pike  were  so  rugged,  that 
eleven  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Vigorous  pur- 
suit was  not  made,  and  my  force  fell  back  through  Woodstock 
to  a  place  called  the  Narrow  Passage,  all  the  trains  being  car- 
ried off  in  safety. 

Our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  in  this  atlair  was  slight,  but 
some  prisoners  were  taken  by  the  enemy,  the  most  of  whom 
were  captured  while  attempting  to  make  their  way  across  the 
Xorth  Fork  to  Massanutten  Mountain,  under  the  impression 
that  the  enemy  had  possession  of  the  Valley  Pike  in  our  rear. 
I  had  the  misfortune  to  lose  my  Adjutant  General,  Lieutenant 
Colonel  A.  S.  Pendleton,  a  gallant  and  efficient  young  officer, 
who  had  served  on  General  Jackson's  staff  during  his  Valley 
campaign,  and  subsequently  to  the  time  of  the  latter's  death. 
Colonel  Pendleton  fell  mortally  wounded  about  dark,  while 
posting  a  force  across  the  Pike,  a  little  in  rear  of  Fisher's  Hill, 
to  check  the  enemy.  He  was  acting  with  his  accustomed  gal- 
lantry, and  his  loss  was  deeply  felt  and  regretted.* 


*  In  bis  ftccoant  of  the  battle  of  Winchester,  <-rant  .•-ays:  "The  enemy  rallied  and  made  a 
i»tnnd  in  a  strong  position  at  Kisln-r's  Hill,  where  he  was  attacked  and  again  defeated  with 
heavy  loss  on  the  20th.''  This  makes  Sheridan  pursue,  and  attack  with  grout  promptness 
and  energy,  if  it  were  true,  hut  it  will  he  seen  thai  the  attark  wa-i  nut  made  until  late  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  :ird  day  niter  the.  battle  at  Winehester,  and  that  the  movement  on  my  left 
flank  was  again  made  l.y  Crook.  If  Sheridan  had  not  had  subordinates  of  more  ability  and 
energy  than  himself,  I  .should  probably  have  had  to  write  a  different  history  of  my  Valley 
campaign. 


RETREAT  UP  THE  VALLEY,  AND  OPERATIONS 
UNTIL  THE  BATTLE  OP  CEDAR  CREEK. 

On  the  morning  of  the  23rd,  I  moved  back  to  Mount  Jack- 
son, where  I.  halted  to  enable  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  the 
hospital  stores  at  that  place  to  be  carried  off.  In  the  afternoon 
Averill's  division  of  cavalry  came  up  in  pursuit,  and  after  some 
heavy  skirmishing  was  driven  back.  I  then  moved  to  Rude's 
Hill  between  Mount  Jackson  and  New  Market. 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th,  a  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
crossed  the  North  Fork  below  Mount  Jackson,  and  attempted 
to  get  around  my  right  flank,  but  was  held  in  check.  The 
enemy's  infantry  soon  appeared  at  Mount  Jackson,  and  com- 
menced moving  around  my  left  flank,  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  river  from  that  on  which  my  left  rested.  As  the  countrv 
was  entirely  open,  and  Rude'sHill  an  elevated  position,  1  could 
see  the  whole  movement  of  the  enemy,  and  as  soon  as  it  was 
fully  developed,  I  commenced  retiring  in  line  of  battle,  and  in 
that  manner  retired  through  New  Market  to  a  point  at  which 
the  road  to  Port  Republic  leaves  the  Valley  Pike,  nine  miles 
from  Rude's  Hill.  This  movement  was  made  through  an 
entirely  open  country,  and  at  every  mile  or  two  a  halt  was 
made,  and  artillery  opened  on  the  enemy,  who  was  pursuing, 
which  compelled  him  to  commence  deploying  into  line,  when 
the  retreat  would  be  resumed.  In  this  retreat,  under  flre  in 
line,  which  is  so  trying  to  a  retiring  force,  and  tests  the  best 
<|iialities  of  the  soldier,  the  conduct  of  my  troops  was  most 
admirable,  and  they  preserved  perfect  order  and  their  line 
intact,  notwithstanding  their  diminished  numbers,  and  the  fact 
that  the  enemy  was  pursuing  in  full  force,  and,  every  now  and 
then,  dashing  up  with  horse  artillery  under  the  support  of 
cavalry,  and  opening  on  the  retiring  lines.  At  the  last  halt, 
which  was  at  a  place  called  "Tenth  Legion,"  near  where  the 
Port  Republic  road  leaves  the  Pike,  and  was  a  little  before  sun- 


96  RETREAT  UP  THE  VALLEY. 

set,  I  determined  to  resist  any  further  advance,  so  as  to  enable, 
my  trains  to  get  on  the  Port  Republic  road;  and  skirmishers 
were  sent  out  and  artillery  opened  on  the  advancing  enemy, 
but,  after  some  skirmishing,  lie  went  into  camp  in  our  view, 
and  beyond  the  reach  ot'  our  guns.  At  this  point,  a  gallant 
officer  of  artiHery,  Captain  Ma.-sie,  was  kiJled  by  a  >hell.  A- 
soon  as  it  was  dark,  we  retired  live  miles  on  the  Port  Ue- 
pnblic  road  and  bivouacked.  In  the  morning  Lomax's  cavalry 
had  been  iio-ted  lo  our  left,  on  the  Middle  and  Hack  road- 
iVoin  Mount -Jackson  to  Jlarrisonburg,  but  it  was  lorced  back 
by  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy's  eavairy.  and  retired  to  the 
latter  place  in  considerable  disorder.  Wickham's  brigade  had 
been  sent  for  from  the  Luray  Valley  to  join  me,  through  the 
\e\v-Market  Gap,  bnt  it  arrived  at  that  gap  ju.^t  as  we  wen 
(••Tiring  through  N'ew-Market,  and  orders  were  sent  tor  it  to 
return  to  the  Luray  Valley  and  join  nn-  at  I 'on  Republic.  In 
the  meantime,  I'ayne'.^  small  brigade  had  been  driven  from 
Million!  by  two  divisions  of  cavalry  un-ier  T..n.ert,  which  had 
moved  up  the  Luray  Valley  and  subsequently  joined  Sheridan 
tiirough  the  New-Market  (iap.  Tin-  cavalry  had  been 
detained  by  \Viekham  with  his  and  I'ayne'-  brigade-*,  ai 
Millford,  a  .-utii'-ieni  lime  i«-  enable  u>  \<>  p.i—  Xe\\ -Markc't 
in  safety.  If,  ho\vev«T.  it  had  mo\'«-d  up  ilie  Luray  X'alley  by 
Conraci"-  More.  \\ .-  would  have  been  in  a  critical  condition. 

<>n  th'-  morning  of  the  J.")th,  we  moved  n.uards  1'i.irt  Ju.-pub- 
lic.  which  i.>  in  the  fork  ol'  tlie  South  Fork  and  South  River, 
and  when-  tne  r<iad  through  Broun".-  (ia[.  in  thi-.lMue  Kidge 
cro>ses  those  rivers,  in  order  to  unite  with  Ker-iiaw'^  division. 
\vhich  had  lieen  ordered  to  join  me  from  ('ulpepper  ('.  II. 
We  e  'he  river  behnv  the  junction,  and  took  po.-nion 

between  I'ori  liepubiic  and  Urown'.-  «.ap.  Kitx  Le,-'~  and 
Lomax'-  cavalry  joined  us  here,  and  on  the  iMth.  l\er-iiaw'- 
division  with  Cutshaw'-  Itattalion  of  artillery  came  up,  aio-i- 
having  cro>se«l  through  Swift  Uun  <iaji,  and  encountered  aiid 
repulsed,  below  1'ort  liepubiic,  a  body  of  the  enemy'-  cavalr\. 
Thei'tMvas  likewise  heavy  .-kirmishing  on  my  front  on  the  :Mth 
with  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  made  two  efforts  to  advance 
towards  Brown's  Gap,  both  of  whicli  were  repulsed  after  brisk 
fighting  in  which  artillery  was  used. 


OPERATIONS  IX  THE  UPPER  VALLEY.  9? 

Having  ascertained  that  the  enemy's  infantry  had  halted  at 
1  larrisonburg,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  I  moved  out  and 
drove  a  division  of  his  cavalry  from  Port  Republic,  and  then 
on  camped  in  the  fork  of  the  rivers.  I  here  learned  that  two 
divisions  of  cavalry  under  Torbert  had  been  sent  through 
Staunton  to  "\Vaynesboro,  and  were  engaged  in  destroying  the 
railroad  bridge  at  the  latter  place,  and  the  tunnel  through  the 
Blue  Ridge  at  Rockfish  Gap,  and,  on  the  28th,  I  moved  for 
those  points.  In  making  this  movement  I  had  the  whole  of 
the  enemy's  infantry  on  my  right,  while  one  division  of  cav- 
alry was  in  my  rear  and  two  in  my  front,  and  oh  the  left  was 
the  Blue  Ridge.  I  had  therefore  to  move  with  great  circum- 
spection. AVickham's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  sent  up  South 
River,  near  the  mountain,  to  get  between  the  enemy  and 
Rockfish  Gap,  while  the  infantry  moved  in  two  columns,  one 
up  South  River  with  the  trains  guarded  in  front  by  Pegram's 
and  Wharton's  divisions,  and  in  rear  by  Ramseur's  division, 
and  the  other,  composed  of  Kershaw's  and  Gordon's  divisions, 
with  the  artillery,  on  the  right  through  Mount  Meridian,  Pied- 
mont and  ]Srew  Hope.  McCausland's  cavalry,  under  Colonel 
Ferguson,  was  left  to  blockade  arid  hold  Brown's  Gap,  while 
Lomax,  with  the  rest  of  his  cavalry  and  Payne's  brigade, 
watched  the  right  flank  and  rear.  Wickhani's  brigade  having 
got  between  Rockfish  Gap  and  "Waynesboro,  drove  the  enemy's 
working  parties  from  the  latter  place,  and  took  position  on  a 
ridge  in  front  of  it,  when  a  sharp  artillery  fight  ensued. 
Pegram's  division,  driving  a  small  body  of  cavalry  before  it, 
'arrived  just  at  night  and  advanced  upon  the  enemy,  when  he 
retired  in  great  haste,  taking  the  roads  through  Stauntou  and 
west  of  the  Valley  Pike,  back  to  the  main  body.  A  company 
of  reserves,  composed  of  boys  under  18  years  of  age,  which 
had  been  employed  on  special  duty  at  Staunton,  had  moved  to 
Rockfish  Gap,  and  another  company  of  reserves  from  Clutr- 
lottesville,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  had  moved  to  the  same 
point,  and  when  the  enemy  advanced  towards  the  tunnel  and 
before  he  got  in  range  of  the  guns,  they  were  opened,  and  he 
retired  to  Waynesboro. 

On  the  29th  and  30th,  we  rested  at  Waynesboro,  and  an 

N 


98  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  UPPER  VALLEY. 

engineer  party  was  put  to  work  repairing  the  bridge,  which 
had  been  but  partially  destroyed. 

On  the  1st  of  October,  I  moved  my  whole  force  across  the 
'•ountry  to  Mount  Sidney  on  the  Valley  Pike,  and  took  posi- 
tion between  that  place  and  Xorth  River,  the  enemy'*  force- 
having  been  concentrated  around  HaRttonbarg,  and  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  river.  In  this  position  we  remained  until 
the  6th,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Rossor's  brigade  of  cavalry 
which  was  on  its  way  from  dem -ral  Lee's  army.  In  the 
meantime  there  waft  some  skirmishing  with  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry on  the  Xorth  River,  at  the.  bridge  near  Mount  Crawford 
and  at  Bridgewaler  above.* 

'Mi  the  fith,  Uo->.-r'-  hri^'adc  arrived  and  \\a>  temporarily 
attached  to  Kit/.  Lee's  division,  of  which  Jios.ser  wa-  given  the 
command,  as  Brigadier-General  AVicUham  had  resigned.  The 
horses  .>!'  R...--er's  brigade  had  been  >o  niuch  reduced  by  pre- 
-  bard  -ervice  and  the  long  march  from  Richmond,  that 
the  hrigade  did  not  e\cc«-d  -i\  hundred  mounted  men  for  duty 
when  it  joined  me.  K»-r>*ia\v'>  division  numbered  L'700  mu-- 
for  duty,  and  In-  had  brought  With  him  <  'utshau  's  hat- 
talioji  of  artillery.  The-e  reimbreements  uhoiit  made  uj»  my 
looses  at  \Vii  and  Fi-her'-  hill,  and  I  determined  ID 
k  the  enemy  iu  his  |i.»iii<n,  ;u  I larrisonhurg,  and  for  that 
|»nr|io>«.-  made  a  recmuioissan n  the  .'»ih,  hut  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  Gtli,  it  was  discovered  that  he.  had  retired  during 
the  night  down  the  Vali, 


•-  lii;it,  alior  ti.e.  ti»;lit  at  l-'i>!i.-r'>  Hill.  "  >ii.-ri.i.-.ii  f.ui--.,,.-«i  liiin  »  iid  nr>-:i\.  .-ii.-i-u\ 
rlir-iiijjli  HftrriKonborg,  Stimntoii.  mn\  ill-  u  -r  ~  "f  tlu-  l<luf  KMtff."  With  }.n\\  iinii'li  i-iiox-y 
••  •  i.m-iiit  \\-i--  iiia.ii-.  nml  IIMW  nan-Ik  truth  tii>  r--  is  in  th--  ^-..t.-in.  ia  tn-:i  I  \\  •-  .ln\.  \i 
through  a Harrlsonborg, Btaanton,  -m-i  th  -,..!•••  -..i  ,<,••  Blue  Ridge,"  will  be  0e«n  from  th<5 
;.,,.  -.,j!,o.  ,.,.,, ,,,lt.  A  (iMrtimi  ")  inv  i-!i\:ilry  ]P.I>-".!  rhi-micli  Huri-i.-i'UlHir«.  Inn  ik».n.-  of  my 
«ilii-r  troop*.  :iinl  iiou»>  .,i  th.-in  tliroiiitli  siiiiiiiiuu.  :unl  I  .n.l  nut  I.-HV  tin-  Vi'll- -•- 

••riii.Mii  iinivi-ii  )i\*  iniiintry  io  I'ort   l.Vi,ml>li<-.  I  w.nilii  h:i\i-  V u  i->im|»-li>->l  (i-  ;---tir. 

tliv«.ui:l)  l<r'i\\  n'-  1,1111.  to  -_'••!   nriivi.iiiii.s  uml   I'.T.-CU.-.  nn.i   i\  \\oulil  ii.-iv-  h.-.-n   iin|,,i~~il,lr  ).,|- 
>H.-  to  rrtuni  -,.-  tlit-  Vull.-y  until  h.-  •  raouate  i  tn,-  \i\,\,, •••  ;,,,i  i  t  f  jr. 

i  Wliili-  >iii-i-Ui:m'-  fm-i-f-s  \».  r>~  m-.-n-  (lai-ri-Kii'-urt;.  .--nil  inin.-  w.-rt-  \v.n.-liin>{  tin-in,  tin- i 

i.ur  i-.-i\.iln   si-iiutx,  in  iln-ir  tiDiiorins  :in>l  «iih  JU-IM-.  ^..i   :ir..un.|   l,i>  lint-.-  n.-:ir  :t  liitlf  tov.  i: 

••.•iil.-tl  I)N\  {••;  federal  engineer  officer,  with  two  «ol- 

.ii«-r>.     Tlif-f  p:n-tif<  .-.-iinf  i,|..,i,  ,-:,,-ii  ,,ti,..r  -n.i.u-niy.  :,nii  I.ii-iitt-nuiit  Mt-ijr-  w:,s  urilt-i-fii  to 
Kurreuder  by  one  of  our  »coaUtto  unich  n--  ri-|>lifii  by  •hooting  and  wounding  the  • it, 

-OK.  in  lits  men  fir.-d  uml  kili-.l  tii.-  l.i.-uK-iii.ut.    out-  of  tin-  nn-n  with  Lieittenaut  .Mci^'s 
»«.-  i-n|.uif«-il  ami  UIH  oth.-r  t--.-ap»-.l.    t\n-  this  a<H  .^hfridau  ordered  the  tvwn  »f  Dayton  t» 


MOVEMENT  DOWN  THE  VALLEY.  99 

When  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy  was  retiring,  I 
moved  forward  at  once  and  arrived  at  New-Market  with  my 
infantry  on  the  7th.  Rosser  pushed  forward  on  the  Back  and 
Middle  Roads  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  was 
engaged  in  burning  houses,  mills,  barns  and  stacks  of  wheat 
and  hay,  and  had  several  skirmishes  with  it,  while  Lomax  also 
moved  forward  on  the  Valley  Pike  and  the  roads  east  of  it.  I 
halted  at  New-Market  with  the  infantry,  but  Rosser  and  Lomax 
moved  down  the  Valley  in  pursuit,  and  skirmished  successfully 
with  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  8th ;  but  on  the.  9th  they  en- 
countered his  whole  cavalry  force  at  Tom's  Brook,  in  rear  of 
Fisher's  Hill,  and  both  of  their  commands  were  driven  back  in 
considerable  confusion,  with  a  loss  of  some  pieces  of  artillery ; 
nine  were  reported  to  me  as  the  number  lost,  but  Grant  claims 
eleven.  Rosser  rallied  his  command  on  the  Back  Road,  at 
Columbia  Furnace,  opposite  Edinburg,  but  a  part  of  the  ene- 
my's cavalry  swept  along  the  Pike  to  Mount  Jackson,  and  then 
retired  on  the  approach  of  a  part  of  my  infantry.  On  the  10th, 
Rosser  established  his  line  of  pickets  across  the  Valley  from 
Columbia  Furnace  to  Edinburg,  and  on  the  llth  Lomax  was 
sent  to  the  Luray  Valley  to  take  position  at  Millford. 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK  OR  BELLE  GROVK. 

Having  heard  that  Sheridan  was  preparing  to  send  part  of 
his  troops  to  Grant,  I  moved  down  the  Valley  again  on  the 
12th.  On  the  morning  of  the  13th  we  reached  Fisher's  Hill, 
and  I  moved  with  part  of  my  command  to  Hupp's  Hill,  between 
Strasburg  and  Cedar  Creek,  for  the  purpose  of  reconnoitring. 
The  enemy  was  found  posted  on  the  North  bank  of  Cedur 
Creek  in  strong  force,  and,  while  we  were  observing  him,  with- 
out displaying  any  of  my  force  except  a  small  body  of  cavalry, 
a  division  of  his  infantry  was  moved  out  to  his  left  and  stacked 


be  burned,  but  for  some  reason  that  order  was  countermanded,  ami  another  substituted  tor 
burning  a  large  number  of  private  houses  in  the  neighborhood,  which  was  executed,  ihn- 
inflicting  on  non-combatants  and  women  and  children  a  most  wanton  and  cruel  puiiii!jii>..-iu 
lor  a  justifiable  act  of  war. 


100  H.YTTLK  OF  PF.DAI:  I'TIKF.K. 

arms  in  an  open  field,  when  a  battery  of  artillery  was  run  out 
suddenly  and  opened  on  this  division,  scattering  it  in  great 
confusion.  The  enemy  then  displayed  a  hirge  force,  and  sent 
a  division  across  the  creek  to  capture  the  guns  which  had 
opened  on  him,  but,  when  it  had  advanced  near  enough,  Con- 
ner's brigade  of  Kershaw's  division  was  sent  forward  to  meet 
this  division,  and,  after  a  sharp  contest,  drove  it  hack  in  con- 
siderable contusion  and  with  severe  loss.  Conner's  brigade 
behaved  very  handsomely  indeed,  but  unfortunately,  after  the 
enemy  had  been  entirely  repulsed,  Brigadier-General  Conner, 
a  most  accomplished  and  gallant  officer,  lost  his  log  by  a  shell 
from  the  opposite  side  of  the  creek.  .s<>nic  prisoners  were 
taken  from  the  enemy  in  this  affair,  and  Colonel  Wells,  the 
division  commander,  fell  into  our  hands  mortally  wounded. 
The  object  of  the  reconnoissance  having  been  accomplished,  1 
moved  back  to  Fisher's  Hill,  and  I  subsequently  learned  that 
the  6th  Corps  had  started  for  (Grant's  army  but  wa*  brought 
back  after  this  affair. 

I  remained  at  Fisher's  Hill  until  the  16th  observing  the 
enemy,  with  the  hope  that  he  would  move  back  from  his  very 
strong  position  on  the  north  of  Cedar  Creek,  and  that  we 
would  be  able  to  get  at  him  in  a  different  position;  but  he  did 
not  give  any  indications  of  an  intention  to  move,  nor  did  lie 
evince  any  purpose  of  attacking  us,  though  the  two  positions 
were  in  sight  of  each  other.  In  the  meantime  there  was  sonic 
skirmishing  at  Jlupp's  Hill,  and  some  with  the  cavalry  at 
Cedar  Creek  on  the  Back  Koad.  On  the  li'ttii  JJossers  scouts 
reported  a  brigade  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  encamped  on  the 
Back  Road,  and  detached  from  the  rest  of  his  force,  and  ]{< 
ua*  permitted  to  go  that  night,  with  a  brigade  of  infantry 
mounted  behind  the  same  number  of  cavalry,  to  attempt  the 
surprise  and  capture  of  the  camp.  lie  succeeded  in  surround- 
ing and  surprising  the  camp,  but  it  proved  to  be  that  of  only 
a  strong  picket,  the  whole  of  which  was  captured — the  brigade 
having  moved  its  location. 

At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  17th,  the  whole  of  my  troop* 
were  moved  out  in  front  of  our  lines,  for  the  purpose  of  cover- 
ing li osier's  return  in  case  of  difficulty,  a.nd,  after  he  had 


BATTLE  OP  CEDAR  CREEK.  101 

returned,  General  Gordon  was  sent  with  a  brigade  of  his  divi- 
sion to  Hupp's  Hill,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  by  close 
inspection  whether  the  enemy's  position  was  fortified,  and  he 
returned  with  the  information  that  it  was.  ,1  was  now  com- 
pelled to  move  back  for  want  of  provisions  and  forage,  or  attack 
the  enemy  in  his  position  with  the  hope  of  driving  him  from 
it,  and  I  determined  to  attack.  As  I  was  not  strong  enough  to 
attack  the  fortified  position  in  front,  I  determined  to  get  around 
one  of  the  enemy's  flanks  and  attack  him  by  surprise  if  I  could. 
After  General  Gordon's  return  from  Hupp's  Hill,  he  and  Cap- 
tain Hotchkiss,  my  topographical  engineer,  were  sent  to  the 
signal  station  on  the  end  of  Massanutten  Mountain,  which  had 
been  re-established,  for  the  purpose  of  examining  the  enemy's 
position  from  that  point,  and  General  Pegram  was  ordered  to 
go  as  near  as  he  could  to  Cedar  Creek  on  the  enemy's  right 
flank,  and  see  whether  it  was  practicable  to  surprise  him  on 
that  flank.  Captain  Hotchkiss  returned  to  my  headquarters 
after  dark,  and  reported  the  result  of  his  and  General  Gordon's 
examination,  and  he  gave  me  a  sketch  of  the  enemy's  position 
and  camps.  He  informed  me  that  the  enemy's  left  flank,  which 
rested  near  Cedar  Creek,  a  short  distance  above  its  mouth,  was 
lightly  picketed,  and  that  there  was  but  a  small  cavalry  picket 
on  the  North  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  below  the  mouth  of  the 
creek,  and  he  stated  that,  from  information  he  had  received,  he 
thought  it  was  practicable  to  move  a  column  of  infantry  between 
the  base  of  the  mountain  and  the  river,  to  a  ford  below  the 
mouth  of  the  creek.  He  also  informed  me  that  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  on  his  right  flank  on  the  Back 
Koad  to  Winchester.  The  sketch  made  by  Captain  Hotchkiss, 
which  proved  to  be  correct,  designated  the  roads  in  the  enemy's 
rear,  and  the  house  of  a  Mr.  Cooley  at  a  favourable  point  for 
forming  an  attacking  column,  after  it  crossed  the  river,  in 
order  to  move  against  the  enemy  and  strike  him  on  the  Valley 
Pike  in  rear  of  his  works.  Upon  this  information,  I  deter- 
mined to  attack  the  enemy  by  moving  over  the  ground  desig- 
nated by  Captain  Hotchkiss,  if  it  should  prove  practicable  to 
move  a  column  between  the  base  of  the  mountain  and  the 
river.  Next  morning,  General  Gordon  confirmed  the  report 


102  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK. 

of  Captain  Hotchkiss,  expressing  confidence  that  the-  attack 
could  be  successfully  made  on  the  enemy's  left  and  rear,  and 
General  Pegrani  reported  that  a  movement  on  the  enemy's 
right  flank  would  be  attended  with  great  difficulty,  as  the 
banks  of  Cedar  Creek  on  that  flank  were  high  and  precipitous 
and  were  well  guarded.  t^-neral  Gordon  and  Captain  Hotch- 
IqaB  were  then  sent  to  examine  and  ascertain  the  practicability 
ol'  the  route  at  the  base  of  the  mountain,  and  General  Pegrani. 
at  his  request,  was  permitted  to  go  to  the  signal  station  on  the 
mountain  to  examine  the  enemy's  position  himself  from  that 
point.  Directions  were  given,  in  the  meantime,  for  everything 
to  be  in  readiness  to  move  that  night  (the  18th),  and  the  divi- 
sion commanders  were  requested  to  be  at  in}'  quarters  at  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  to  receive  their  final  instructions. 

The  river  makes  a  circuit  to  the  left  in  front  of  the  right  of 
the  position  at  Fisher's  Hill  and  around  by  Strasburg,  leaving 
a  considerable  body  of  land  between  it  and  the  mountain,  on 
which  are  several  farms.  Whenever  Fisher's  Hill  had  been 
occupied  by  us,  this  bend  of  the  river  had  been  occupied  by  a 
portion  of  our  cavalry,  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  turning  the 
right  of  the  position,  and  it  was  now  occupied  by  Colonel 
I'ayne  with  his  cavalry  numbering  about  300.  In  order  to 
make  the  contemplated  movement,  it  was  necessary  to  cross 
the  river  into  this  bend,  and  then  pass  between  the  foot  of  the 
mountain  and  the  river  below  Strasburg,  where  the  passage 
was  very  narrow,  and  cross  the  river  again  below  the  mouth  of 
Cedar  Creek.  The  enemy's  camps  and  positions  were  visible 
from  a  signal  station  on  Round  Hill  in  rear  of  Fisher's  Hill, 
and  had  been  examined  by  me  from  that  point,  but  the  dis- 
tance was  too  great  to  see  with  distinctness.  From  the  station 
on  the  mountain,  which  immediately  overlooked  the  enemy's 
left,  the  view  was  very  distinct,  but  I  could  not  go  to  that  point 
myself,  as  the  ascent  was  very  rugged,  and  it  required  several 
hours  to  go  and  come,  and  I  could  not  leave  my  command  for 
that  time.  I  had  therefore,  necessarily,  to  rely  on  the  reports 
of  my  officers. 

General  Gordon  and  Captain  Hotchkiss,  on  their  return, 
reported  the  route  between  the  mountain  and  river,  which 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK.  103 

was  a  blind  path,  to  be  practicable  for  infantry  but  not  for 
artillery,  and  a  temporary  bridge  was  constructed  under  Cap- 
tain Hotchkiss's  superintendence,  at  the  first  crossing  of  tlio 
river  on  our  right.  The  plan  of  attack  on  which  I  determined 
was  to  send  the  three  divisions  of  the  2nd  Corps,  to-wit :  Gor- 
don's, Earnseur's,  and  Pegram's,  under  General  Gordon,  over 
the  route  which  has  been  specified  to  the  enemy's  rear,  to 
make  the  attack  at  o  o'clock  in  the  morning,  which  would  be 
a  little  before  day-break — to  move  myself  with  Kershaw's  and 
Wharton's  divisions,  and  all  the  artillery,  along  the  Pike 
through  Strasburg,  and  attack  the  enemy  on  the  front  and  left 
Hank  as  soon  as  Gordon  should  become  engaged,  and  for  Eos- 
ser  to  move  with  Ms  own  and  Wickham's  brigade,  on  the 
Back  Road  across  Cedar  Creek,  and  attack  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry simultaneously  with  Gordon's  attack,  while  Loma-x  should 
move  by  Front  Royal,  cross  the  river,  and  come  to  the  Valley 
Pike,  so  as  to  strike  the  enemy  wherever  he  might  be,  of  which 
lie  was  to  judge  by  the  sound  of  the  tiring. 

At  two  o'clock,  P.  M.,  all  the  division  commanders,  except 
Pegram,  who  had  not  returned  from  the  mountain,  came  to 
my  headquarters,  and  I  gave  them  their  instructions.  Gor- 
don was  directed  to  cross  over  into  the  bend  of  the  river  im- 
mediately after  dark,  and  move  to  the  foot  of  the  mountain, 
where  he  would  rest  his  troops,  and  move  from  there  in  time 
to  cross  the  river  again  and  get  in  position  at  Cooley's  house, 
in  the  enemy's  rear,  so  as  to  make  the  attack  at  the  designated 
hour,  and  he  was  instructed,  in  advancing  to  the  attack,  to 
move  for  a  house  on  the  west  side  of  the  Valley  Pike  called 
the  "Belle  Grove  House,"  at  which  it  was  known  that  Sheri- 
dan's headquarters  were  located.  A  guide  who  knew  the 
country  and  the  roads  was  ordered  to  be  sent  to  General  Gor- 
don, and  Colonel  Payne  was  ordered  to  accompany  him  with 
his  force  of  cavalry,  and  endeavor  to  capture  Sheridan  him- 
self. Ko^ser  was  ordered  to  move  before  day,  in  time  to 
attack  at  f>  o'clock  next  morning,  and  to  endeavor  to  surprise 
the  enemy's  cavalry  in  cam  p.  Kershaw  and  Wharton  were 
ordered  to  move,  at  1.  o'clock  in  the  morning,  towards  Stras- 
burg  under  my  personal  superintendence,  and  the  artillery 


104  JUTTLF,  OF  CEDAR  CRF. 

\v;is  ordered  to  concentrate  where  the  Pike  passed  through  the 
lint •>  ;it  Fisher's  Hill,  and,  at  the  hour  appointed  for  tin- 
attack,  to  move  at  a  gallop  to  llupp's  Hill — the  movement 
•  if  tin-  artillery  lining  thus  delayed  for  fear  of  attracting 
The  attention  of  tin-  cm-my  by  the  nnnhling  of  the  wheeK 
<>ver  the  macadamized  road.  Swords  and  canteens  were 
directed  to  be  left,  in  ramp,  so  a-  to  make  as  little  noise 
as  possible.  The  division  commanders  were  particularly 
admonished  as  to  the  necessity  for  promptness  and  energy  in 
all  their  movements,  and  they  were  instructed  to  press  the 
enemy  with  vigour  after  he  was  encountered,  ami  to  allow  him 
no  time  to  form.  1  >;it  t.«  continue  the  pursuit  until  his  forces  should 
be  completely  roared.  They  were  al>o  admonished  of  the 
danger  to  be  apprehended  from  a  disposition  to  plunder  the 
enemy's  camps  by  their  men,  and  they  were  enjoined  to  take. 
e\ery  po-sibie  piv.-auiion  against  it. 

(iordon   nio\."i  appointed  time,  and,  after    lie  had 

started,  General  I'egram  reported  to  me  that  he  had  discov- 
ered, from  the  signal  station  on  the  mountain,  what  he  sup- 
posed to  be  an  intrenchment  thrown  up  aer<>.->.  the  road  over 
which  Gordon  would  have  to  advance-  after  cros-ing  the  river 
the  second  time,  and  that  the  .-ignal  operators  had  informed 
him  that  it  had  been  tin-own  up  >ine,..  Gordon  and  ]Iotehki>s 
made,  their  examination:  and  he  -iig-vsted  the  propriety  of 
attaekingthe  enemy's  left  tlank  at  the  same  time  ( lordon  made 
his  attack,  a>  he  would  probably  have  more  difficulty  than  had 
been  anticipated,  [adopted  this  suggestion,  and  determined 
to  ero>s  Kei>haw'-  division  over  Cedar  Creek,  at  Bowman's 
Mill,  a  little  above  its  mouth,  and  .-trike  the  enemy's  left  tlank 
simultaneously  with  the  other  attacks,  of  which  purpose  notice 
was  sent  to  General  (Jordon.  by  General  I'egram.  At  one 
o'clock  '»u  the  morning  of  the  ll'th,  Ivershaw  and  Wharton 
moved,  and  I  aeeonij-anied  them.  At  Strashurg.  K'ershaw 
moved  to  the  right  on  the  road  to  Bowman's  Mill,  and  Whar- 
ton moved  along  the  I'ike  to  llnpp's  Hill,  with  instruction* 
not  to  display  hi>  fon-e.-,  but  avoid  the  enemy's  notice  until 
the  attack  began,  when  he  was  to  move  forward,  support  tin- 
artillery  when  it  came  up,  and  send  a  force  to  get  possession 


EATTLI*  OF  CEDAR  CREEK.  loo 

of  the  bridge  on  the  Pike  over  the  creek.  I  accompanied 
Jvershaw's  division,  and  we  got  in  sight  of  the  enemy's  fires  at 
half-past  three  o'clock.  The  moon  was  now  shining  and  we 
could  see  the  camps.  The  division  was  halted  under  cover  to 
await  the  arrival  of  the  proper  time,  and  I  pointed  out  to  Ker- 
shaw,  and  the  commander  of  his  leading  brigade,  the  enemy's 
position  and  described  the  nature  of  the  ground,  and  directed 
them  how  the  attack  was  to  be  made  and  followed  up.  Ker- 
shaw  was  directed  to  cross  his  division  over  the  creek  an 
quietly  as  possible,  and  to  form  it  into  column  of  brigades  as 
he  did  so,  and  advance  in  that  manner  against  the  enemy's  left 
breastwork,  extending  to  the  right  or  left  as  might  be  neces- 
sary. At  half-past  four  he  was  ordered  forward,  and,  a  very 
short  time  after  he  started,  the  tiring  from  liosser  on  our  left, 
and  the  picket  firing  at  the  ford  at  which  Gordon  was  cross- 
ing were  heard.  Ivershaw  crossed  the  creek  without  molesta- 
tion and  formed  his  division  as  directed,  and  precisely  at  five 
o'clock  his  leading  brigade,  with  little  opposition,  swept  over 
the  enemy's  left  work,  capturing  seven  guns,  which  were  at 
once  turned  on  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  this  attack  was  made, 
I  rode  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  position  on  IIupp's  Hill  to 
which  "Wharton  and  the  artillery  had  been  ordered.  I  found 
the  artillery  just  arriving,  and  a  very  heavy  fire  of  musketry 
was  now  heard  in  the  enemy's  rear  from  Gordon's  column. 
~\Vhartou  had  advanced  his  skirmishers  to  the  creek  capturing 
some  prisoners,  but  the  enemy  still  held  the  works  on  our  left 
of  the  Pike,  commanding  that  road  and  the  bridge,  and  opened 
with  his  artillery  on  us.  Ourartillery  was  immediately  brought 
into  action  and  opened  on  the  enemy,  but  he  soon  evacuated 
his  works,  and  our  men  from  the  other  columns  rushed  into 
them.  Just  then  the  sun  rose,  and  Wharton's  division  and  the 
artillery  were  immediately  ordered  forward.  I  rode  in  advance 
of  them  across  the  creek,  and  met  General  Gordon  on  the  op- 
posite hill.  Kershaw's  division  had  swept  along  the  enemy's 
works  on  the  right  of  the  Pike,  which  were  occupied  by  Crook's 
corps,  and  he  and  Gordon  had  united  at  the  Pike,  and  their 
divisions  had  pushed  across  it  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  The 
rear  division  of  Gordon's  column  (Pegram's)  was  crossing  the 


106  BATTLE  OF  CEDAK,  CREEIC. 

river  at  the  time  Kershaw's  attack  was  made,  and  General 
Gordon  moved  rapidly  to  Cooler's  house,  formed  his  troops 
and  advanced  against  the  enemy  with  his  own  division  on  the 
left,  under  Brigadier  General  Evans,  and  Eamseur's  on  the 
right,  with  Pegram's  in  the  rear  supporting  them.  There  had 
been  a  delay  of  an  hour  at  the  river  before  crossing  it,  either 
from  a  miscalculation  of  time  in  the  dark,  or  because  the  cav- 
alry which  was  to  precede  his  column  had  not  gotten  up,  and 
the  delay  thus  caused,  for  which  no  blame  is  to  be  attached  to 
General  Gordon,  enabled  the  enemy  partially  to  form  his  lines 
after  the  alarm  produced  by  Kershaw's  attack,  and  Gor- 
don's attack,  which  was  after  light,  was  therefore  met  with 
greater  obstinacy  by  the  enemy  than  it  would  otherwise  have 
encountered,  and  the  lighting  had  been  M-vere.  Gordon.  how- 
ever, pushed  his  attack  with  great  energy,  and  the  10th  and 
Crook's  corp.-,  were  in  complete  route,  and  their  ramps,  with 
a  number  of  pi. •.-«•-  of  artillery  and  a  considerable  quantity  <>t' 
small  :irms,  abandoned.  The  Cth  eorp>,  which  was  on  the  ene- 
my's right,  and  some  distance  t'r<>m  the  point  attacked,  had 
had  time  to  get  under  arm-,  and  take  position  00  as  to  arrest 
our  progre>s.  General  (iordon  brieily  informed  me  of  tin- 
condition  of  things,  and  stated  that  i'egram's  divi>ion,  which 
had  not  been  previously  engaged,  had  been  ordered  in.  lie 
then  rode  to  take  command  of  his  division,  and  I  rode  forward 
on  the  I'ike  to  ascertain  the  position  of  the  enemy,  in  order  to 
continue  the  attack.  There  was  now  a  heavy  fog,  and  that, 
with  the  smoke  from  the  artillery  and  small  arm-,  -o  obscured 
objects  that  the  enemy's  position  could  not  be  seen  :  but  I  soon 
came  to  Generals  Kamseurand  lVgram,who  informed  me  that 
Pegram's  division  had  encountered  a  division  of  the  <>th  eorps 
on  the  left  of  the  Valley  Tike,  and.  after  a  sharp  engagement, 
had  driven  it  back  on  the  main  body  of  that  corps,  which  was 
in  their  front  in  a  strong  position.  They  further  informed  me 
that  their  divisions  were  in  line  confronting  the  Oth  corps,  but 
that  there  was  a  vacancy  in  the  line  on  their  right  which  ought 
to  be  filled.  I  ordered  AVharton's  division  forward  at  once, 
and  directed  Generals  I  Jam-cur  and  1'egram  to  put  it  where  it 
was  required.  In  a  very  short  time,  and  while  I  was  endeavor- 


BATTLE  OP  CEDAR  CKEEK.  107 

ing  to  discover  the  enemy's  line  through  the  obscurity,  Whar- 
ton's  division  came  back  in  some  confusion,  and  General 
Wharton  informed  me  that,  in  advancing  to  the  position 
pointed  out  to  him  by  Generals  Ramseur  and  Pegram,  his 
division  had  been  driven  back  by  the  6th  corps,  which,  he 
said,  was  advancing,  lie  pointed  out  the  direction  from  which 
lie  said  the  enemy  was  advancing,  and  some  pieces  of  artillery 
which  had  come  up  were  brought  into  action.  The  fog  soon 
rose  sufficiently  for  us  to  see  the  enemy's  position  on  a  ridge 
to  the  west  of  Middletown,  audit  was  discovered  to  be  a  strong 
one.  After  driving  back  Wharton's  division,  he  had  not 
advanced,  but  opened  on  us  with  artillery,  and  orders  wore 
given  for  concentrating  all  our  guns  on  him.  In  the  mean 
time,  a  force  of  cavalry  was  advancing  along  the  Pike,  and 
through  the  fields  to  the  right  of  Middletown,  thus  placing  our 
right  and  rear  in  great  danger,  and  Wharton  was  ordered  to 
form  his  division  at  once,  and  take  position  to  hold  the  ene- 
my's cavalry  in  check.  Wbfford's  brigade  of  Kershaw's 
division,  which  had  become  separated  from  the  other  brigades, 
was  ordered  up  for  the  same  purpose.  Discovering  that  the 
6th  corps  could  not  be  attacked  with  advantage  on  its  left  flank, 
because  the  approach  in  that  direction  was  through  an  open 
Hat  and  across  a  boggy  stream  with  deep  banks,  I  directed 
Captain  Powell,  serving  on  General  Gordon's  staff,  who  rode 
up  to  me  while  the  artillery  was  being  placed  in  position,  to 
tell  the  General  to  advance  against  the  enemy's  right  flank, 
and  attack  it  in  conjunction  with  Kershaw,  while  a  heavy  fire 
of  artillery  was  opened  from  our  right ;  but  as  Captain  Pow- 
ell said  he  did  not  know  where  General  Gordon  was,  and 
expressed  some  doubt  about  finding  him,  immediately  after  he 
started,  I  sent  Lieutenant  Page,  of  my  own  staff,  with  orders 
for  both  Generals  Gordon  and  Kershaw  to  make  the  attack. 
In  a  short  time  Colonel  Carter  concentrated  18  or  20  guns  on 
the  enemy,  and  he  was  soon  in  retreat,  Ramseur  and  Pegram 
advanced  at  once  to  the  position  from  which  the  enemy  wan 
driven,  and  just  then  his  cavalry  commenced  pressing  heavily 
on  the  right,  and  Pegram's  division  was  ordered  to  move  to 
the  north  of  Middletown,  and  take  position  across  the  Pike 


108  i'.ATTLK  OK  CKDAK  CRKKK. 

against  the  cavalry.  Jjieuteuant  Page  had  returned  and  in- 
formed me  that  he  delivered  my  order  to  General  Kershau, 
but  the  latter  informed  him  that  his  division  was  not  in  a  con- 
dition to  make  the  attack,  as  it  was  very  much  scattered,  ami 
there  was  a  cavalry  force  threatening  him  in  front.  Lieuten- 
ant Page  also  stated  that  he  had  seen  Gordon's  division  in 
Kershaw's  rear  reforming,  and  that  it  was  also  much  scattered, 
and  that  he  had  not  delivered  the  order  t<>  General  Gordon, 
because  he  saw  that  neither  his  division  nor  Kershaw's  was  in 
a  condition  to  execute  it.  As  soon  as  Pegram  moved,  Kershaw 
was  ordered  from  the  left  to  supply  hi*  place.  I  then  rode  to 
Middletown  to  make  provision  against  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
and  discovered  a  large  body  of  it  seriously  threatening  that 
flank,  which  was  very  much  exposed.  AVharton's  division 
and  Wofiprd's  brigade  were  put  in  position  on  Pcgram's  right. 
and  several  charge*  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  repulsed.  1 
had  no  cavalry  on  that  Hank  except  Payne's  very  small  brig- 
ade, which  had  accompanied  (•lonlon.and  made  some  captures 
of  prisoners  and  waggon-..  Lomax  had  not  arrived,  but  1 
received  a  me*>age  from  him,  informing  me  that  he  had 
crossed  the  river  after  some  delay  from  a  cavalry  force  guard- 
ing it,  and  I  sent  a  message,  to  him  requiring  him  to  move  to 
Middletown  as  quick  as  possible,  but,  a*  1  subsequently  ascer- 
tained, he  did  not  receive  that  message.  Rosser  had  attacked 
the  enemy  promptly  at  the  appointed  time,  but  he  had  not 
been  able  to  surprise  him,  as  he  was  found  ou  the  alert  on  that 
liank,  doubtless  owing  to  the  attempt  at  a  surprise  on  the  night 
of  the  16th.  There  was  now  one  division  of  cavalry  threaten- 
ing my  right  flank,  and  two  were  on  the  left,  near  the  Back 
Road,  held  in  check  by  Kosser.  The  force  of  the  latter  was 
too  weak  to  make  any  impression  on  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and 
all  he  could  do  was  to  watch  it.  As  I  passed  across  Cedar 
Creek  after  the  enemy  was  driven  from  it,  I  had  discovered  a 
number  of  men  in  the  enemy's  camps  plundering,  and  one  of 
Wharton's  battalions  was  ordered  to  clear  the  camps,  and  drive 
the  men  to  their  commands,  it  was  reported  to  me  subse- 
quently that  a  great  number  were  at  the  same  work,  and  1  sent 
all  my  staff  officers  who  could  be  spared,  to  stop  it  if  possible. 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK.  109 

and  orders  were  sent  to  the  division  commanders  to  send  for 
their  men. 

After  he  was  driven  from  his  second  position,  the  enemy  had 
taken  a  new  position  ahout  two  miles  north  of  Middletown,  and, 
as  soon  as  I  had  regulated  matters  on  the  right  so  as  to  prevent 
his  cavalry  from  getting  in  rear  of  that  flank,  I  rode  to  the  left, 
for  the  purpose  of  ordering  an  advance.  I  found  Eamseur  and 
Kershaw  in  line  with  Pegram,  but  Gordon  had  not  come  up. 
In  a  short  time,  however,  I  found  him  coming  up  from  the  rear, 
and  I  ordered  him  to  take  position  on  Kershaw's  left,  and 
advance  for  the  purpose  of  driving  the  enemy  from  his  new 
position — Kershaw  and  Ramseur  being  ordered  to  advance  at 
the  same  time.  As  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  our  left  was  very 
strong,  and  had  the  benefit  of  an  open  country  to  the  rear  of 
that  flank,  a  repulse  at  this  time  would  have  been  disastrous, 
and  I  therefore  directed  General  Gordon,  if  he  found  the 
enemy's  line  too  strong  to  attack  with  success,  not  to  make  the 
assault.  The  advance  was  made  for  some  distance,  when  Gor- 
don's skirmishers  came  back  reporting  a  line  of  battle  in  front 
behind  breast  works,  and  General  Gordon  did  not  make  the 
attack.  It  was  now  apparent  that  it  would  not  do  to  press  my 
troops  further.  They  had  been  up  all  night  and  were  much 
jaded.  In  passing  over  rough  ground  to  attack  the  enemy  in 
the  early  morning,  their  own  ranks  had  been  much  disordered, 
and  the  men  scattered,  and  it  had  required  time  to  reform  them. 
Their  ranks,  moreover,  were  much  thinned  by  the  absence  of 
the  men  engaged  in  plundering  the  enemy's  camps.  The  delay 
which  had  unavoidably  occurred,  had  enabled  the  enemy  to 
rally  a  portion  of  his  routed  troops,  and  his  immense  force  of 
cavalry,  which  remained  intact,  was  threatening  both  of  our 
flanks  in  an  open  country,  which  of  itself  rendered  an  advance 
extremely  hazardous.  I  determined,  therefore,  to  try  and  hold 
what  had  been  gained,  and  orders  were  given  for  carrying  off 
the  captured  and  abandoned  artillery,  smalls  arms,  and  wag- 
gons. A  number  of  bold  attempts  were  made  during  the  sub- 
sequent part  of  the  day,  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  to  break  our 
line  on  the  right,  but  they  were  invariably  repulsed.  Late  in 
the  afternoon,  the  enemy's  infantry  advanced  against  Ram- 


110  BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK. 

seur's,  Kershaw's  and  Gordon's  lines,  and  the  attack  on  Ram- 
seur's  and  Kershaw's  fronts  was  handsomely  repulsed  in  my 
view,  and  I  hoped  that  the  day  was  finally  ours,  but  a  portion 
of  the  enemy  had  penetrated  an  interval  which  was  between 
Evans'  brigade,  on  the  extreme  left,  and  the  rest  of  the  line, 
when  that  brigade  gave  way.  and  Gordon's  other  brigades  soon 
followed.  General  Gordon  made  every  possible  eftbrt  to  rail)1 
his  men,  and  lead  them  back  against  the  enemy,  but  without 
avail.  The  information  of  this  affair,  with  exaggerations, 
passed  rapidly  along  Kershaw's  and  Ramseur's  lines,  and  their 
men,  under  the  apprehension  of  being  flanked,  commenced 
falling  back  in  disorder,  though  no  enemy  was  pressing  them, 
and  this  gave  me  the  first  intimation  of  Gordon's  condition. 
At  the  same  time  the  enemy's  cavalry,  observing  the  disorder 
in  our  ranks,  made  another  charge  on  our  right,  but  was  again 
repulsed.  Every  effort  was  made  to  stop  and  rally  Kershaw's 
and  Ramseur's  men,  but  the  mass  of  them  resisted  all  appeals, 
and  continued  to  go  to  the  rear  without  waiting  for  any  effort 
to  retrieve  the  partial  disorder.  Kamsi-ur,  however,  succeeded 
in  retaining  with  him  two  or  three  hundred  men  of  his  divi- 
sion, and  Major  Goggin  of  Kershaw's  staff,  who  was  in  com- 
mand of  Conner's  brigade,  about  the  same  number  from  that 
brigade:  and  these  men,  aided  by  several  pieces  of  artillery, 
held  the  enemy's  whole  force  on  our  left  in  check  for  one  hour 
and  a  half,  until  Ramseur  was  shot  down  mortally  wounded, 
and  the  ammunition  of  those  pieces  of  artillery  was  exhausted. 
While  the  latter  were  being  replaced  by  other  guns,  the  force 
that  had  remained  with  Ramseur  and  Goggin  gave  way  also. 
Pegram's  and  Wharton's  divisions,  and  Wofford's  brigade  had 
remained  steadfast  on  the  right,  and  resisted  all  efforts  of  the 
enemy's 'cavalry,  but  no  portion  of  this  force  could  be  moved 
to  the  left  without  leaving  the  Pike  open  to  the  cavalry,  which 
would  have  destroyed  all  hope  at  once.  Every  effort  to  rally 
the  men  in  the  rear  having  failed,  I  had  now  nothing  left  for 
me  but  to  order  these  troops  to  retire  also.  When  they  com- 
menced to  move,  the  disorder  soon  extended  to  them,  but  Gen- 
eral Pegrani  succeeded  in  bringing  back  a  portion  of  his  com- 
mand across  Cedar  Creek  in  an  organized  condition,  holding 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK.  Ill 

the  enemy  in  check,  but  this  small  force  soon  dissolved.  A 
part  of  Evans'  brigade  had  been  rallied  in  the  rear,  and  held  a 
ford  above  the  bridge  for  a  short  time,  but  it  followed  the  exam- 
ple of  the  rest.  I  tried  to  rally  the  men  immediately  after 
crossing  Cedar  Creek,  and  at  Hupp's  Hill,  but  without  success. 
Could  500  men  have  been  rallied,  at  either  of  these  places,  who 
would  have  stood  by  me,  I  am  satisfied  that  all  my  artillery 
and  waggons  and  the  greater  part  of  the  captured  artillery 
could  have  been  saved,  as  the  enemy's  pursuit  was  very  feeble. 
As  it  was,  a  bridge  broke  down  on  a  very  narrow  part  of  the 
road  between  Strasburg  and  Fisher's  Hill,  just  above  Stras- 
burg,  where  there  was  no  other  passway,  thereby  blocking  up 
all  the  artillery,  ordnance  and  medical  waggons,  and  ambu- 
lances which  had  not  passed  that  point;  and,  as  there  was  no 
force  to  defend  them,  they  were  lost,  a  very  small  body  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  capturing  them. 

The  greater  part  of  the  infantry  was  halted  at  Fisher's  Hill, 
and  Rosser,  whose  command  had  retired  in  good  order  on  the 
Back  Koad,  was  ordered  to  that  point  with  his  cavalry.  The 
infantry  moved  back  towards  2few  Market  at  three  o'clocd 
next  morning,  and  Rosser  was  left  at  Fisher's  Hill  to  cover 
the  retreat  of  the  troops,  and  hold  that  position  until  they  were 
beyond  pursuit.  He  remained  at  Fisher's  Hill  until  after  ten 
o'clock  on  the  20th,  and  the  enemy  did  not  advance  to  that 
place  while  he  was  there.  He  then  fell  back  without  molesta- 
tion to  his  former  position,  and  established  his  line  on  Stony 
Creek,  across  from  Columbia  Furnace  to  Edinburg,  seven  miles 
below  Mount  Jackson.  My  other  troops  were  halted  at  New 
Market,  about  seven  miles  from  Mount  Jackson,  and  there  was 
an  entirely  open  country  between  the  two  places,  they  being 
very  nearly  in  sight  of  each  other.* 


*  Grant  says  in  his  uccount  of  the  battle  of  Odar  Creole:  "The  enemy  was  defeated  with 
great  slaughter,  and  the  loss  of  the  most  of  his  artillery  and  trains,  and  the  trophies  he  had 
captured  in  the  morning.  The.  wreck  of  his  army  escaped  during  the  night,  and  fled  in  tin- 
direction  of  Staunton  and  Lynehburg.  Pursuit  was  made  ty  Mount  Jackson.''  Stanton,who 
M-ems  to  think  it  his  duty  to  improve  on  all  Grant's  statements,  says  :  "The  routed  forces  ot 
the  enemy  were  pursued  to  Mount  Jackson,  where  lie  arrived  without  an  organized  regi- 
ment of  his  arrny.  All  of  his  artillery  and  thousands  of  prisoners  fell  into  Sheridan's  hands. 
These  successes  closed  military  operations  iu  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  a  rebel  /i/<r< 
appeared  there  no  more  dunny  the  war."1  The  recklessness  of  these  statements,  of  both  Oram 


112  BATTLE  OF  CKDAfc  CRKEK. 

Lomax  had  moved,  ou  the  day  of  the  battle,  on  the  From 
I { oval  road  towards  Winchester,  under  the  impression  that  the 
enemy  was  being  forced  back  towards  that  place,  and  lie  did 
not  reach  me.  When  he  ascertained  the  reverse  which  hud 
taken  place  in  the  latter  part  of  the  day,  he  retired  up  the 
Luray  Valley  to  his  former  position  at  Milltbrd,  without 
molestation. 

My  loss  in  the  battle  of  Cedar  Creek  was  twenty-three  pi- 
of  artillery,  some  ordnance  and  medical  wagons  and  ambu- 
lances, which  had  been  carried  to  the  front  for  the  use  of  the 
troops  on  the  field;  about  1860  in  killed  and  wounded,  and 
something  over  1,000  prison ••[•-:.  Major-General  liamseur  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  mortally  wounded,  and  in  him, 
not  only  my  command,  but  the  country  sustained  a  heavy  lo>s. 
He  was  a  most  gallant  and  energetic  officer  whom  no  disaster 
appalled,  but  his  courage  and  energy  seemed  to  gain  new 
strength  in  the  midst  of  confusion  and  disorder.  Ife  fell  at 
his  post  lighting  like  a  lion  at  bay,  and  his  native  .State  has 
reason  to  be  proud  of  his  memory.  Brigadier-General  Uattle 
was  wounded  at  the  beginning  of  the  light,  and  other  valuable 
officers  were  lost.  Fifteen  hundred  prisoners  were  eaptuivd 
from  the  enemy  and  brought,  off,  and  his  !o»  in  killed  and 
wounded  in  this  action  was  very  heavy. 

This  was  ti:<  if  a  glorious  victory  given  up  \>\  my  own 

troops  after  they  had  Avon  it,  and  it  is  to  l>e  ace. Minted  for,  on 
the  ground  «>f  the  partial  demoralization  caused  hy  the  plun- 
der of  the  enemy^  camps,  and  from  the  fact  that  the  IIM-H 
undertook  to  judge  tor  them>eive.>  when  it  was  proper  to  retire. 
Had  they  but  Availed,  the  mist-hie!' on  the  left  would  have  been 
remedied.  I  have  never  been  able  to  satisfy  myself  that  the 
enemy's  attack,  in  the  afternoon,  was  not  a  demonstration  to 
cover  his  retreat  during  the  night.  Ft  certainly  was  not  a  vig- 


:ir-,.i  :-i;ii'!»'i.  ,\  ill  :i|.|..    rfrom  tl nan 

In  the  Shenandoah  Valley.    Wi.nM  r  •  •  .  ih.-it  rhi>  w  „  iii.-ii  Hcd  in 

MH'h  vrtid  dtamay  before  its  panmerg  priaonera,  who  were 

-..•nt  to  Richmond— sabsequeutly  confronted  siii-ri«l;nr>  u!i., 

tup  tw.j  .l.-iys.  without  his  attucki  njt  ii.  :nni  >.-in  -.111  .•\]M-.iiii,Jn-  u  hi.-h  .-.•.(.hn-.-.l  two  iiiip..r- 
r:int  post.-,  with  over  KMO  ]/riM.>ni-r.>  .-tn.l  .~.M  ..•!•;•  1  pit  ,  Ulery,  in  :ln'  liinh-  i>r>hi-riiliin'- 

i-ommand'.'    Yet  Mich  \v:is  tlio 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK.  113 

orous  one,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  very  small  force 
with  Ramseur  and  Goggin  held  him  in  check  so  long;  and  the 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  in  the  division  which  first  gave 
way,  was  not  heavy,  and  was  the  least  in  numbers  of  all  but 
one,  though  it  was  the  third  in  strength,  and  its  relative  loss 
was  the  least  of  all  the  divisions.  I  read  a  sharp  lecture  to 
n.iy  troops,  in  an  address  published  to  them  a  few  days  after 
the  battle,  but  I  have  never  attributed  the  result  to  a  want  of 
courage  on  their  part,  for  I  had  seen  them  perform  too  many 
prodigies  of  valor  to  doubt  that.  There  was  an  individuality 
about  the  Confederate  soldier  which  caused  him  to  act  often  in 
battle  according  to  his  own  opinions,  and  thereby  impair  his 
own  efficiency;  and  the  tempting  bait  offered  by  the  rich 
plunder  of  the  camps  of  the  enemy's  well-fed  and  well-clothed 
troops,  was  frequently  too  great  for  our  destitute  soldiers,  and 
caused  them  to  pause  in  the  career  of  victory. 

Had  my  cavalry  been  sufficient  to  contend  with  that  of  the 
enemy,  the  route  in  the  morning  would  have  been  complete ; 
as  it  was,  I  had  only  about  1200  cavalry  on  the  field  under 
Ilosser,  and  Lomax's  force,  which  numbered  less  than  1700, 
did  not  get  up.  My  infantry  and  artillery  was  about  the  same 
strength  as  at  Winchester.  The  reports  of  the  ordnance  offi- 
cers showed  in  the  hands  of  my  troops  about  8,800  muskets, 
in  round  numbers  as  follows:  in  Kershaw's  division  2,700, 
Ramseur' s  2,100,  Gordon's  1,700,  Pegram's  1,200,  and  Whar- 
ton's  1,100.  Making  a  moderate  allowance  for  the  men  left  to 
guard  the  camps  and  the  signal  station  on  the  mountain,  as 
well  as  for  a  few  sick  and  wounded,  I  went  into  this  battle 
with  about  8,500  muskets  and  a  little  over  forty  pieces  of 
artillery. 

The  book  containing  the  reports  of  the  Chief  Surgeon  of 
Sheridan's  cavalry  corps,  which  has  been  mentioned  as  cap- 
tured at  this  battle,  showed  that  Sheridan's  cavalry  numbered 
about  8,700  men  for  duty  a  few  days  previous,  and  from  infor- 
mation which  I  had  received  of  reinforcements  sent  him,  in 
the  way  of  recruits  and  returned  convalescents,  I  am  satisfied 
that  his  infantry  force  was  fully  as  large  as  at  Winchester. 


114  BATTLE  OP  CEDAR  CREEK. 

Sheridan  was  absent  in  the  morning  at  the  beginning  of  the 
fight,  and  had  returned  in  the  afternoon  before  the  change  in  the 
fortunes  of  the  day.  Nevertheless,  I  saw  no  reason  to  change 
the  estimate  I  had  formed  of  him.* 

It  may  be  asked,  why  with  my  small  force  I  made  the 
attack  ?  I  can  only  say  we  had  been  lighting  large  odds 
during  the  whole  war,  and  I  knew  there  was  no  chance  of  les- 
sening them.  It  was  of  the  utmost  consequence  that  Sheridan 
should  be  prevented  from  sending  troops  to  Grant,  and  Gene- 
ral Lee,  in  a  letter  received  a  day  or  two  before,  hud  expressed 
an  earnest  desire  that  a  victory  should  be  gained  in  the  Valley 
if  possible,  and  it  could  not  be  gained  without  fighting  for  it. 
T  did  hope  to  gain  one  by  surprising  the  enemy  in  his  camp. 
and  then  thought  and  still  think  [  would  have  had  it,  if  my 
directions  luul  born  strictly  complied  with,  and  my  troops  had 
awaited  my  orders  to  retire.! 


CLOSE  OF  THE  VALLEY  ('AMI'AK-iX. 

After  the  return  from  Cedar  Creek,  the  main  body  of  my 
troops  remained  in  their  camp  for  the  rest  of  the  month  with- 
out disturbance,  but  on  the  26th  of  October  the  enemy's  eav- 
alry  attacked  Lorn  ax  at  Millford  and,  after  sharp  lighting,  was 

,t   nt  tu.'   main   lifxiy  "f  liis  army  had   U-cn  aiTt^teil.  and  :<   ivw  lint-  fnrnn  '', 
l-ehind  lireastworks  of  mils.  U-;'.uv  Hu-ri'ian  arrived  nn  tin-  field :  and  in-  still  had  imincn*" 
_:ai,i.-l  Hi.'  u  ln-ii  in'  undo  [i,.-  atta"k  i:i  til'-  alti-rni  .1  •:.. 

tA  silly  story  was  circulated  and  f  von  pui'iished  in  tin-  paper*,  that  thKl'attlc  \\a-  plain,'  ••) 
^ducted  by  unc  of  my  Mioi.irdin;'t.'s  i.p  tu  .••  (•••••t:iin  point.  w  hen  iny  arrival  <>«*  the  tit-Id 
d  til"  luii'siiit  iind  an-.'M.-il  tin-  vii-tm-y.  _\n  i.tiii-cr  nr  .s«>l.ii«-i-  on  that  ilay  n-ctMvoii  :iii 

I'l'ii.-i-  I'l-om  mi*  t"  lialt.  unites  hi-  "as  ;:oiu>f  to  tin-  n-ar.     My  or.U.-rs  wi-ri-  T,,  in- t|,,.  .-m-nix 

iVi. in  tin- iM'^innnii.'  an<ij;i\.'  iiiin  no  tiim-  to  form,  ami  uh.'ii  I  t-.iMnl  that  my  troops  hail 
h  ilo-i|.  1  ciiilfavuuri''!  {••  •  in.  l.ut  I  ili-i'ovf i-i'ii  it  wo'ilil  not  il"  to  prosx  tin-in  fnr- 

th-T.  Tini-i-  \MIII  II.-IM-  knouii  mi.'  ti  urn  my  \  nii-ii.a-  \M  11  a>  iii(i~"  w  ho  <  ami-  in  contact  with 
UK-  .icirins;  ill"  \var.  know  that  I  \\a>  not  likely  to  "icnn  ."  |  i-.in  a  l./it'l--  1'i-r  ni".  ••! 

•i-~i!lii"  my  iiiui.'>  in  anv  iiai-tic.nlsir.      Vt-l    '•  -  '-civ  aid   mlopi  valna'ol.- 

•i.v  oi'  my  otiiccr-. 

'I'h.-i't-  was  Mm  it  in -r  lai-i'  n-port  ut  to  my  ft  Ing  the  Valley  Campaign,  which 

,ii.t.-ii'i.-ii  some  circulation  and  credence,  bnt  whicli  I  w-oni.j  not  nntiee.  c\cepi  f«v  v\--  i-i-t 
that  it  was  r.-l'erreil  to  on  tlic  tionr  ot'  tin-  I  'oineiii-i-ate  Senate  l.y  two  m-i-nii.ers:  of  thut  lioily. 
The  utter  falsehood  of  this  report  was  well  knuwti  to  all  my  stati';.ml  '.t-n.-ra!  oliic"r-.  us  well 
us  to  all  othf>rn  who  Bfsocinted  with  m«. 


CLOSE  OP  THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  115 

repulsed.  Having  heard  that  Sheridan  was  preparing  to  send 
troops  to  Grant,  and  that  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad  was 
being  repaired,  I  moved  down  the  Valley  again  on  the  10th  of 
November.  I  had  received  no  reinforcements,  except  about 
350  cavalry  under  General  Cosby  from  Breckenridge's  depart- 
ment in  Southwestern  Virginia,  some  returned  convalescents, 
and  several  hundred  conscripts  who  had  been  on  details  which 
had  been  revoked.  On  the  llth,  on  our  approach  to  Cedar 
Creek,  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  towards 
Winchester,  after  having  fortified  and  occupied  a  position  on 
Hupp's  Hill  subsequently  to  the  battle  of  Cedar  Creek. 
Colonel  Payne  drove  a  small  body  of  cavalry  through  Middle- 
town  to  I^ewtown,  and  I  followed  him  and  took  position  south 
of  the  latter  place  and  in  view  of  it.  Sheridan's  main  force 
was  found  posted  north  of  !N"ewtown,  in  a  position  which  he 
was  engaged  in  fortifying.  I  remained  in  front  of  him  during 
the  llth  and  12th,  Rosser  being  on  my  left  flank  on  the  Back 
Road,  and  Lomax  on  my  right  between  the  Valley  Pike  and 
the  Front  Royal  road,  with  one  brigade  (McCausland's)  at  Ce- 
darville  on  the  latter  road.  Rosser  had  some  skirmishing  with 
the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the  llth,  and  on  the  12th  two  divisions 
advanced  against  him,  and  after  a  heavy  fight  the  enemy  was 
repulsed  and  some  prisoners  captured.  Colonel  Payne,  who 
was  operating  immediately  in  my  front,  likewise  had  a  sharp 
engagement  with  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  defeated 
it.  When  Rosser  was  heavily  engaged,  Lomax  was  ordered 
to  his  assistance  with  a  part  of  his  command,  and,  during  hi* 
absence,  late  in  the  afternoon,  Powell's  division  of  the  ene- 
my's cavalry  attacked  McCausland  at  Cedarville,  and,  after  a 
severe  fight,  drove  him  back  across  the  river  with  the  loss  of 
two  pieces  of  artillery.  At  the  time  of  this  affair,  a  blustering 
wind  was  blowing  and  the  firing  could  not  be  heard  ;  and 
nothing  was  known  of  McCausland's  misfortune  until  after  wo 
commenced  retiring  that  night.  In  these  cavalry  fights  three 
valuable  officers  were  killed,  namely :  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Marshall  of  Rosser's  brigade,  Colonel  Radford  of  McCausland's 
brigade,  and  Captain  Harvie  of  McCausland's  staff. 
Discovering  that  the  enemy  continued  to  fortify  his  position. 


116  OT.OT  <>F  TI1K  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN. 

and  showed  no  disposition  to  come  out  of  his  lines  with  his 
infantry,  and  not  being  willing  to  attack  him  in  his  intrcneh- 
ments,  after  the  reverses  I  had  met  with,  I  determined  to  re- 
tire, as  we  were  beyond  the  reach  of  supplies.  After  dark  on 
the  12th,  we  moved  to  Fisher's  Hill,  and  next  day  returned  in 
the  direction  of  New-Market,  where  we  arrived  on  the  14th, 
no  effort  at  pursuit  bein^  made.  1  discovered  by  this  move- 
ment that  no  troops  had  been  sent  to  Grant,  and  that  the  pro- 
ject of  repairing  the  Manas>as  Gap  "Railroad  had  been 
abandoned.* 

Shortly  after  our  return  to  New-Market,  Kershaw's  division 
was  returned  to  General  Lee,  and  Cosby's  cavalry  to  Brecken- 
ridge.  On  the  22nd  of  November  two  divisions  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  advanced  to  Mount  Jackson,  after  having  driven  in  our 
cavalry  pickets.  A  part  of  it  crossed  over  the  river  into 
Meem's  bottom  at  the  foot  of  Kude's  Hill,  but  was  driven  back 
by  a  portion  of  my  infantry,  and  the  whole  retreated,  being 
pursued  by  "Wickham's  brigade,  under  Colonel  Munford,  to 
Woodstock. 

On  the  27th,  Rosser  crossed  Great  North  Mountain  into  Har- 
dy County,  with  his  own  and  Payne's  brigade,  and,  about  the 
29th,  surprised  and  captured  the  fortified  post  at  'Now  Creek, 
on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  rail-road.  At  this  place,  two  regi- 
ments of  cavalry  with  their  arms  and  colours  were  captured, 
and  eight  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  very  large  amount  of  ord- 
nance, quarter  master,  and  commissary  stores  fell  into  our 
hands.  The  prisoners,  numbering  800,  four  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  some  waggons  and  horses,  were  brought  off,  the  other 
guns,  which  were  heavy  siege  pieces,  being  spiked,  and  their 
carriages  and  a  greater  part  of  the  stores  destroyed.  Rosser 
also  brought  off  several  hundred  cattle  and  a  large  number  of 
sheep  from  Hampshire  and  Hardy  counties. 

This  expedition  closed  the  material  operations  of  the  cam- 
paign of  1864  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and,  at  that  time,  the 


*From  Grant's  account  of  the  battle  of  Cedar  rrt-.-k,  it  would  be  supposed  that  the  6th 
Corps  was  returned  to  the  army  of  the  Potomac  immediately  after  that  battle.,  but  the  truth 
is  that  no  troops  were  went  from  Sheridan's  army  until  in  December,  when  the  cold  weather 
had  put  an  end  to  all  operations  in  the  field  by  infantry. 


CLOSE  OF  THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  117 

enemy  held  precisely  the  same  portion  of  that  valley,  which 
he  held  before  the  opening  of  the  campaign  in  the  spring,  and 
no  more,  and  the  headquarters  of  his  troops  were  at  the  same 
place,  to-wit:  "Winchester.  There  was  this  difference  how- 
ever :  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  he  held  it  with  com- 
paratively a  small  force,  and  at  the  close,  he  was  compelled  to 
employ  three  corps  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  for  that 
purpose,  and  to  guard  the  approaches  to  "Washington,  Mary- 
land, and  Pennsylvania.  "When  I  was  detached  from  General 
Lee's  army,  Hunter  was  advancing  on  Lynchburg,  170  miles 
south  of  "Winchester,  with  a  very  considerable  force,  and 
threatening  all  of  General  Lee's  communications  with  a  very 
serious  danger.  By  a  rapid  movement,  my  force  had  been 
thrown  to  Lynchburg,  just  in  time  to  arrest  Hunter's  march 
into  that  place,  and  he  had  been  driven  back  and  forced  to 
escape  into  the  mountains  of  "Western  Virginia,  with  a  loss  of 
ten  pieces  of  artillery,  and  subsequent  terrible  suffering  to  his 
troops.  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  had  been  invaded,  "Wash- 
ington threatened  and  thrown  into  a  state  of  frantic  alarm,  and 
Grant  had  been  compelled  to  detach  two  corps  of  infantry  and 
two  divisions  of  cavalry  from  his  army.  Five  or  six  thousand 
prisoners  had  been  captured  from  the  enemy  and  sent  to  Rich- 
mond, and,  according  to  a  published  statement  by  Sheridan, 
his  army  had  lost  13,831,  in  killed  and  wounded,  after  he  took 
command  of  it.  Heavy  losses  had  been  inflicted  on  that  army 
by  my  command,  before  Sheridan  went  to  the  Valley,  and  the 
whole  loss  could  not  have  been  far  from  double  my  entire 
force.  The  enemy  moreover  had  been  deprived  of  the  use  of 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  rail-road,  and  the  Chesapeake  and 
Ohio  canal,  for  three  months.  It  is  true  that  I  had  lost  many 
valuable  officers  and  men,  and  about  60  pieces  of  artillery, 
counting  those  lost  by  Ramseur  and  McCausland,  and  not  de- 
ducting the  19  pieces  captured  from  the  enemy;  but  I  think  I 
may  safely  state  that  the  fall  of  Lynchburg  with  its  foundries 
and  factories,  and  the  consequent  destruction  of  General  Lee's 
communications,  would  have  rendered  necessary  the  evacua- 
tion of  Richmond,  and  that,  therefore,  the  fall  of  the  latter 
place  had  been  prevented ;  and,  by  my  subsequent  operations, 


118  CLOSE  OP  THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN. 

Grant's  operations  aga'inst  Lee's  army  had  been  materially 
impeded,  and  for  some  time  substantially  suspended. 

My  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  at  Winchester  and 
Fisher's  Hill,  had  been  less  than  4,000,  and,  at  Cedar  Creek, 
about  3,000,  but  the  enemy  has  attempted  to  magnify  it  to  a 
much  larger  figure,  claiming  as  prisoners  several  thousand 
more  than  my  entire  loss.  How  he  makes  out  his  estimate  is 
not  for  me  to  explain.  He  was  never  scrupulous  as  to  the 
kinds  of  persons  of  whom  he  made  prisoners,  and  the  state- 
ments of  the  Federal  officers  were  not  always  confined  to  the 
truth,  as  the  world  has  probably  learned.  I  know  that  a  num- 
ber of  prisoners  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands,  who  did  not  be- 
long to  my  command :  such  as  cavalry  men  on  details  to  get 
fresh  horses,  soldiers  on  leave  of  absence,  conscripts  on  special 
details,  citizens  not  in  the  service,  men  employed  in  getting 
supplies  for  the  departments,  and  stragglers  and  deserters  from 
other  commands. 

My  army  during  the  entire  campaign  had  been  self  sustain- 
ing, so  far  as  provisions  and  forage  were  concerned,  and  a  con- 
siderable number  of  beef  cattle  had  been  sent  to  General  Lee's 
army;  and  when  the  difficulties  under  which  I  laboured  are 
considered,  I  think  I  may  confidently  assert  that  I  had  done  as 
well  as  it  was  possible  for  me  to  do.* 


*Some  attempts  have  been  made  to  compare  my  campaign  in  the  Valley  with  that  of  Gen- 
eral Jackson  in  the  same  district,  in  order  to  cast  censure  on  me;  but  such  comparison  K  m.t 
necessary  for  the  vindication  of  the  fame  of  that  great  leader,  and  it  is  most  unjust  to  mi:, 
us  the  circumstances  under  which  we  operated  were  so  entirely  dissimilar.  It  was  my  for- 
tune to  serve  under  General  Jackson,  after  his  Valley  campaign  until  his  death,  and  1  haw 
the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  I  enjoyed  his  confidence,  which  was  signally  shown  in  hi* 
lust  official  act  towards  me ;  and  no  one  admires  his  character  and  reveres  his  memory  more 
than  I  do.  It  is  not  therefore  with  any  view  to  detract  Irom  his  merits,  that  I  mention  the  fol- 
lowing facts,  but  to  show  how  improper  it  is  to  compare  our  campaigns,  with  a  view  of  con- 
trasting their  merits.  1st.  General  Jackson  did  not  have  the  odds  opposed  to  him  which  I 
hud,  and  his  troop."  were  composed  entirely  of  the  very  best  material  which  entered  into  tin- 
composition  of  our  armies,  that  is,  the  men  who  came  out  voluntarily  in  the  beginning  of  tho 
war;  while  my  command,  though  comprising  all  the  principal  organizations  which  were  with 
him  did  not  contain  1.500  of  the  men  who  had  participated  in  the  first  Valley  campaign,  and 
there  was  a  like.-  fulling  off  in  the  other  organizations  with  me,  which  had  not  been  wit. 
Jackson  in  that  campaign.  This  was  owing  to  the  losses  in  killed  and  disabled,  and  prisoners 
who  wore  not  exchanged.  Besides  the  old  soldiers  whose  numbers  were  so  reduced,  my 
command  was  composed  of  recruits  and  conscripts.  2nd.  General  Jackson'*  cavalry  wa* 
not  outnumbered  Viy  the  enemy,  and  it  was  far  superior  in  efficiency — A.shby  being  a  host  iu 
himself;  while  my  cavalry  was  more  than  trebled  in  numbers,  and  far  excelled  in  arms, 
equipments,  and  horses,  by  that  of  the  enemy.  3rd.  The  Valluy,  at  tho  time  of  hla  cam- 


CLOSE  OF  THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN.  115 

Shortly  after  Rosser's  return  from  the  New  Creek  expedi- 
tion, Colonel  Munford  was  sent  with  Wickham's  brigade  to  the 
counties  of  Hardy  and  Pendleton,  to  procure  forage  for  1m 
horses,  and,  cold  weather  having  now  set  in  so  as  to  prevent 
material  operations  in  the  field,  the  three  divisions  of  the  2nd 
Corps  were  sent,  in  succession,  to  General  Lee, — WhartoirB 
division,  the  cavalry,  and  most  of  the  artillery  being  retained 
with  me. 

On  the  16th  of  December,  I  broke  up  the  camp  at  New-Mar- 
ket, and  moved  back  towards  Staunton,  for  the  purpose  of 
establishing  my  troops  on  or  near  the  Central  railroad — 
Lomax's  cavalry,  except  one  brigade  left  to  watch  the  Luray 
Valley,  having  previously  moved  across  the  Blue  Ridge,  so  as 
to  be  able  to  procure  forage.  Cavalry  pickets  were  left  in  front 
of  New-Market,  and  telegraphic  communications  kept  up  with 
that  place,  from  which  there  was  communication  with  the 
lower  Valley,  by  means  of  signal  stations  on  the  northern  end 
of  Massanutten  Mountain,  and  at  Ashby's  Gap  in  the  Blue 
Ridge,  which  overlooked  the  enemy's  camps  and  the  surround- 
ing country. 

The  troops  had  barely  arrived  at  their  new  camps,  when 
information  was  received  that,  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  in 
motion.  On  the  19th,  Custar's  division  moved  from  "Winches- 
ter towards  Staunton,  and,  at  the  same  time,  two  other  divi- 
*ions  of  cavalry,  under  Torbert  or  Men-it,  moved  across  by 
Front  Royal  and  Chester  Gap  towards  Gordonsville.  This 
information  having  been  si-nt  me  by  signal  and  telegraph, 
Whartoivs  division  was  moved,  on  the  20th,  through  a  hail- 


pitign,  wan  teeming  with  provisions  ami  forage  from  one  end  to  the  other;  while  my  Com- 
mand hud  vnry  great  difficulty  iu  obtaining  provisions  for  the  men,  and  had  to  rely  almost 
••utirely  on  the  grass  in  the  open  fields  for  forage.  4th.  When  GeneralJackson  was  pressed 
find  had  to  retire.  MS  \vell  when  he  fell  back  before  Hunks  in  the  spring  of  1802, as, later,  when 
h<>  retired  before  Fremont  to  prevent  Shields  from  getting  in  his  rear,  the  oondition  of  the 
M  liter  courses  w;ts  -ueh  n~  to  «  liable  him  to  stop  the  advance  of  one  column,  by  burning  the 
i'1-idges,  and  then  fall  upon  and  defeat  another  column;  and,  when  hard  r"'('ss'-'d,  place  his 
i mops  in  a  position  of  security,  until  a  favorable,  opportunity  offered  for  attacking  the 
enemy:  while  all  the  water  courses  were  low  and  fordable,  and  the  whole  country  was  open 
in  my  front,  on  my  flanks,  and  in  my  rear,  during  my  entire  campaign.  These  facts  do  not 
detract  from  the  merits  of  General  Jackson's  campaign  in  the  slightest  degree,  and  tin-  he  it 
from  me  to  attempt  to  obscure  his  well  earned  and  richly  deserved  fame.  They  oiii 
that  I  ought  not  to  be  condemned  for  not  doing  what  he  did. 


120  CLOSE  OF  THE  VALLEY  CAMPA^  ' 

storm,  towards  Harrisonbnrg,  and  Rosser  ordered  to  the  front 
with  all  the  cavalry  he  could  collect.  Custar's  division  reached 
Lucy's  Spring,  nine  miles  north  of  Harrisonburg,  on  the 
evening  of  the  20th,  and,  next  morning  before  day,  ROSMT, 
with  about  600  men  of  his  own  and  Payne's  brigades,  attacked 
it  in  camp,  and  drove  it.  back  down  the  Valley  in  some  con- 
fusion. Lomax  had  been  advised  of  the  movement  towards 
Gordonsville,  and.  as  soon  ;;>  Cu>ter  was  disposed  of,  Whar- 
ton's  division  was  moved  back,  and  on  t  helped  a  portion  of  it 
was  run  on  tin-  railroad  to  ('harloitesvilie — M'nnford,  who  had 
now  returned  from  acm-s  the  -Treat  Xorth  Mountain,  hciiiu" 
ordered  to  the  -a me  place.  On  my  arrival  at  Charlottesville 
on  the  2-5rd,  T  found  that  the  enemy's  two  divisions  of  cavalry, 
which  had  crossed  the  iliiu-  Hid  ire  had  been  held  in  chc<-k 
near  <  i'>rdon>ville  hy  Lomax,  until  the  arrival  of  a  hriirade  of 
infantry  from  liichmond,  when  they  retired  precipitately.  I 
returned  to  the  Valley  and  established  my  headquarters  at. 
Staunton — WhartonV  division  and  the  artillery  hein^  en- 
camped ea.-t  of  that  place,  ami  Jio- -  -airy  west,  of  it; 
and  thus  closed  the  operations,  of  .1804  with  inc. 

*  At  the  close  of  the  year  1864,  GrantN  plans  for  the  campaign  in  Virginia  had  hren 

had  merely  attained  a  position  on  Jamc-M  I:i\er.\vhir'i  in-  iniitht  h  d  atth» 

tieginnin;;  of  tin-  .-ampaij;n  without  opposition.  .  n-tuo  armies.  \\  jili  which  the 

•  •.uii|iaign  was  opened,  were  eon<-t-rnf«l.  he  htnl  Mistaint-d  n  il«'f«-:it,  :'inl,  if  the  <  -iiit- 
\teen  between  those  twn  :irnii«-s  :il..in-.  iii-  «.,i'M  h:i\t-  l..-i-:i  .t.--tr^y'l.     Hut.  miti>rtun:tt'-lv. 
lie  liud  the  nn-aiis  of  ivhiK.p-iu;,'  and  n-.-ruitiiij;  hi-^  iirtny  t"  a;i  almost  iinliiniifd  o\tt:nt,  :ui'l 
there  were  no  means  of  ivcriiunirf  lt.-n.Tal   l..-<-'s.     Four  yeftrt  «ii'  MI   itm-Miiiij.led  .-.trugul.- 
had  destroyed  the  finances  of  i  u.i  .•\ii:l!isi.i.,l  tin-  iniiti-riai  "ni 

ofwhicli  an  army  coiiM  i  i  !,••<•  hud  performed  KU  task  aa  a  military  com- 

mand>-r,  1'Hi  tun  lii'Vi-rniiH-iit,  \\:i-  nnaoii--  t..  lurni.-li  him  the   m.-:m-  .if  pr.ip.-riy  continnin:.' 
the  war:  and  In- had  therefore  to  he^in  ti.  nm.-iut  of  his  arm;, 

of  the.  piv\  i.ni-  yar.  while  a  new  draft  and  heavy  ivinfoiv.-nifii's  iVoin  oilur  quarters  had 
furnished  hi*  opponent  with  a  new  army  ami  larj,'«  ly  in.-r-  ••.-.•.!  DOmlMra,     ''.'if  !••.•.  >letail<-ii 

m.-ii  >.-nt  to  (ieneral  I ,  after  the  revocation  of  their  <  i  notninx  t"  tne  ,-,T, 

of  his  anny,  I'Ut  \Mrca  p. ..-hive  injury  toil.     'J'lie  in:.--  of  Hi-'iii  ha.l  il'-~irt-d  to  Keep  out  of 
nrice.  I't-iMiise  they  Jiad  no  stomach  for  ttie  fight,  and  w'"-n  foi-eed  tutu  it.  they  imt 
~.  rv .  ,1  to  ili--,  iniiiate  dissatisfaction  in  the.  ranks  (.;'  the  army.     Some  writers  *  ho  nevr 
•  i  their  nun  preeimi.-  per>ons  to  tiie  bullets  of  the  enemy,  have  written  M>ry  ^lihiy 
al'Oiit  the  desertions  from  th<   arm\.     V.u.  i..nl  r.u-hiil  tli:u  I  -'ioi:ld  ^:.y  oni-  word   in  jtistiti- 
i-jitiiiii  ol'deserrion  under  any  eiri-um.-tan'-es.     I  h,..,l  n.,  toleration  f..i-  it  dm  in-  the  w:.'\  an.i 
never  failed  to  sanction  and  order  the  i-veciaion  of  -'-m-ii".  .ity  f..r 

that  ofi'enrp.  \viien  Miiiinut.-ii  ;••  me  :  hut  some  paliiatioii  wa-  tn  Ke  found  !<•:•  th.'  i-<indii(!'.  ..(' 
many   of  thor-e   who   did    d.-M-rt.   in  the  fact  tiint   they  did  so   to   j;o   lo   tin-   aid    . 
ramiliett,  who  they  knew  were  suffering  for  the  n<  :'  li;'e.  \\hiie  many  ah]e.iioili>  .1 

young  men   remained  nt   lionn>,  in   pea.-e   aiid   plenty,  iimier  e\eiu)>tions  and  d«-tail-.     'I'h.- 
duty  to  defend  one's  country  exists   independently  of  any  law.  and  the.   latUT   is  m 
enforce,  not  create,  tho  obligation.    By  ihe  law,  or  the  miwis"  administration  of  it,  a  man 


OPERATIONS    IN    1865 


On  the  2nd  of  January,  1865, 1  had  a  consultation  with  Gen. 
Lee  at  Richmond,  about  the  difficulties  of  my  position  in  the 
Valley,  and  he  told  me  that  he  had  left  me  there  with  the  small 
command  which  still  remained,  in  order  to  produce  the  impres- 
sion that  the  force  was  much  larger  than  it  really  was,  and  he 
instructed  me  to  do  the  best  I  could. 

Before  I  returned  from  Richmond,  Rosser  started,  with 
between  300  and  400  picked  cavalry,  for  the  post  of  Beverly 
in  Western  Virginia,  and,  on  the  llth,  surprised  and  captured 
the  place,  securing  over  five  hundred  prisoners  and  some  stores. 
This  expedition  was  made  over  a  very  mountainous  country, 
amid  the  snows  of  an  unusually  severe  winter.  Rosser's  loss 
was  very  light,  but  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cook  of  the  8th  Vir- 
ginia cavalry,  a  most  gallant  and  efficient  officer,  lost  his  leg 
in  the  attack,  and  had  to  be  left  behind. 

The  great  drought  during  the  summer  of  1864,  had  made 
the  corn  crop  in  the  Valley  a  very  short  one,  and,  asjSheridan 
had  destroyed  a  considerable  quantity  of  small  grain  and  hay, 
I  found  it  impossible  to  sustain  the  horses  of  my  cavalry  and 

may  be  exempted  from  enforced  service,  but  he  cannot  be  released  from  the  sacred  duty 
of  defending  his  country  against  invasion.  Those  able-bodied  men  who  flocked  abroad  to 
avoid  service,  and  were  so  blatant  in  their  patriotism  when  beyond  the  reach  of  danger,  as  I 
have  had  DC'-ys-ion  to  learn  in  rny  wandering.",  as  \\ell  as  tho.se  who  sought  exemptions  and 
details  under  the  law,  with  a  vi«-w  tu  avukl  the  dangers  and  hardships  of  the  war,  were  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  deserters,  and  morally  more  criminal  than  the  poor  soldier,  who,  in  the 
itgony  of  his  distress  for  the  sufferings  of  hi*  wife  and  little  ones  at  home,  yielded  to  the 
temptation  to  abandon  his  colours.  There  were  some  eases  of  exemptions  and  details, 
where  the  persons  obtaining  them  could  be  more  useful  at  home  than  in  the  field,  and  those 
who  sought  them  honestly  on  that  account  are  not  subject  to  the  above  strictures,  but  there 
were  many  cases  where  the  motives  were  very  different.  The  men  whose  names  form  the 
roll  of  honor  for  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States,  are-those  who  voluntarily  entered  the 
service  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  or  as  soon  as  they  were  able  to  bear  arms,  and  served 
faithfully  to  the  end,  or  until  killed  or  disabled;  and  I  would  advise  the  unmarried  amonx 
my  fair  countrywomen  to  choose  their  husbands  from  among  the  survivors  of  this  class,  and 
not  from  among  the  skulkers.  By  following  this  advice,  they  may  not  obtain  as  much  pelf, 
but  they  may  rest  assured  that  they  will  not  be  the  mothers  of  cowards,  and  their  posterity 
'•v'ill  have  no  cause  to  blush  for  the  conduct  of  their  progenitors. 


122  OPERATIONS  IN  1865. 

artillery  where  they  were,  and  forage  could  not  be  obtained 
from  elsewhere.  I  was  therefore  compelled  to  send  Fitz  Lee's 
two  brigades  to  General  Lee,  and  Lomax's  cavalry  was  brought 
from  across  the  Blue  Ilidge,  where  the  country  was  exhausted 
of  forage,  and  sent  west  into  the  counties  of  Pendleton,  High- 
land, Bath,  Alleghany,  and  Grecnbrier.  where  'hay  could  be 
obtained.  Rosser's  brigade  had  to  be  temporarily  disbanded, 
and  the  men  allowed  to  go  to  their  homes  with  their  horses,  to 
sustain  them,  with  orders  to  report  when  called  on. — One  or 
two  companies,  whose  homes  were  down  the  Valley,  being 
required  to  picket  and  scout  in  front  of  New  Market.  The 
men  and  horses  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  King's  artillery  were 
sent  to  ISouth-Westen)  Virginia  to  be  wintered,  and  nic 
the  horses  of  the  other  battalions  were  sent  oti',  under  care  of 
some  of  the  men,  who  undertook  to  forage  them  until  spring. 
Nelson's  battalion,  with  some  pieces  of  artillery  with  their 
hor>es,  was  retained  with  me,  and  the  remaining  otlicers  ami 
men  of  the  other  battalions  were  sent,  under  the  ejharg 
Colonel  (-arter,  to  General  Lee,  to  man  stationary  batrerie.-  »n 
his  lines.  Brigadier-General  Long,  who  had  been  absent  on 
siek  l"ave  for  some  time  and  "had  returned,  remained  with  me, 
and  most  of  the  guns  which  were  without  horses  were  sent  to 
Lynchburg  by  railroad.  This  wa>u  deplorable  state  ot'  thin--. 
but  it.  could  not  be  avoided,  as  the  horses  of  the  «-avalry  and 
artillery  would  have  perished  had  they  been  kept  in  the  Valley. 
K.-hols'  brigade  of  "VThartoirs  division  was  subsequently  *ent 
to  South-Western  Virginia,  to  report  to  (Jcneral  Kchols  tor 
special  duty,  and  McNeil's  company  of  parri/an  rangers  and 
Woodsoivw  company  of  unattached  Mi-souri  cavalry  were  -em 
to  the  County  of  Hardy — Major  Harry  'iilmor  being  likewi-.- 
ordered  to  that  County,  with  the  remnant  of  his  battalion,  lo 
take,  charge  of  the  whole,  and  operate  against  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  railroad  :  but  he  was  surprised  and  captured  then1, 
at  a  private  house,  soon  after  his  arrival.  Two  very  small  bri- 
gades of  Wharton's  division,  and  Nelson's  battalion  with  the 
few  pieces  of  artillery  which  had  been  retained,  were  left  as 
my  whole  available  force,  and  these  were  in  winter  quarters 
near  Fisherville,  on  the  Central  railroad  between  Staunton  and 


OPERATIONS  IN  1865.  123 

Waynesboro.  The  telegraph  to  jtfew  Market  and  the  signal 
stations  from  there  to  the  lower  Valley  were  kept  up,  and  a  few 
scouts  sent  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  in  this  way  was  my 
front  principally  picketed,  and  I  kept  advised  of  the  enemy's 
movements.  Henceforth  my  efficient  and  energetic  signal  offi- 
cer, Captain  Wilbourn,  was  the  commander  of  my  advance 
picket  line. 

The  winter  was  a  severe  one,  and  all  material  operations 
were  suspended  until  its  close.  Late  in  February,  Lieutenant 
Jesse  McNeil,  who  was  in  command  of  his  father's  old  com- 
pany, with  forty  or  fifty  men  of  that  company  and  Woodson's, 
made  a  dash  into  Cumberland,  Maryland,  at  night,  and  cap- 
tured and  brought  off  Major-Generals  Crook  and  Kelly  with  a 
staff  officer  of  the  latter,  though  there  were  at  the  time  several 
thousand  troops  in  and  around  Cumberland.  The  father  of 
this  gallant  young  officer  had  performed  many  daring  exploits 
during  the  war,  and  had  accompanied  me  into  Maryland,  doing 
good  service.  When  Sheridan  was  at  Harrisonburg,  in  Octo- 
ber, 1864,  Captain  McNeil  had  burned  the  bridge  at  Edinburg 
in  his  rear,  and  had  attacked  and  captured  the  guard  at  the 
bridge  at  Mount  Jackson,  but  in  this  affair  he  received  a  very 
severe  wound  from  which  he  subsequently  died.  Lieutenant 
Baylor  of  Rosser's  brigade,  who  was  in  Jefferson  County  with 
his  company,  made  one  or  two  dashes  on  the  enemy's  outposts 
during  the  winter,  and,  on  one  occasion,  captured  a  train  loaded 
with  supplies,  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad. 

On  the  20th  of  February,  an  order  was  issued  by  General 
Lee,  extending  my  command  over  the  Department  of  South- 
western Virginia  and  East  Tennessee,  previously  commanded 
by  General  Breckcuridge — the  latter  having  been  made  Secre- 
tary of  War. 

On  the  27th,  Sheridan  started  from  Winchester  up  the  Val- 
ley with  a  heavy  force,  consisting,  according  to  the  statement 
of  Grant,  in  his  report,  of  "  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  number- 
ing about  5.000  each."  I  had  been  informed  of  the  prepar- 
ations for  a  movement  of  some  kind,  some  days  previous,  and 
the  information  had  been  telegraphed  to  General  Lee.  AH 


13i  OPERATIONS  IN  1865, 

sooii  as  Sheridan  started,  I  was  informed  of  the  fact  by  signa, 
aud  telegraph,  and  orders  were  immediately  sent  by  telegraph 
to  Lomax,  whose  headquarters  wore  at  Millboro,  on  the  Cen- 
tral railroad,  forty  miles  went  of  Staunton,  to  get  together  all 
of  his  cavalry  as  soon  as  possible.  Rosscr  was  also  directed  to 
collect  all  of  his  men  that  he  could,  and  an  order  \vas  sent  by 
telegraph  to  General  Echols,  in  South- Western  Virginia,  to 
send  his  brigade  by  rail  to  Lynchburg.  My  own  headquarters 
were  at  Staunton,  but  there  were  no  troops  at  that  place  except 
a  local  provost  guard,  aud  a  company  of  reserves,  composed 
of  boys  under  18  years  of  ago,  which  was  acting  under  orders 
of  the  Conscript  Bureau.  Orders  were  therefore  given  for  the 
immediate  removal  of  all  stores  from  that  place.  Rosser  suc- 
ceeded in  collecting  a  little  over  100  men,  and  with  these  he 
attempted  to  check  the  enemy  ;it  Xorth  River,  near  Mount 
Crawford,  on  the  1st  of  March,  but  was  unable  to  do  so. 
On  the  afternoon  of  that  day,  the  enemy  approached  to  within 
three  or  four  miles  of  Staunton,  and  [  then  telegraphed  to 
Lomax  to  concentrate  his  cavalry  at  Pond  Gap,  in  Augusta 
County,  southwest  of  Stauuton,  and  to  follow  and  annoy  the 
enemy  should  he  move  towards  Lynchburg,  and  rode  out  of 
town  towards  Waynesboro,  after  all  the  stores  hnd  IK  t-n 
removed. 

Whartou  and  Nelson  were  ordered  to  move  to  Waynesbor^ 
by  light  next  morning,  and  on  that  morning  the  (2nd)  their 
commands  wore  put  in  position  on  a  ridge  covering  Waynes- 
boro on  the  west  aud  just  outside  of  the  town.  My  object,  in 
taking  this  position  was  to  secure  the  removal  of  five  pieces 
of  artillery  for  which  there  were  no  horses,  and  SOUK-  >,tores 
still  in  Waynesboro,  as  well  as  to  presi-nt  a  bold  front  to  the 
enemy,  and  ascertain  the  object  of  his  movement,  which  I 
could  not  do  very  well  if  I  took  refuge  at  once  in  the  moun- 
tain. The  last  report  for  TV  barton's  command  showed  1,200 
men  for  duty;  but,  as  it  was  exceedingly  inclement,  and  rain- 
ing and  freezing,  there  were  not  more  than  1,000  muskets  on 
the  line,  and  Nelson  had  six  pieces  of  artillery.  I  did  not 
intend  making  my  final  stand  on  this  ground,  yet  I  was  satis- 
tied  that  if  my^meu  would  fight,  which  I  hud  DO  reason  to 


OPERATIONS  IN  1R66.  125 

doubt,  I  could  hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  night,  and  then 
cross  the  river  and  take  position  in  Rock  fish  Gap;  for  I  had 
done  more  difficult  things  than  that  during  the  war.  About 
12  o'clock  in  the  day,  it  was  reported  to  rue  that  the  enemy 
was  advancing,  and  I  rode  out  at  once  on  the  lines,  and  soon 
discovered  about  a  brigade  of  cavalry  coming  up,  on  the  road 
from  Stauntou,  on  which  the  artillery  opened,  when  it  retired 
out  of  range.  The  enemy  manoeuvred  for  some  time  in  our 
front  keeping  out  of  reach  of  our  guns  until  late  in  the  after- 
noon, when  I  discovered  a  force  moving  to  our  left.  I  imme- 
diately sent  a  messenger  with  notice  of  this  fact  to  General 
Wharton,  who  was  on  that  flank,  and  with  orders  .for  him  to 
look  out  and  provide  for  the  enemy's  advance;  and  another 
messenger,  with  notice  to  the  guns  oil  the  left,  and  directions 
for  them  to  fire  towards  the  advancing  force,  which  could  not 
be  seen  from  where  they  were.  The  enemy  soon  made  an 
attack  on  our  left  Hank,  and  I  discovered  the  men  on  that  flank 
giving  back.  Just  then,  General  Wharton,  who  had  not 
received  my  message,  rode  up  to  me  and  I  pointed  out  to  him 
the  disorder  in  his  line,  and  ordered  him  to  ride  immediately 
to  that  point  and  rectify  it.  Before  he  got  back,  the  troops 
gave  way  on  the  left,  after  making  very  slight  resistance,  and 
soon  everything  was  in  a  state  of  confusion  and  the  men  com- 
menced crossing  the  river.  I  rode  across  it  myself  to  try  and 
stop  them  at  the  bridge  and  check  the  enemy,  but  they  could 
not  be  rallied,  and  the  enemy  forded  the  river  above  and  got 
in  our  rear.  I  now  saw  that  everything  was  lost,  and,  after 
the  enemy  had  got  between  the  mountain  and  the  position 
where  I  was,  and  retreat  was  thus  cut  off,  I  rode  aside  into  the 
woods,  and  in  that  way  escaped  capture.  I  went  to  the  top  of 
a  hill  to  reconnoitre,  and  had  the  mortification  of  seeing  the 
greater  part  of  my  command  being  carried  off  as  prisoners, 
and  a  force  of  the  enemy  moving  rapidly  towards  Itockfish 
Gap.  I  then  rode  with  the  greater  part  of  my  staff  and  15  or 
20  others,  including  General  Long,  across  the  mountain,  north 
of  the  Gap,  with  the  hope  of  arriving  at  Greenwood  depot,  to 
which  the  stores  had  been  removed,  before  the  enemy  reached 
that  place ;  but,  on  getting  near  it,  about 'dark,  we  discovered 


120  OPERATIONS  IN  1865. 

the  enemy  in  possession.  We  then  rode  to  Jarman's  Gap, 
about  three  miles  from  the  depot,  and  remained  there  all  night, 
as  the  night  was  exceedingly  dark,  and  the  ice  rendered  it 
impossible  for  us  to  travel  over  the  rugged  roads. 

The  only  solution  of  this  affair  which  I  can  give,  is  that 
my  men  did  not  fight  as  I  had  expected  them  to  do.  Had 
they  done  so,  I  am  satisfied  that  the  enemy  could  have  been 
repulsed  ;  and  I  was  and  still  am  of  opinion  that  the  attack  at 
\Vaynesboro  was  a  mere  demonstration  to  cover  a  movement 
to  the  south  towards  Lynchburg.  Yet  some  excuse  is  to  bo 
made  for  my  men,  an  they  knew  that  they  were  weak  and  the 
enemy  very  strong. 

The  greater  part  of  my  command  was  captured,  as  was  also 
the  artillery,  which,  with  live  guns  on  the  cars  at  Greenwood, 
made  eleven  pieces.  Very  few  were  killed  or  wounded  on 
either  side.  The  only  person  killed  on  our  side  that  I  have 
ever  heard  of  was  Colonel  William  II.  Harmon,  who  had  for- 
merly been  in  the  army,  but  then  held  a  civil  appointment ; 
and  he  was  shot  in  the  streets  of  Waynesboro,  either  after  he 
had  been  made  prisoner,  as  some  said,  or  while  he  wa* 
attempting  to  make  his  escape  after  everything  was  over.  M\ 
aide,  Lieutenant  William  G.  Galloway,  who  had  been  sent  to 
the  left  with  one  of  the  messages,  and  my  medical  director, 
Surgeon  II.  McGuire,  had  the  misfortune  to  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  All  the  waggons  of  Wharton's  command 
were  absent  getting  supplies  ;  but  those  we  had  with  us,  inclu- 
ding the  ordnance  and  medical  waggons,  and  my  own  baggage 
waggon,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.* 

*  Grant,  in  speaking  of  this  affair,  says:  "He  (Sheridan)  entered  Staunton  on  the  2nd,  thu 
*>nemy  having  retreated  on  Waynesboro.  Thence  he  pushed  on  to  Wnynesboro,  where  h« 
found  the  enemy  in  force  in  an  intrenched  position,  under  General  Karly.  Without  sto]>- 
ping  to  make  a  reconnoissance,  nn  immediate  nttack  was  made,  the  position  was  carried, 
and  1.000  prisoners,  II  pieces  ot  artillery,  with  horses  and  raNsons  complete,  200  wapgons 
and  teams  loaded  with  subsistence,  and  17  battle-Hatts  were  captured."  This  is  all  very 
brilliant ;  but,  unfortunately  for  its  truth,  Sheridan  was  not  at  Waynesboro,  but  was  ., 
ton,  where  he  had  stopped  with  a  part  of  his  force;  while  the  affair  at  Waynesboro  was  con- 
duetcd  by  one  of  his  subordinates.  The  strength  of  my  force  has  already  bet-n  stated,  and 
it  was  not  in  an  intrenched  position.  I  am  not  aM-  t»  say  how  many  prisoners  were  taken, 
t'Ut  I  know  that  they  were  more  than  my  command  numbered,  as  a  very  considerable  num- 
ber of  recently  exchanged  and  paroled  prisoners  were  at  the  time  in  the  Valley,  on  leave  of 
absence  from  General  Lee's  army.  I  not  only  did  not  have  2X)  waggons  or  anything  like  it, 
hut  had  no  use  for  them.  Where  tho  17  battle-Mags  could  liavo  been  gotten,  1  canuot 
Imagine. 


OPERATIONS  IN  1865.  127 

On  the  3rd,  I  rode,  with  the  party  that  was  with  me,  towards 
Charlottesville ;  but,  on  getting  near  that  place,  we  found  the 
enemy  entering  it.  We  had  then  to  turn  back  and  go  by  a 
circuitous  route  under  the  mountains  to  Gordonsville,  as  the 
Rivanna  River  and  other  streams  were  very  much  swollen. 
On  arriving  at  Gordonsville  I  found  General  Wharton,  who 
had  made  his  escape  to  Charlottesvillc  on  the  night  of  the  af- 
fair at  Waynesboro,  and  he  was  ordered  to  Lynchburg,  by  the 
way  of  the  Central  and  Southside  Railroads,  to  take  command 
of  Echols'  brigade,  and  aid  in  the  defence  of  the  city.  General 
Long  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  Lee  at  Petersburg. 

The  affair  at  Waynesboro  diverted  Sheridan  from  Lyuch- 
burg,  which  he  could  have  captured  without  difficulty,  had  he 
followed  Hunter's  route,  and  not  jumped  at  the  bait  unwilling- 
ly offered  him,  by  the  capture  of  my  force  at  the  former  place. 
His  deflection  from  the  direct  route  to  the  one  by  Charlottes- 
ville, was  without  adequate  object,  and  resulted  in  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  effort  to  capture  Lynchburg,  or  to  cross  the  James 
River  to  the  south  side.  He  halted  at  Charlottesville  for  two 
or  three  days,  and  then  moved  towards  James  River  below 
Lynchburg,  when,  being  unable  to  cross  that  river,  he  crossed 
over  the  Rivanna  at  its  mouth,  and  then  moved  by  the  way  of 
Frederick's  Hall  on  the  Central  Railroad,  and  Ashland  on  the 
R.  F.  &  P.  Railroad,  across  the  South  and  Xorth  Annas,  and 
down  the  Parnunkey  to  the  White  House. 

At  Gordonsville  about  200  cavalry  were  collected  under 
Colonel  Morgan,  of  the  1st  Virginia  Cavalry,  and,  with  this 
force,  I  watched  the  enemy  for  several  days  while  he  was  at 
Charlottesville,  and  when  he  was  endeavoring  to  cross  the 
.James  River.  When  Sheridan  had  abandoned  this  effort,  and 
on  the  day  he  reached  the  vicinity  of  Ashland,  while  I  was 
riding  on  the  Louisa  Court  House  and  Richmond  road, 
towards  the  bridge  over  the  South  Anna,  with  abont  20  cav- 
alry, I  came  very  near  being  captured  by  a  body  of  300  cav- 
alry sent  after  me,  but  I  succeeded  in  eluding  the  enemy  with 
most  of  those  who  were  with  rne,  and  reached  Richmond  at 
two  o'clock  next  morning,  after  passing  twice  between  the 


128  OPERATIONS  IN 

enemy's  camps  and  his  pickets.  My  Adjutant  General,  Cap- 
tain Moore,  however,  was  captured,  but  made  his  escape. 

Lomax  had  succeeded  in  collecting  a  portion  of  his  cavalry 
and  reaching  Lynchburg,  where  he  took  position  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  river,  but  the  enemy  avoided  that  place.  Rosser 
had  collected  a  part  of  hi*  brigade  and  made  an  attack,  near 
New-Market,  on  the  guard  which  was  carrying  back  the  pris- 
oners captured  at  Waync.sboro,  with  the  view  of  releasing  them, 
but  he  did  not  succeed  in  that  object,  though  he  captured  a  piece 
of  artillery:  the  guard  was  compelled  to  retire  in  great  haste. 
He  then  moved  towards  Richmond  on  Sheridan's  track. 

After  consultation  with  General  Lee,  at  his  headquarters 
ccar  Petersburg,  Rosser's  and  McCausland's  brigades  were 
ordered  to  report  to  him  under  the  command  of  General  Ros- 
ser, and  I  started  for  the  Valley,  by  the  way  of  Lynchburg,  to 
reorguni/e  what  was  left  of  my  command.  At  Lynchburg  a 
dispatch  was  received  from  General  Kchols,  stating  that 
Thomas  was  moving  in  East  Tenn< -x -c,  ami  threatening  South- 
western Virginia  with  a  heavy  force,  and  1  immediately  went 
on  the  cars  to  Wytheville.  From  that  place  I  went  with  Gen- 
eral Kchols  to  Bristol,  on  the  state  line  between  Virginia  and 
Tennessee,  and  it  was  ascertained  beyond  doubt  that  some 
important  movement  by  the  enemy  \vas  on  foot.  We  then 
returned  to  Abingdon,  sind  while  I  was  engaged  in  endeavor- 
ing to  organize  the  small  force  in  that  section,  so  as  to  meet 
the  enemy  in  the  best  way  we  could,  I  received,  on  the  30th  of 
March,  a  telegraphic;  dispatch  from  General  Lee,  directing  un- 
to turn  over  the  command  in  Southwestern  Virginia  to  Gene- 
ral Kchols,  and  in  the  Valley  to  General  Lomax,  and  inform- 
ing me  that  he  would  address  a  letter  to  me  at  my  home.  J 
complied  at  once  with  this  order,  and  thus  teninnau-il  my  mil- 
itary career. 


CONCLUSION. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  30th  of  March,  after"  having  turned 
over  the  command  to  General  Echols,  I  rode  to  Marion  in 
Hmythe  county,  and  was  taken  that  night  with  a  cold  and 
eoughjso'jViolent  as  to  produce  hemorrhage  from  tho  lungs, 
and  prostrate  me  for  several  days  in  a  very  dangerous  condi- 
tion. While  I  was  in  this  situation,  a  heavy  cavalry  force 
under  Stonernan,  from  Thomas'  army  in  Tennessee,  moved 
through  North  Carolina  to  the  east,  and  a  part  of  it  came  into 
Virginia  from  the  main  column,  and  struck  the  Virginia  and 
Tennessee  Railroad  at  New  River,  east  of  Wytheville ;  whence, 
after  destroying  the  bridge,  it  moved  east,  cutting  off  all  com- 
munication with  Richmond,  and  then  crossed  over  into  North 
Carolina.  As  soon  as  I  was  in  a  condition  to  be  moved,  I  was 
carried  on  the  railroad  to  Wytheville,  and  was  proceeding 
thence  to  my  home,  in  an  ambulance  under  the  charge  of  a 
Burgeon,  when  I  received,  most  unexpectedly,  the  news  of  the 
surrender  of  General  Lee's  arrmr.  Without  the  slightest  feel- 
ing  of  irreverence,  I  will  say,  that  the  sound  of  the  last  trump 
would  not  have  been  more  unwelcome  to  my  ears. 

Under  the  disheartening  influence  of  the  sad  news  I  had 
received,  I  proceeded  to  my  home,  and  I  subsequently 
received  a  letter  from  General  Lee,  dated  on  the  30th  of 
March,  explaining  the  reasons  for  relieving  me  from  command. 
As  a  copy  of  that  letter  has  been  published  in  Virginia,  with- 
out any  knowledge  or  agency  on  niy  part,  it  is  appended  to 
this  narrative.  The  letter  itself,  which  was  written  on  the 
very  day  of  the  commencement  of  the  attack  on  General  Lee's 
lines  which  resulted  in  the  evacuation  of  Richmond,  and  just 
ten  days  before  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, has  a  historical  interest;  for  it  shows  that  our  great 
commander,  even  at  that  late  day,  was  anxiously  and  earnest- 
ly contemplating  the  continuation  of  the  struggle  with  unaba- 
ted vigor,  and  a  full  determination  to  make  available  everr 
•iemout  of 
1 


130  CONCLUSION. 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Cedar  Creek,  I  had  -written 
a  letter  to  General  Lee,  stating  my  willingness  to  be  relieved 
from  command,  if  he  deemed  it  necessary  for  the  public  inter- 
and  I  should  have  been  content  with  the  course  pursued 
towards  me,  had  his  letter  not  contained  the  expressions  of 
personal  confidence  in  me  which  it  does;  for  I  knew  that,  in 
^vorything  he  did  as  commander  of  our  armies,  General  Lee 
was  actuated  solely  by  an  earnest  and  ardent  desire  for  the 
success  of  the  cause  of  his  country.  As  to  those  among  my 
countrymen  who  judged  me  harshly,  I  have  not  a  word  of 
reproach.  When  there  wa^  -o  much  at  stake,  it  was  not  un- 
natural that  persons  entirely  ignorant  of  the  facto,  and  forming 
their  opinions  from  the  many  false  reports  >et  afloat  in  a  time 
of  terrible  war  and  public  suti'oring,  should  pass  erroneous  and 
severe  judgments  on  those  commanders  who  met  with 
reverses. 

I  was  not  embraced  in  the  terms  of  General  Lcc'>  surrender 
•  •r  that  of  General  .Johnston,  and,  as  the  order  relieving  me- 
from  command  had  also  relieved  me  from  all  embarraMmeDt 
as  to  the  troops  which  had  been  under  me,  as  soon  as  I  was  in 
a  condition  to  travel,  1  started  on  horseback  to  the  Trans-Mi- 
sissippi  Department,  to  join  the  army  of  General  Kirby  Smith, 
>hould  it  hold  out :  with  the  hope  of  at  least  meeting  an  hon- 
orable death  while  lighting  under  the  flag  of  my  country. 
Hefore  I  reached  that  Department,  Smith's  army  had  also  been 
surrendered,  and,  without  giving  a  parole  or  incurring  any 
obligation  whatever  to  the,  L'nited  States  authorities,  after  a 
long,  wi-ary  and  dangerous  ride  from  Virginia,  through  tl in- 
states of  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama, 
Mississippi,  Arkansas  and  Texas,  I  tinally  succeeded  in  leaving 
the  country;  a  voluntary  exile  rather  than  submit  to  the  rule 
of  our  enemies.  .1.  A.  EARLY. 


APPENDIX 


LETTER  FROM  GENERAL  LEE. 

"HD.-QRS.,  C.  S.  AKMIKS, 

"SOth  March,  1865. 
" LT.-GENKRAL  J.  A.  EARLY,  franklin  Co.,  Va. 

"GENERAL, — My  telegram  will  have  informed  you  that  I  deem  a  change  oi 
Commanders  in  your  Department  necessary ;  but  it  is  due  to  your  zealous  and 
patriotic  services  that  I  should  explain  the  reasons  that  prompted  my  action.  The 
situation  of  affairs  is  such  that  we  can  neglect  no  means  calculated  to  develop  the 
resources  we  possess  to  the  greatest  extent,  and  make  them  as  efficient  as  possible. 
To  this  end,  it  is  essential  that  we  should  have  the  cheerful  and  hearty  support  of 
the  people,  and  the  full  confidence  of  the  soldiers,  without  which  our  efforts  would 
be  embarrassed  and  our  means  of  resistance  weakened.  I  have  reluctantly  arrived 
At  the  conclusion  that  you  cannot  command  the  united  and  willing  co-operatiou 
which  is  so  essential  to  success.  Your  reverses  in  the  Valley,  of  which  the  public 
and  the  army  judge  chiefly  by  the  results,  have,  I  fear,  impaired  your  influence 
both  with  the  people  and  the  soldiers,  and  would  add  greatly  to  the  difficulties 
wh'ch  will,  under  any  circumstances,  attend  our  military  operations  in  .S.  W.  Vir- 
ginia. While  my  own  confidence  in  your  ability,  zeal,  and  devotion  to  the  causa 
is  unimpaired,  I  have  nevertheless  felt  that  I  could  not  oppose  what  seems  to  be 
the  current  of  opinion,  without  injustice  to  your  reputation  and  injury  to  the  ser- 
vice. I  therefore  felt  constrained  to  endeavor  to  find  a  commander  who  would  bn 
more  likely  to  develop  the  strength  and  resources  of  the  country,  and  inspire  the 
soldiers  with  confidence;  and,  to  accomplish  this  purpose,  I  thought  it  proper  to 
yield  my  own  opinion,  and  to  defer  to  that  of  those  to  whom  alone  we  can  look 
for  support. 

I  am  sure  that  you  will  understand  and  appreciate  my  motives,  and  no  one  will 
be  more  ready  than  yourself  to  acquiesce  in  any  measures  which  the  interests  of 
the  country  may  seem  to  require,  regardless  of  all  personal  considerations. 

Thanking  you  for  the  fidelity  and  energy  with  which  you  have  always  supported! 
ray  efforts,  and  for  the  courage  and  devotion  you  havo  ever  manifested  in  the  ser- 
vice of  the  country, 

I  am,  very  respectfully  and  truly, 

Your  ob't  serv't, 

R.  E.  LEE,  Gen'l ." 


Since  the  foregoing  narrative  was  written,  I  have  seen,  in  a  newspaper  pui< 
lished  in  the  United  States,  the  following  communication :— 


ISi  AITENDTX. 

11  Ilc.-Qns.,  BATTALION  U.  8.  IXVANIHY, 

"Camp- near  Lynchburg,  Va., 

"  Feb.  7,  1866. 
"C.   W.  Bcnos,  Esq..  Kditf'T  Lyn^iburij   Virginian. 

"  fclR, — I  have  received  a  communication  from  the  War  D-K-.rtnient,  Adjutant- 
i^neral's  Office,  relative  to  a  newspaper  slip,  containing  a  copy  of  General  Lee'« 
letter  to  General  Karly,  on  removing  him  from  command.  The  letter  is  dated 
Headquarters  C.  S.  Armit-s,  Msirch  '.V>,  addressed  to  Lieut. -Gen.  Early.  Franklin 
'.'.  II.,  Virginia,  and  i<=  said  to  !><>  in  your  possession,  it  having  appeared  in  your 
paper.  The  Secretary  of  War  consider*  that  the  original  Wter  properly  belong* 
to  the  Archive  office. 

"I  am  directed  by  Major-General  Terry,  commanding  this  Department,  to  pro- 
cure said  letter,  and  I  then-fore  rail  your  attention  to  tlm  matter,  and  request  that 
you  deliver  to  m*  the  original  letter  in  your  possession,  in  compliance  with  my 
ias  tractions. 

I  am.  vi-ry  r^si-ccf fully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  E.  LATIMER, 

Brevet  Major  and  Captain  llth  U.  S.  Infantry, 
Commanding  Post." 

I  hi*  demand  for  General  Lee's  private  letter  to  me,  and  the  attempt  to  enforce 
it  by  military  power,  show  how  wide  has  bf--n  the  departure  from  the  original 
principles  of  the  Uni:-  .overnment,  and  to  what  petty  and  contemptible 

measures  that  Government,  as  at  present  administered,  resorts  in  domineering 
over  a  disarmed  and  hc-1]  .  I  have  the  pleasure  of  informing  the 

Hon.  .Secretary  of  War,  and  the  keeper  of  rh»-  "Archive  Office,"  that  the  original 
letter  is  in  my  possession,  beyond  the  reach  of  provost  marshals  and  agents  of  thu 
Freedmen's  Bureau,  or  even  Holt  with  his  Bureau  of  Military  Justice  and  hi* 
suborners  of  perjury. 


B, 

STATISTICS    SHOWING    THE    RELATIVE   STRENGTH    OF    THE   TWO 
SECTIONS  DURING  THE  WAR. 

The  census  of  the  United  States  for  1860  showt-d  an  aggregate  free  population 
of  27,185,109 ;  of  this,  488,285  were  free  blacks,  of  which  the  larger  proportion 
were  in  the  Southern  States ;  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  consider  that  element  in 
this  estimate,  though  to  do  KO  would  make  it  more  favorable  for  the  Confederato 
States.  Of  the  above  27,185,109  of  freo  population,  there  were  in  the  States  form- 
ing the  Southern  Confederacy,  as  follows  : 

Alabama 520,  IGt 

Arkansas 321,323 

Florida 78,686 

Oeorghi 695,097 

Kentucky.. 930,223 

Louisiana....i 370,913 

, „ 3.54, 690 


APPENDIX.  133 

Missouri „ 1,058,352 

North  Carolina 661,586 

South  Carolina 301,271 

Tennessee 831,063 

Texas 420,651 

Virginia 1,105,196 

Aggregate 7,570,221 

Kentucky  undertook  to  assume  a  neutral  position,  but  she  was  soon  overrun  by 
Federal  troops,  and  her  government  and  a  very  large  proportion  of  her  popula- 
tion took  sides  with  the  North.  Those  of  her  citizens  who  were  not  awed  by  Fed- 
eral bayonets,  formed  a  State  government  and  joined  the  Confederacy — many  of 
her  young  men  going  into  the  Confederate  army  ;  but,  in  fact,  whatever  may 
have  been  the  sympathies  of  the  people,  her  moral  influence  as  well  as  the  benefit 
of  her  physical  strength  were  given  to  the  Federal  Government.  The  legitimate 
iJovernment  of  Missouri  sided  with  the  South,  as  very  probably  did  the  majority 
of  her  people,  but  she  was  also  overrun  at  a  very  early  stage  of  the  war  by  Fede- 
eral  troops,  and  her  legitimate  Government  subverted  by  force ;  and  the  benefit  of 
her  resources  and  physical  strength  was  likewise  given  to  the  United  States,  not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  her  men  joined  the  Confederate 
army.  Perhaps  the  number  of  men  added  to  the  strength  of  the  Confederate  army 
from  Kentucky  and  Missouri  did  not  exceed  the  accession  to  the  Federal  army 
from  Western  Virginia,  Eastern  Tennessee,  and  some  other  of  the  Southern  States, 
and  that,  in  estimating  the  relative  strength  of  the  two  parties  at  the  beginning, 
it  would  be  proper  to  reject  Kentucky  and  Missouri  from  the  estimate  of  the  Con- 
federate strength.  The  free  population  of  these  two  States  amounted  to  1,988,575, 
and  without  them  there  would  be  left  on  the  Confederate  side  a  free  population  of 
5,581,649  against  a  similar  population  of  21,603,460  on  the  Federal  side,  which 
would  make  the  odds  against  us  very  nearly  four  to  one.  But  I  will  divide  the 
population  of  these  States  equally  between  the  parties,  and  this  will  give  a  free 
population  of  6,575,937  Confederates,  against  a  similar  population  of  20,609,172 
Federals,  which  makes  the  odds  more  than  three  to  one  against  us  in  the  begin- 
ning, without  considering  the  fact  that  the  Northern  people  had  possession  of  the 
Government,  with  the  army  and  navy  and  all  the  resources  of  that  Government, 
while  the  Confederate  States  had  to  organize  a  new  government,  and  provide  an 
army  and  the  means  of  supplying  it  with  arms  as  well  as  everything  else.  Not- 
withstanding this  immense  odds  against  us,  I  presume  there  is  scarcely  a  Confed- 
erate, even  now,  who  does  not  feel  confident  that  if  it  had  been  "hands  off  and  a 
fair  fight,"  we  would  have  prevailed  ;  but  an  immense  horde  of  foreign  mercena- 
ries, incited  by  high  bounties  and  the  hope  of  plunder  held  out  to  them,  flocked  to 
the  Federal  army;  and  thus  was  its  size  continually  growing,  while  the  Confede- 
rate army  had  to  .rely  on  the  original  population  to  keep  up  its  strength.  Any 
accession  of  troops  from  Maryland  was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  those 
obtained  from  Western  Virginia  by  tho  Federals,  without  counting  East  Tennes- 
see or  other  quarters.  The  Federal  Government  was  not  satisfied  with  recruiting 
its  army  from  abroad,  but,  as  the  country  was  overrnn,  the  southern  negroes  were 
forced  into  its  service,  and  thus,  by  the  aid  of  its  foreign  mercenaries  and  the 
negro  recruits,  it  was  enabled  finally  to  exhaust  the  Confederate  army. 

To  show  the  immense  strength  of  tho  Federal  army,  the  following  extracts  aro 


134  APPENDIX. 

taken  from  the  report  of  the  Federal  Secretary  of  War,  Stanton,  which  vraa  sent 
to  the  Congress  at  its  session  beginning  on  the  first  Monday  in  December,  1865. 
In  that  report  he  says  : 

"Official  reports  show  that  on  the  1st  of  May,  1864,  the  aggregate  national  mil- 
itary force  of  all  arms,  officers  and  men,  was  nine  hundred  and  seventy  thousand 
seven  hundred  and  ten,  to-wit : 

Available  force  present  for  duty f><!2,:Ui 

On  detached  service  in  tin-  uitt'.Tf-nt  military  departments 109,348 

In  field  hospitals  or  unfit  for  duty 41,206 

In  general  hospitals  or  on  sick  leave  at  hoiin- 7."',  07s 

Absent  on  furlough  or  -..                  . -.  of  war 66,  U90 

Absent  without  leave 13, 4&; 

'  ini'id  aggregate 970, 710 

"  The  aggregate  available  force  present  for  duty  Mnv  1st.  18G4,  was  distributed 
in  the  different  commands  as  follows : — 

Department  of  Washington 42,  r.M 

Army  of  the  Potomac 1. 

Department  of  Virginia  and  North  raiolin* 

Department  of  the  South i- 

Department  of  the  Gulf Bl.  8fi(> 

Department  of  Arkansas 1 

Department  of  the  Tennessee 71, 174 

Department  of  the  Missouri i:>,  77" 

Department  of  the  North-West 

I  >e;p:iriini-m  of  K.insa- 4,708 

Head-quarters  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi 47C 

Department  of  the  Cumberland 119,948 

Department  of  the  Ohio £j.  41U 

Northern  Department :• 

Department  of  West  Virginia UO,  7*J 

Department  of  the  Kast 2,828 

1  '••purtment  of  the  Susquehanun 2,970 

.Middle  Department. 5,027 

Ninth  Army  Corp^ 20,780 

Department  of  New  Mexico a,  45-1 

Department  of  the  Pacific 5, 141 

Total 6G2,:j4:." 

And  again : — 

"Official  reports  show  that  on  the  1st  of  March,  1865,  the  aggregate  military 
force  of  all  arms,  officers  and  men,  was  nine  hundred  and  sixty-five  thousand  five 
hundred  and  ninety-one,  to-wit: — 

Available  force  present  for  duty C02, 008 

On  detached  service  in  the  different  military  departments 132,  538 

Infield  hospitals  and  unfit  for  duty 35,628 

In  general  hospitals  or  on  sick  leave 143,419 

Absent  on  furlough  or  as  prisoners  of  war 01,095 

at  without  leave 19,683 

Grand  aggregate 905,591 

"This  force  was  augmented  on  the  1st  of  May,  1865,  by  enlistments,  to  the 
number  of  one  million  five  hundred  and  sixteen,  of  all  arms,  officers  and  men, 
(1,000,516)." 


APPENDIX.  185 

And  again  ha  says: — 

"The  aggregate  quotas  charged  against  the  sereni!  States  under  all 
callB  made  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  from  the  15th 
day  of  April,  1861,  to  the  14th  day  of  April,  18G5,  at  which  time  draft- 
ing and  recruiting  ceased,  was 2.  7->i>,  u-l'J 

"  The  aggregate  number  of  men  credited  on  the  several  calls,  and  put 
into  service  of  the  United  States,  in  the  army,  navy,  and  marine 
corps,  during  the  above  period,  was 2,656,5.03 

"Leaving  a  deficiency  on  all  calls,  when  the  war  closed,  of. 102,596" 

This  does  not  include  that  portion  of  the  Federal  forces  consisting  of  the  regular 
army,  and  the  negro  troops  raised  in  thb  Southern  States ;  which  were  not  raised 
by  calls  on  the  States.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  state  the  number  of  troops 
called  into  the  service  of  the  Confederate  Government  during  the  war,  as  all  its 
records  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  United  States  authorities,  or  were  destroyed,  but 
I  think  I  can  safely  assert  that  the  "  available  force  present  for  duty  "  in  the  Fede- 
ral army,  at  the  beginning  or  close  of  the  last  year  of  the  war,  exceeded  the  entire 
force  called  into  the  Confederate  service  during  the  whole  war;  and  when  it  is  con- 
sidered that  the  troops  called  into  the  United  States  service  during  that  time,  num- 
bered more  than  one-third  of  the  entire  free  population  of  the  Confederate  States, 
men,  women,  and  children,  the  world  can  appreciate  the  profound  ability  of  the 
leaders,  and  the  great  heroism  of  the  soldiers,  of  that  army  which  Jinally  over- 
came the  Confederate  army,  by  the  "mere  attrition"  of  numbers,  after  a  prolonged 
struggle  of  four  years.  They  can  be  excelled  only  by  the  i/ifif/n(/.,nmit>/  of  the 
conquerors. 


c  o  x  T  i:  \  T  s . 


I\  VIU«;iMA   FllOM   THK  TiAPIIUN*   TO  JAMES    UIVEK. 

Pnge. 

Introduction K> 

Battles  of  the  Wilder::                                     ..irly's  Division 1<> 

Battles  of  Spotsylvania  Court  Hmi<i — Operations  of  Hill's  ('.'•  <:•:..•: -2- 

Hanover  Junction — Operations  of  Early's  Division 'J^ 

Battles  of  Cold  Harbour — <  '                  *.<i  Ewell'n  C"i]>i 20 

••AMI'AI'IN   IX  MA1LYLANI)  AM>  TMK  VALLKV  OF  V1HUIX1A. 

Introduction 

March  to  Lynchburg  and  Pursuit  of  Hunter •}" 

March  down  the  Valley  and  Operations  in  •                                   i  Maryland..  -Is 

Uattlo  of  Monocacy 

Operations  in  front  of  Washington  and  recrossing  the  }'otoin;i«: •'•'» 

Kfturn  to  the  Valley  and  Operations  there (>^ 

Battle  of  Kernstown 

Expedition  into  Maryland  and  1'onnsylvania — Burning  of  Chambersburg 66 

!:«-ir'':it  i-j  Fi-'uer's  Hill  and  subsequent  Operations  until  the  Battle  of  Win- 
chester   71 

.of  Winchester 84 

Affair  at  Fisher's  Hill HL' 

Retreat  up  the  Valley  and  Operations  until  the  Battle  of  Cedar  Creek !>o 

Battle  of  Cedar  Creek  or  Belle  Grove !•;> 

Clone  of  tho  Valley  Campaign 114 

Operations  in  18«>j 1:!: 

Conclusion llli' 

AJTENDIX. 

A.  Letter  irom  General  Lee l.".l 

B.  Statistics  showing  the  relative  strength  of  the  two  Sections  during  the  War..  13." 


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